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ABSTRACT
John Rawls developed the most compelling normative account of liberal
constitutional democracy of the 20th century. Today, however, prominent political
theorists such as Jeremy Waldron and Ian Shapiro are calling for post-Rawlsian, “power
friendly” approaches to democratic theory. Power friendly approaches surrender a
significant historical strain of liberal democratic thought, often associated with Rawls—
the hope for a politics of shared reason. Such “rationalist expectations” must be
abandoned, says Shapiro. Power friendly theorists hold that disagreements over justice,
and other issues, are so deep that political philosophers cannot say what justice requires
even under ideal conditions. Democratic citizens can only constitute themselves as a
democratic body politic through real time political processes. But this means that, for
nearly every constitutional and legislative issue, the will of some citizens will govern all.
There is no hope for a politics of shared reason; what we have is a struggle between
reasons, where one side wins and the other side loses. Power friendly theorists seek to
legitimate this unavoidable exercise of force by describing pragmatic, prudential or
normative reasons for accepting such democratic outcomes as authoritative. Democratic
institutions that produce a stable modus vivendi, in which the spiritual and material needs
of citizens are at least minimally satisfied, should be regarded as authoritative on those
(or similar) grounds. For instance, Shapiro argues that democracy deserves our
allegiance because it is the best available way of “managing power relations among
people who disagree about the nature of the common good,” but who must nevertheless
live together. Of course, the loser is never happy about losing these struggles, but she has
sound reason to accept the outcomes anyway, and she lives to fight another day.
Power friendly theorists have a point. But what they do not realize is that Rawls
conceded this point around 1980, and then proposed his own power friendly account of
democratic law and political authority. Rawls’s account centers on his liberal principle of
legitimacy. What is significant about his approach is its faithfulness to the spirit, if not
the fact, of the liberal ideal of shared reason. That is, while Rawls is not the shared
reason rationalist that many accuse him of being, he does not surrender as much of the
liberal project as the power friendly theorists do. Rawls’s view represents a third option,
which sits between the rationalist and the power friendly poles. Unfortunately, few have
understood his account, because few have read all of his work, or considered his
intellectual debts. I construct a Rawlsian power friendly view of law and legitimacy that
is philosophically rigorous, faithful to Rawls’s texts, and grounded in a thorough
understanding of his intellectual debts, in particular to H. L. A. Hart and Philip Soper. In
the end, I argue that the Rawlsian power friendly view is philosophically superior to both
the rationalist view (wrongly attributed to Rawls) and the newer power friendly views of
Waldron and Shapiro.
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PREFACE
THE END OF LIBERALISM

“All government,” says John Dunn, “however necessary and expeditious, is also a
presumption and an offence.”1 States typically provide citizens with many practical
advantages, but they also “insist on a very large measure of compulsory alienation of
judgement on the part of their citizens.”2 States claim they are justified in compelling
citizens to follow certain rules and laws, through coercive sanctions when necessary,
regardless of whether or not their citizens judge the rules or laws to be morally sound or
otherwise in their self-interest. This assumed right to demand and compel compliance,
says Dunn, is largely what makes a state a state. The levying of such demands, and the
threats of sanction for noncompliance, are an affront to citizens in modern democracies
because democratic citizens take themselves to be politically free and equal and capable
of judging on their own exactly what they ought to do. Political philosophers have long
recognized that might does not make right, so a central problem in political philosophy is
justifying (apologizing for, according to Dunn) this aspect of the state’s relationship to its
citizens. What we need is an account of justified political authority that is appropriate for
modern democracies. The term “political authority” here is a stand-in for a set of related
problems in political philosophy. When I say that we need to account for political
authority in modern democracies, I mean, roughly, that we need to understand the source
and nature of the law’s normative authority over citizens, and to know when, if ever, the

1
2

John Dunn, Democracy: A History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005), p. 19.
Dunn, Democracy, p. 19.
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state has a right to use its power to compel citizens to act in certain ways, and when, if
ever, citizens have a duty to obey, or at least to acquiesce or defer to, the state when it
demands that its rules and laws be followed by all, and threatens to compel obedience
with coercive force.
Ancient and medieval political philosophers justified political authority in terms
of what they took to be uncontroversial natural or divine understandings of the human
good. That these understandings were not widely available to the public, and were
known only by some privileged few, was not important. What mattered was the fact that
the nature of the human good could be known, and that the state could be an aid to, and
might even be necessary for, the realization of this good. Insofar as the human good was
seen as natural or divine in nature, the resulting political orders were also seen as
naturally or divinely mandated. Plato’s Republic is but one example.
Under the influence of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, liberal political
theorists abandon this general approach. One type of liberal theorist, the social contract
liberal, seeks instead to justify political authority by grounding it in public or shared
reasons, reasons that all individuals could affirm.3 This strand of liberalism aims to make
the state’s exercise of coercive power against citizens consistent with freedom of
conscience, and at the same time an expression of the political freedom, equality, and
sovereignty of citizens. For when the state’s power is exercised in accord with and
pursuant to political rules that all citizens could affirm, the state’s power ceases to be an

3

Two helpful accounts of the relationship between liberalism and shared reason are Charles Larmore, The
Morals of Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapters. 6-7, and Jeremy Waldron,
“Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” Philosophical Quarterly, v. 37 (1987), pp. 127-150.
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external force exercised against citizens, and instead becomes an exercise of force by
citizens for citizens.
This liberal ideal of shared reason has come under heavy attack in recent years,
and not without some justification. Nevertheless, it is an ideal that I seek to vindicate in
this dissertation. This liberal hope can be defended against many supposedly fatal
attacks. Moreover, liberal shared reason approaches represent a more attractive vision of
democratic political community than those offered by what I will call “shared interest”
approaches. But I am getting ahead of myself. The story I aim to tell begins with what I
call good faith disagreement, so it is to this that I now turn.

“Reasonable” or Good Faith Disagreement.

We know from experience that equally thoughtful and sincere individuals tend to
disagree over how to answer many important questions about the human condition,
including questions about the nature of the good life for human beings, and about what
kind of political institutions we ought to have. Experience has also taught us that free
and open discussion of these questions does not generally lead to consensus. In fact,
deliberation sometimes sharpens disagreement, pushing us even farther apart. This
happens often enough for us to doubt that consensus on many important questions is
within our reach. It has become common instead to simply recognize that people tend
naturally to affirm different and often irreconcilable answers to such questions, even after
deliberation. People tend naturally to disagree.

3

Some of these disagreements are simple in nature, in the sense that they can be
traced to e.g. uncontroversial factual or logical errors made by one or both parties to the
dispute. Many more of these disagreements are rooted ultimately in what John Rawls
calls the burdens of judgment.4 Disagreements rooted in these burdens are not simple.
The burdens explain how it is that equally diligent and sincere individuals can
nevertheless reach different answers to questions about e.g. the nature of the human good.
The burdens include the following conditions:
(a) Empirical evidence is often complex and conflicting, and thus hard to assess.
(b) Even when people agree about what the relevant considerations are, they may
disagree about how to weigh them against one another.
(c) Important concepts are often vague and subject to difficult, borderline cases.
(d) The way a person assesses evidence and weighs values is partly determined by the
totality of her experiences, but no two persons have had the same experiences.
(e) There are often different kinds of normative considerations on both sides of an
issue, so it is hard to make a judgment.
(f) Any set of social institutions is limited in the set of values it can admit, so the
nature of social life forces us set priorities among cherished values and make
difficult choices about which to admit and which to restrict.
What the burdens describe are some of the many ways that the intellectual tools we share
are simply inadequate to the task of publicly justifying any unique and determinate
answers to many of the most important questions we face as individuals and as a society.

4

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 54-8. Hereafter
PL.
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What the burdens imply is that disagreements over questions like the nature of the human
good are not ultimately rooted in defects of either intellect or character, but are better
understood as the result of the inadequacy of the common resources of human reason.
This is why this phenomenon is often referred to as “reasonable disagreement.”
Two individuals may act “reasonably”—diligently and honestly trying to think through
problems related to our human condition—and still come to affirm different and even
irreconcilable answers. There are both moral and epistemic issues at play here. One
moral issue has to do with honesty and diligence in the search for answers. When we call
such disagreements “reasonable” we affirm that each participant has acted responsibly—
each has honestly and diligently applied reasoning tools to the question—and thus
deserves some measure of respect. This does not imply any univocal understanding of
reason. My view is that reason is plural—there are many ways to do it. How then can
people know if others are honestly and diligently applying reason to an issue? If pushed,
I would appeal to something like Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance.” I do not believe
we can identify necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguish reason strictly
speaking from all other approaches to problems. We can, however, see some ways of
approaching problems as resembling what we ourselves regard most fully as reason. This
may seem unsatisfactory, and there is undoubtedly much more could and should be said,
but I believe this is simply part of the (post-modern?) condition we face today.
One epistemic issue indicated by “reasonable” disagreement has to do with
thinking. “Reasonable” in this sense acknowledges that these questions require careful
and deliberate attention. We seek reasons for affirming that e.g. some ways of living are
good for us, and that others are not. By calling these disagreements reasonable we
5

acknowledge that the parties have reasons for holding the views they do. Unfortunately,
the intellectual tools we share cannot do all that we might want them to. They
underdetermine unique and determinate answers to many of the questions we ask.
This leads, then, to another moral issue, what we might think of as each person’s
moral right to take a stand on controversial issues. The burdens explain not only why the
diligent and honest search for answers does not lead to consensus, but also why we
cannot simply reject other people’s answers as dumb or immoral, as unworthy of
consideration and undeserving of a hearing in our public spaces. So another reason for
calling these disagreements “reasonable” is to acknowledge that, given the burdens of
judgment, it is not a failing of some sort for a person to affirm a conception of the good
life, or an understanding of politics or justice, that is different from our own, even if the
view they affirm is controversial in some way.
It is of course naïve to deny that disagreements are ever rooted in intellectual or
moral failures. Certainly some are. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that even most
of our disagreements with our fellow citizens are like this. It is factually wrong, I
believe, to insist that most of people who disagree with us do so because they are in some
way intellectually or morally defective. And it is morally wrong too, because this
suspicious attitude toward others fails to accord them the respect that is often due to
them, and because this kind of suspicion corrodes public discourse and can become a
disruptive force in society. In any case, although some people cheat, and all people make
mistakes, it is nevertheless reasonable to believe that most of our fellow citizens are
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sincere in their convictions, and that they have come honestly to the views that they
affirm.5
Reasonable disagreement should not be confused with pluralism.6 Pluralism is
the idea that there are many human goods, not just one, and that these different goods are
not reducible to something more fundamental, such as happiness or freedom. It is a claim
about the nature of value. Reasonable disagreement is different. It is not a claim about
the nature of value, but instead a claim about what we can justify to others. Our
deliberations about theories of value, such as pluralism, are not themselves immune to the
burdens of judgment, and so we should not be surprised that there is reasonable
disagreement over whether or not pluralism is true.
There are many good reasons for using the term “reasonable disagreement” to
refer to disagreements ultimately rooted in the burdens of judgment, but I will not refer to
them this way in what follows. I prefer to use the term “good faith disagreement” to
describe this phenomenon. Different theorists mean different things by “reasonable
disagreement,” and, in fact, there are reasonable disagreements over the causes and
implications of reasonable disagreement itself. (This is, in my view, one of the more
interesting puzzles modernity forces on us.) But my main reason for avoiding the term
has to do with my ultimate purpose in this dissertation. I develop a Rawlsian approach to
law and the government’s right to enforce it, so I spend a good deal of time talking about
Rawls’s work. Unfortunately, Rawls is not very clear about what he means by reasonable
disagreement. Sometimes he appears to use the term to refer to any disagreement
5

John Nolt disagress. That is, it is not obvious to him that it is reasonable to believe that most of our
fellow citizens are sincere in the way I claim. Nevertheless, he says, it may be reasonable to act on the
assumption that most people are sincere, even if you do not in fact believe it.
6
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between individuals that is rooted in the burdens of judgment. This is what I will call a
good faith disagreement. At other times he appears to use it to refer only to
disagreements between individuals who affirm views of the human good that do not
conflict with the essentials of liberal democracy. This is a more limited set of
disagreements and represents just a portion of the total set of good faith disagreements.
This significance of this difference will become clear later, as I develop my Rawlsian
view. So, from here forward, I will use the term “good faith disagreement” to refer to
any disagreement rooted in the burdens of judgment.
There are many kinds of good faith disagreements, but two kinds are especially
important for my dissertation. Some disagreements are about the nature of the good for
human beings. Here I have in mind something like what Rawls calls a comprehensive
doctrine. These are more or less coherent moral, religious, or philosophical conceptions
of the ultimate good for human beings. In modern democracies, citizens affirm a
plurality of different and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. Other disagreements
are over political matters. For example, there are good faith political disagreements over
exactly what sort of democratic decision procedures a society ought to institute. Should
we have winner take all democracy, or some form of proportional representation? Which
is more consistent with the ideal of shared political authority? Which more reliably
produces nearly just results over time? Other good faith political disagreements are more
abstract. For example, there are disagreements over how we should understand and
balance abstract ideals like freedom and equality, and how these abstract ideals should be
implemented in actual policies. There are even good faith political disagreements over
what justice ultimately requires. Though I single out good faith disagreements over (a)
8

the good for human beings and (b) political matters, in this preface, I do not take them to
represent an exhaustive account of good faith disagreement. In fact, there are many other
kinds of good faith disagreements. But I want to highlight this limited set of
disagreements because they have a central place in this dissertation.
Good faith disagreements have played a role in the emergence of the modern
liberal society. Disagreements have long been rooted in the burdens of judgment, though
this was not always recognized. Our history is replete with examples of such
disagreements being met with repression, violence, and even war. Majorities have often
sought to impose their views on minorities. It is dissatisfaction with this constant
struggle for supremacy, coupled with uncertainty about the possibility of final victory,
that finally sets us on the path to our modern liberal society.

The Liberal Society.

Modern liberal societies emerged historically as a response to the Reformation
and subsequent debates over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.7 At this point in history it became evident to many that toleration of
differences was preferable to the continual fighting that resulted from efforts to impose
views on others, especially since there seemed to be little hope that any final victory
could be achieved. A modus vivendi developed, where different factions stopped
fighting, not out of respect for the other, or the implications of the burdens of judgment,

7

Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have Good Reasons for Supporting Liberal Democracy?”, The
Modern Schoolman, v. 78 (2001), pp. 232-4; Rawls, PL, pp. xxvi-xxvii.
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but as a way of producing a tolerable if sometimes uneasy peace. Through time, what
began as a mere modus vivendi evolved into a precursor of the liberal society—a society
organized around something like our idea of freedom of conscience or thought. Thinking
about toleration had changed. What once was viewed simply a tolerable means of
maintaining the peace between different people eventually became a core value
commitment shared by people living in these societies. This is the beginning of what we
now think of as the liberal society.
The U.S. is a liberal society (liberal political society or liberal polity). Other
examples of liberal societies include Great Britain, France, and Germany. Political
theorists disagree about exactly what fundamental principles characterize such societies,
distinguishing them from other, non-liberal polities, but the lists of characteristics they
develop typically include principles of freedom, equality, toleration, individual rights,
constitutionalism, and the rule of law.8 Rawls defines liberal societies as those that (a)
secure for their citizens some set of rights, liberties and opportunities, such as are
commonly found in constitutional regimes, (b) give priority to these individual freedoms
over perfectionist values or the common good, and (c) ensure that all citizens have access
to sufficient means to make effective use of their rights, liberties, and opportunities.9 He
adds that they are well-ordered. The members of liberal societies constitute and govern
themselves as a body politic through a public and (for the most part) voluntarily affirmed

8

For a representative sample, see, e.g., George Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (New York:
Continuum, 2002), pp. 22-5; Gerald Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism (Thousand Oaks, Ca.:
SAGE Publications, Inc., 2003), pp. 1-22; Robert Talisse, Democracy After Liberalism: Pragmatism and
Deliberative Politics (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 15-32; Bert van den Brink, The Tragedy of
Liberalism: An Alternative Defense of a Political Tradition (Albany: State University of New York Press,
2000), pp. 9-15; and Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have Good Reasons?”
9
Rawls, LP, pp. 140-1.
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conception of justice, without excessive coercion, manipulation or deception.10 They
recognize that justice is centered on the inviolability of persons and understand their
society to be a system of cooperation aimed at and justified by the good of all individual
members, and not by some notion of aggregate or corporate good. Nicholas Wolterstorff
offers a similar account of the liberal polity:
… a polity in which there is a constitutional-legal framework which guarantees to
all its sane adult citizens due process of law along with the so-called “civil
liberties,” foremost among those liberties being these: freedom of conscience,
freedom of religious practice, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom
from search and seizure without warrant, freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment, and freedom from intrusions into one’s private life.11
The U.S., Great Britain, Germany, and France are certainly not perfectly liberal
(according to either account or to common sense), nor are they perfectly just.
Nevertheless, they each exhibit the core commitments of liberal societies.
None of the rights and liberties typically found in liberal polities are absolute.
The lone exception may be freedom of conscience. In any case, all liberal polities
institute some restrictions on citizens’ rights and liberties. For example, Germany is a
liberal society, but it has laws that prohibit its citizens from denying that the Holocaust
occurred. France too is a liberal society, despite its recent decision to restrict the wearing
of head scarves by Muslim women in certain contexts. These and similar restrictions do
not make these societies illiberal. Such restrictions may give us reason to wonder if any
10

Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 4, 19, 64-67.
Hereafter LP.
11
Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have,” p. 232.
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society is fully liberal, but restrictions do not imply that any particular society is illiberal.
Generally speaking, such restrictions on liberties are intended to promote liberty, either
by securing the conditions necessary for any system of ordered liberty, or by making
possible a more adequate system of ordered liberty.
Liberal societies can differ quite a bit from one another. They often place
different restrictions on the various fundamental liberties of citizens. Rawls’s and
Wolterstorff’s accounts both leave room for this variation. This variation is rooted in the
different histories, traditions, and self-understandings of different liberal societies. For
example, while both Germany and the U.S. secure free speech rights for citizens, they
disagree about how to handle Holocaust denial. German law forbids it. This does not
mean that Germans deny or do not understand the importance of free speech. It may be
that the German people have decided that the harm that accompanies Holocaust denial
simply outweighs the value of allowing people to make such statements. If so, Germany
may be less than fully liberal. Alternatively, the German people may have decided that
Holocaust denial somehow threatens the conditions necessary for a system of ordered
liberty at all, or that it somehow prevents them from securing the most adequate system.
Exactly why the Germans have made this decision is not clear. What is clear is that their
decision is a response to their role in the Holocaust and their own historical failings. On
the other hand, the U.S. allows its citizens to deny the Holocaust. This does not imply
widespread acceptance of such claims in the U.S. Rather, Americans have decided that
limiting free speech is not the best way to handle this kind of claim. Americans have
faith that a free marketplace of ideas can show such statements to be false, and mitigate
the harm they tend to cause. There is nothing suspect about this variation among liberal
12

societies. It is the normal result of reasonable disagreements over how to specify the
fundamental commitments of liberal societies, and reflects the different histories,
sociological and material conditions, and self-understandings of different liberal
societies. And any liberal society (in fact, any society) that respects the basic rights of its
citizens can reasonably claim some measure of self-determination in setting up its own
internal policies.

Liberal Political Philosophy.

Liberal political philosophy (or liberalism) attempts to offer a normative
justification for the fundamental social and political institutions that characterize liberal
societies. Wolterstorff describes the task this way: “assuming the liberties cited [in
various accounts of liberal societies] and the restrictions allowed are not a mere grab-bag,
what’s the governing Idea?”12
Different liberal theorists defend different governing ideas. Nevertheless, it is
possible to identify certain key commitments shared by them all. Alan Ryan says, for
instance, that liberalism is “the belief that the freedom of the individual is the highest
political value, and that institutions and practices are to be judged by their success in
promoting it.”13 And Martha Nussbaum writes that
Liberalism holds that the flourishing of human beings taken one by one is both
analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of the state or the nation or
12

Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have,” p. 233.
See, e.g., Alan Ryan, “Liberalism,” in R. Goodin and P. Pettit, eds., A Companion to Contemporary
Political Philosophy, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1993), pp. 292-3.
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the religious group; analytically, because such unities do not really efface the
separate reality of individual lives; normatively because the recognition of that
separateness is held to be a fundamental fact for ethics, which should recognize
each separate entity as an end and not as a means to the ends of others.14
These statements point to key commitments shared by liberal political philosophers: (a)
the primacy of the individual, (b) freedom, and (c) equality. In the next few paragraphs I
will describe these commitments in an abstract and (I hope) uncontroversial way.

(a)

Liberalism holds that individual persons are primary in two ways.15 First,

liberalism affirms that the individual person is the fundamental element for political
theorizing. Some see this commitment to the primacy of the individual as a metaphysical
claim, while others see it as a prudential or practical one.16 In any case, the main idea is
that individuals are always ultimately distinct or separate from the various associations
and groups (religious, political, filial) that they have membership in. The groups that
individuals form do not have an ontological status equal to or more fundamental than that
of the individuals themselves. The individual person is the ultimate unit of analysis.
Second, liberalism holds that the good of individuals—their liberties and
opportunities—is normatively prior to the good of groups, including society as a whole.
The good of individuals may not be subordinated to or sacrificed for the good or goals of

14
15
16

Nussbaum, quoted in Talisse, Democracy, p. 17.
See, e.g., Talisse, Democracy, pp. 17-19.
Talisse, Democracy, p. 17.
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social groups.17 This does not mean that people cannot choose to make sacrifices for the
sake of various groups. It means that no one can be required to do so in a liberal society.

(b)

The second fundamental theoretical commitment of liberalism is freedom.

Liberal political theorists hold that citizens should be free in two different, but closely
related, ways. The first kind of freedom is referred to as “personal freedom” or “moral
autonomy.”18 It amounts to a deep respect for each individual’s capacity for selfdirection.19 Each normal adult human being is capable of developing, revising, and
pursuing a “conception of the good,” a more-or-less systematic set of beliefs about what
is valuable and worth pursuing for human beings. The general idea of freedom here is
that each person should be able to decide for herself how to lead her life. Citizens respect
one another’s freedom by allowing each other to exercise their capacities for selfdirection.
The second kind of freedom is the citizen’s right to play a role in the government,
i.e., to play a role in the constitution of the political rules that bind citizens into a body
politic and organize much of their collective behavior. Some call this “public freedom”
or “public autonomy.”20 Citizens have different conceptions of the good. This would not
be a problem if each of us lived on our own, in isolation from other citizens. But we do
not live alone. We are social beings, and our goals and actions affect the lives of others.
Sometimes one citizen’s understanding of the good conflicts with another citizen’s
17

This does not rule out practices like eminent domain, though it does require that such practices be
limited to the purpose of securing the conditions necessary for a more adequate ordered system of liberty.
18
E.g., van den Brink, Tragedy, pp. 10-2, and Talisse, Democracy, pp. 17-19, respectively.
19
See, e.g., Talisse, Democracy, pp. 17-20; Waldron, “Liberalism,” Section 3; and Wolterstorff, “Do
Christians Have,” p. 234.
20
See, e.g., van den Brink, Tragedy, p. 11.
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understanding. In order to deal with these conflicts, liberal societies need institutions and
rules, e.g., a constitution and laws that define offices and powers of government officials
and citizens, and that define the limits of personal freedom. The liberal political
theorist’s idea of public freedom includes the freedom of citizens to reflect on the
legitimacy and justice of their institutions, and a fundamental right to play a role in the
development of these institutions.

(c)

The third fundamental theoretical commitment of liberalism is equality.21 This

does not mean that liberal political theorists are economic egalitarians, though some are.
Rather, liberal theorists affirm some principle of the equal basic worth or status of all
citizens. One aspect of equal basic worth is each citizen’s right to have her interests
given equal consideration in the development and operation of social and political
institutions. A second aspect of it is each citizen’s right to equal respect of her
entitlement to choose and act on a conception of the good. This applies also to each
citizen’s public freedom.

Utilitarian versus Social Contract Liberalism.

Utilitarian liberals argue that the basic institutions characteristic of liberal
societies are normatively justified because such institutions maximally promote the utility

21

See, e.g., Waldron, “Liberalism,” Section 3; and Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have,” p. 234.
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of citizens.22 The freedoms secured and promoted in liberal societies tend to produce the
most utility for all affected over time. Some complain, though, that utilitarian liberalism
is not liberalism at all, but rather a species of perfectionism.23 Roughly put, the charge is
that utilitarian liberalism makes certain robust claims about the human good, e.g., that
people’s conceptions of the good are rooted in some notion of individual happiness or
preference satisfaction. In making such bold claims, utilitarian liberals ignore good faith
disagreement and the freedom to affirm one’s own conception of the good. Liberalism is
committed to the idea that people are free to choose even conceptions of the good that
make no reference to happiness, or that are not rooted in the satisfaction of their own
desires. They may even choose to affirm a conception of the good that defines the good
life in terms of the flourishing of some group they belong to, rather than the flourishing
of individuals.
Whatever one makes of these criticisms, (and I’m not saying they prove decisive)
worries like these have provided some motivation for social contract liberalism. Social
contract liberals argue that the basic institutions characteristic of liberal society are
justified because they represent terms of political association that all citizens as free and
equal might affirm or accept, from the common and shared moral point of view of
citizen. For example, Gerald Gaus says that “liberals insist that moral and political
principles are justified if and only if each member of the community has reason to
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embrace them.”24 In another work Gaus says that “this idea of public justification is at
the heart of contractual liberalism.”25 Jeremy Waldron says something similar: “liberals
are committed to … a requirement that all aspects of the social order should either be
made acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every last individual.”26 And
Thomas Nagel says that “the task of discovering the conditions of [political] legitimacy is
traditionally conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone
who is required to live under it.”27 Nicholas Wolterstorff agrees: “the liberal theorist
sees the liberal polity as committed to the ideal of establishing rules of engagement which
all citizens reflectively agree to.”28
This liberal ideal of shared reason can be traced to the Enlightenment, a time
characterized by a growing faith and confidence in the human ability to understand the
world.29 Many thinkers of this period felt that reason could free us once and for all from
the tyranny of tradition and superstition. Political and social theorists, made bold by
progress in the sciences, sought to understand and justify our political and social worlds
as well. Here, then, is the germ of the hope of shared reason: freedom of conscience,
coupled with confidence in the human ability to understand and justify social and
political arrangements. These lead naturally (though not inevitably) to a desire for
political institutions that could be justified to all.
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For contemporary liberalism, the hope offered by shared reason is that free and
equal citizens, deeply divided by their differing and irreconcilable understandings of the
right and the good for human beings, might nevertheless find terms of political
association that each could affirm, or could publicly see as justified, from the common,
shared moral point of view of “citizen.” If such terms are found, the state’s coercive
power, exercised against citizens, is not only consistent with each citizen’s freedom and
equality, but is also an expression of it. For when the state’s power is exercised in accord
with and pursuant to constitutional rules accepted by all citizens, it is not an external
force exercised against citizens, but is instead an exercise of force by citizens.
Power-friendly theorists think it is time for us to abandon this strand of liberal
political thought. They hold that our disagreements over the right and the good are so
deep that political philosophers cannot say what justice ultimately requires, even under
the ideal conditions of political theory. What justice ultimately requires on the ground
can only be worked out—if it can be worked out at all—by citizens through real-time
political processes. An implication of this is that, for nearly every political issue, the will
of some will govern all. There is no hope for a politics of shared reason; what we have is
a constant struggle, where one side wins, and other sides lose. Of course, power-friendly
theorists recognize that might does not make right, so they seek to legitimate the
unavoidable exercise of force in democratic politics by describing normative, pragmatic
or prudential reasons for accepting such outcomes as authoritative. For instance,
democratic institutions that produce a stable modus vivendi, in which the spiritual and
material needs of citizens are at least minimally satisfied, might be regarded as
authoritative on those (or similar) grounds. No one is happy to lose these struggles, but if
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the power-friendly theorists are right, those in the minority have sound reason to accept
the outcomes anyway. At the very least, they live to fight another day.
Power friendly theorists would be right to reject shared reason, if it required
consensus over some specific and determinate set of social and political institutions.
Consensus accounts of shared reason are doomed to fail. For instance, a consensus
account of shared reason would require that liberal democratic citizens find concrete and
determinate democratic decision procedures for resolving disagreements. That is, it
would require citizens to find democratic decision procedures that no person could reject
in good faith. This would be possible only if questions of democratic institutional design
were immune to the burdens of judgment. But we know that they are not immune. There
are many good faith disagreements over what sorts of decision procedures are most
appropriate for a liberal democracy. For instance, is winner take all democracy or
proportional representation most faithful to an ideal of shared political authority? Is the
ideal of shared political authority the right metric to apply to this question, or should we
seek instead a decision procedure that will most reliably produce nearly just results over
time? If we choose this option, what exactly does justice require? And so on. Good
faith disagreement infects this discussion all the way down. This is but one example of
the way that good faith disagreements put strong consensus accounts of shared reason
well out of our reach.
Fortunately, the ideal of shared reason does not require consensus, at least not a
consensus of this strong and implausible sort. Consensus accounts of shared reason are
doomed, but relaxed, power friendly accounts of shared reason are not. For instance,
Kant offers a non-voluntarist social contract theory that marries shared reason with the
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fact that power must often be exercised in the face of good faith dissent and
disagreement.30 He argues that the law must be based on “the will of the entire people,”
because “the will of another person cannot decide anything for someone without
injustice.”31 However, he continues,
… we need by no means assume that this contract … based on a coalition of the
wills of all private individuals in a nation to form a common, public will for the
purposes of rightful legislation, actually exists as a fact, for it cannot possibly be
so…. It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted
practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way
that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation…. This
is the test of the rightfulness of every public law. For if the law is such that a
whole people could not possibly agree to it (for example, if it stated that a certain
class of subjects must be privileged as a hereditary ruling class), it is unjust; but if
it is at least possible that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to consider the
law as just, even if the people is at present in such a position or attitude of mind
that it would probably refuse its consent if it were consulted.32
Kant provides an example:
If a war tax were proportionately imposed on all subjects, they could not claim,
simply because it is oppressive, that it is unjust because the war is in their opinion
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unnecessary. For they are not entitled to judge this issue, since it is at least
possible that the war is inevitable and the tax indispensable.33
Kant recognizes that the exercise of power without any basis in public consensus is
unavoidable in politics, but he does not give up on the liberal hope of shared reason.
Instead, he offers a relaxed account of it. He does not insist that the law be something
that all citizens do in fact agree to, or something that no reasonable citizen could
reasonably reject; it is enough for the law to be something that all citizens could agree to.
One might reasonably ask if this relaxed or power friendly approach to shared
reason is shared reason at all. After all, in Kant’s example the citizens do not agree that
the war is necessary—some see no or insufficient reason for it. Though this worry is
reasonable, I think it is ultimately mistaken. What Kant proposes is a shared reason view
of legitimate state action. The demand for shared reason is a demand for a certain kind of
reciprocity. The demand for reciprocity is, in turn, a demand for a certain kind of respect.
It is a demand that persons be treated in ways that each could see as justified. For now, I
will set aside the issue of just what it means to offer reasons others “could” see as
justified, since different political theorists take different positions on it. I want to make a
couple of more general points here instead. First, by offering reasons at all for political
activity, we show respect for each person’s rational agency, for each person’s capacity
for judgment. Second, when we offer reasons we think another person could accept,
from a shared moral point of view, we show respect as well for that person’s political
freedom and equal political status as a fellow citizen. While Kant does not require shared
reason in the fullest sense (terms of association all persons do in fact converge on, or that
33
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could not reasonably be rejected by anyone), his view nevertheless requires reciprocity
(laws that could have been produced by the united will of the nation) and thereby evinces
a respect for the rational agency, liberty and equality of citizens (a law has genuine force
only when it is the kind of thing that citizens could freely affirm).
This sort of liberal “power friendly” shared reason requires two kinds of
reciprocity. First, it requires something similar to what Reidy calls “reciprocity in
advantage.”34 Terms of association must respect the interests of all citizens. Exactly
what it means to respect the interests of citizens is a question I will leave open for now.
But the basic point is that there is no reason to think any terms of association that ignored
a citizen’s interests altogether, or, worse, positively threatened those interests, would be
affirmed by that citizen. Citizens have no reason to see such terms of association as
preferable to anarchy, to the state of nature.
Second, shared reason requires something similar to what Reidy calls “reciprocity
in justification.”35 This requires that citizens be prepared to defend their political activity
in terms of reasons that are publicly available, that are part of some relevant public
discourse. Again, for now I will leave open the question of just what should count as a
“relevant” or available public reason. But the basic idea is that political activity should
not be based solely on non-public reasons, as this does not properly respect others as free
and equal citizens.
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My Aims in this Dissertation.

John Rawls developed the most compelling normative account of constitutional
liberal democracy of the 20th century. Unfortunately, Rawls is often read as offering an
implausibly strong consensus account of the liberal ideal of shared reason. As a result,
much of his work has been pushed aside as old-fashioned and irrelevant in our modern
context. This is a mistake. What Rawls proposes is a power-friendly shared reason
account of liberal democratic law and political authority. It centers on his liberal
principle of legitimacy.36 Unfortunately, few have understood his account, because few
have read all of his work on it, or considered his intellectual debts.
I have three main goals in this dissertation. One of my goals is to construct a
Rawlsian power-friendly shared reason account of political authority for modern pluralist
liberal societies that is philosophically rigorous, faithful to Rawls’s texts, and grounded in
a thorough understanding of his intellectual debts, in particular to H. L. A. Hart and
Philip Soper. Though some of the things Rawls says suggest that he might hold a strong
consensus view of shared reason, I will show that there are sound exegetical reasons for
rejecting this reading of Rawls. In any case, the strong consensus view is not plausible.
Whatever its apparent merits, it is simply impossible to achieve. Rawls understood this,
and instead offered a view that is in many ways like the views of his contemporary power
friendly critics. Whether or not the view I develop is actually Rawls’s view is a question
that cannot be answered with any certainty, as Rawls’s death means that many such
36
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answers are now lost to history. But the view I develop is certainly Rawlsian, and I think
it is one that Rawls would appreciate.
A second goal I have is to critically compare the Rawlsian view to those of
political theorists such as Shapiro, Waldron, and Soper. All of these theorists recognize
the need for accounts of political authority that do not wish away the fact of good faith
disagreement. It is simply unrealistic to think that this will go away in our time. And just
as citizens will always be divided by their differing conceptions of the good, so too will
they always be divided by their differing views of what political institutions are
appropriate for a liberal society. All of the views I discuss take this to heart. I will
subject each of them to internal, immanent critique, and compare them to Rawls’s view.
In the end, I argue that the Rawlsian view is substantively (philosophically) superior to
both the consensus view (wrongly attributed to Rawls) and the power-friendly views of
Waldron, Shapiro, and Soper.
One reason for getting a good version of Rawls’s account on the table is its
faithfulness to the liberal ideal of shared reason. The liberal hope for a politics of shared
reason is an overarching theme of my dissertation. This hope is rooted in sound
normative commitments and is worth pursuing. But what it amounts to, once we
recognize the depth and breadth of reasonable pluralism, is an open and largely
unanswered question. A third goal then is to reflect on this issue. What hope do we have
of achieving a politics of shared reason, given our deep disagreements over the right and
the good? Can the liberal hope for a politics of shared reason be vindicated at all? As I
will make clear, Rawls’s view gets us closer to this liberal hope than others. However,
his view may prove unworkable.
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

In this dissertation I develop and defend an account of the conditions under which
a democratic government has the right to enforce the law, and the nature of the reasons
that citizens have to obey, or at least to acquiesce to, the government’s demands when
these conditions are in place.37 In developing this account I draw on work on political
legitimacy and political obligation. The problem of political legitimacy has to do with
when, if ever, a state has sufficient normative justification to coercively enforce its laws
against its citizens. The problem of political obligation has to do with when, if ever,
citizens have a duty to obey, or at least to acquiesce to, the state’s demand that its laws be
followed. In this chapter I survey recent work in these areas of political philosophy. My
purpose here is twofold. First, this chapter describes broadly the areas of philosophy that
my project falls into. Second, it offers tentative accounts of concepts and themes relevant
to my project.
I begin this chapter by discussing work on political obligation. The question this
work seeks to answer is this: do citizens have a duty to obey the laws of their own
government? This is a very old problem in philosophy, one examined by Plato in his
Crito. Several traditional approaches have received extensive critical discussion.
Unfortunately, dissatisfaction with the main traditional approaches to this problem has
led to a general skepticism among political philosophers, many of whom now doubt that
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a compelling account of political obligation is possible. As a result, many have
concluded that no citizen has a duty to obey her government’s laws. Some go even
further, and hold that this implies too that no government is legitimate, i.e., that no
government has a right to enforce its laws. This move requires something called the
correlativity thesis, which holds roughly that the state has a right to enforce the law only
if citizens have a duty to obey the law, and vice versa. Under the sway of this thesis,
many political philosophers now affirm a kind of philosophical anarchism.
There have been two kinds of responses to this development. One response is to
seek out new accounts of political obligation. Some of these alternative accounts are
discussed in this chapter. One of them receives extensive critical analysis in Chapter 3.
A second response has been to reject the correlativity thesis, in an effort to free the
government’s right to enforce the law from the citizen’s duty to obey it. This move has
led to new work on political legitimacy. In the last part of this chapter I develop a brief
taxonomy of this new work.

Justice, Political Legitimacy, and Political Obligation.

Most political philosophers hold that political obligation and political legitimacy
vary somewhat independently of justice. Justice refers in the broadest sense to some
appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life (however defined)
among the morally salient entities (e.g., individuals, groups, associations) in a society
(domestic or global). Political obligation refers to the citizen’s (supposed) duty to obey
the laws in her own country. Political legitimacy refers to the government’s (claimed)
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right to coercively enforce its laws against its citizens. These are distinct virtues that the
law might possess, and represent different ways of assessing the same law. In short, the
question of whether or not a law is legitimately enforceable, or whether it generates a
duty of obedience for citizens, is separate from the question of whether or not the law is
just.
For instance, there is nothing implausible about the claim that some citizen might
have a duty to obey a law, a political obligation, that she at the same time would have a
moral duty to resist, out of considerations of justice. This is just the kind of situation that
gives rise to civil disobedience. One example might be a law restricting gay marriages.
Such a law might be unjust, perhaps because it treats people unequally, or because it fails
to properly respond to their liberty rights. Nonetheless, if the law is properly enacted, it
might still generate a political obligation, a duty to obey the law. What a person ought to
do, all-things-considered, in such situations is not entirely clear. What is clear is that
there is nothing particularly odd about thinking that individuals have conflicting duties in
situations like these. Similarly, it could also be the case that a citizen would have no
political obligation to obey a law that is clearly just. We can see this by turning around
the gay marriage law example: a law permitting gay marriage might be just, but might
not generate political obligations for citizens if the law were not enacted properly. Here
an individual might have good moral reason to obey a law that she otherwise has no
political obligation to obey. Similar examples could show political legitimacy varies
independently of justice as well.
None of this implies that there is not, or cannot be, some relationship between
justice, legitimacy, and obligation. For instance, some hold that laws that are too unjust
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simply cannot generate political obligations or be legitimately enforced. Rawls holds, for
instance, that laws allowing people to hold slaves could not be legitimately enforced,
even if they were enacted properly.38 Edmundson holds that only a nearly just state is
capable of being legitimate.39 But not everyone agrees. Some think that even the worst
Nazi laws could have generated real political obligations, if certain conditions were met.
Of course, proponents of this position do not hold that people should have obeyed the
Nazis, all-things-considered. Rather, they hold that the law is a normative domain that is
distinct from other normative domains, such as justice. The point is that the relationship
between justice and either political obligation or legitimacy, if one exists, is complicated.
It is a mistake to assume that justice and obligation or justice and legitimacy are identical.
If there is some relationship between justice and these other virtues that the law might
possess, it needs to be explained and justified.

The Problem of Political Obligation.

Socrates was sentenced to death for crimes he allegedly committed against his
fellow Athenians.40 While he was waiting to receive his punishment, his friend Crito
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came to visit. Crito believed that the Athenians were being unjust, that they were making
a terrible mistake, and that Socrates ought to try to escape into exile. He developed a
plan to spirit Socrates away, perhaps to Thessaly, where Crito had powerful friends, and
he brought the idea to Socrates. Of course, Socrates wanted to think about it. He had to
decide whether or not to obey a legal but apparently unjust decision by his government.
This is the problem of political obligation: do citizens have a duty to obey the laws of
their own country, simply because they are laws, and regardless of justice?
Accounts of political obligation try to show that citizens do have a duty to obey
the laws of their government.41 This duty is generally understood to be strict. First, it is
a duty to obey all of the laws of the state. Second, it is a fairly strong duty, one that can
only be overridden in extraordinary circumstances. Neither of these conditions imply
that political obligation is an absolute duty. This is one common misconception about
political obligation. If citizens have political obligations, these should always factor into
their calculations about how to act. However, a duty to obey the law does not determine
how a citizen ought to act, all-things-considered. Political obligation is a prima facie
duty. It is one issue that anyone concerned to be moral ought to consider, but it is not the
only one. For instance, individuals may have other political duties that are distinct from
the duty to obey the law. We may have a duty of justice that is political in nature, but
that is distinct from political obligation. Many political theorists argue that political
obligation and justice vary independently, so that it makes perfect sense to say that a
person could have a political obligation to obey a law that they also have a duty, rooted in
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considerations of justice, to resist. This is the essence of civil disobedience. And citizens
may have non-political duties as well, such as person-to-person moral duties, that are
distinct from political obligation. This is not meant to minimize the seriousness of the
duty to obey the law. Citizens want to know how they ought to act, all-things-considered,
so they need to understand how the duty to obey the law figures into these judgments.
Three standard accounts of political obligation seek to ground the duty
respectively in consent, fair play, and gratitude. Voluntarist accounts of political
obligation seek to ground an individual’s obligation to the law in some voluntary act of
commitment, e.g., an individual decision or choice of some sort.42 The consent account
is voluntarist. One construal of the fair play account is too. Non-voluntarist accounts
seek to ground political obligation in something else. A second construal of the fair play
account is non-voluntarist, as is the gratitude account. Before discussing these traditional
accounts, I will discuss what can be called a “general moral reasons” approach. This
approach is not very good, but it is worth discussing because it draws out central themes
in the debate over political obligation. After that I will critically evaluate the three
traditional accounts.

A False Start: The General Moral Reasons Approach.

Before I discuss the traditional approaches to political obligation, I want to
introduce what we can call the “general moral reasons” approach.43 This approach fails,
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but its failure is worth noting, because it draws out central issues in the literature on
political obligation. The general moral reasons approach is fairly straightforward: we
have a duty to obey laws that have good moral content, and a duty to resist laws with bad
moral content. On this view, the only reasonable ground for any supposed duty to obey
the law is the law’s moral worth. This central claim of the general moral reasons view is
correct, in a sense, but this way of putting it obscures more than it uncovers. Whether or
not we ought to obey the law, all-things-considered, is always an open question.
However, this is not the question under consideration in the literature on political
obligation. The question of political obligation has to do with why, if at all, something’s
“being a law” should factor into our deliberations about how to act, all-things-considered,
and just what weight something’s “being a law” should have. We want to know if law as
such is one of the things that needs to be considered, and, if so, how it measures up
against other “non-law” considerations. But the general moral reasons approach moves
us away from the idea that we have any special obligation to obey the law just because it
is the law.44 In making this move, it abandons a central idea in the debates about political
obligation. In the end, then, the general moral reasons approach is not an account of
political obligation at all.
In any case, there are several other problems with this general moral reasons
approach. First, people reasonably disagree about the moral content of different laws.
Thus, in many cases it will be perfectly reasonable for those enacting a law to conclude
that it has good moral content, even if it is reasonable for others to find it morally
objectionable. How are citizens supposed to regard such laws? The general moral
44
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reasons approach does not help us with this situation. Second, some laws are morally
indifferent. If the duty to obey the law depends on the law’s moral content, we have no
reason to obey these laws. But this doesn’t seem right. Again, the general moral reasons
approach fails us.
Finally, the general moral reasons approach does not meet what political
philosophers call the particularity requirement. The particularity requirement demands
that an account of political obligation explain why a citizen has a special relationship
with her own government that she does not have with other governments.45 But if the
ground of the duty to obey the law is the moral content of the law, then it seems like
citizens have a duty to obey all laws with good moral content, regardless of what
government enacts them. This general moral reasons account makes no distinction
between my own state and other states. As a result, it fails to explain the special
relationship citizens have to their own state.46

Consent Accounts of Political Obligation.

One traditional account of political obligation grounds the duty to obey the law in
consent.47 This is actually a family of accounts, since there are three distinct but common
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versions of it: express consent, voting, and residence. On all of these accounts, citizens
have a duty to obey the law because they have in some deliberate fashion promised or
agreed to obey the government. This promise to obey the government is cashed out as a
duty to obey the government’s laws.
A. John Simmons offers one fully developed and powerful consent account.48 His
view grows out of his understanding of Locke’s political philosophy. According to
Simmons,
Political power is morally legitimate, and those subject to it are morally obligated
to obey, only where the subjects have freely consented to the exercise of such
power and only where that power continues to be exercised within the terms of
the consent given. The legitimacy of particular states thus turns on consent, on
the actual history of that state’s relations with its subjects.49
Here Simmons affirms a version of the correlativity thesis, but I will set this aside for
now. I want to emphasize two other points he makes. First, on his view a citizen’s
political obligation can only be grounded on free consent. No other account, he thinks,
respects our fundamental commitment to the political freedom of all individuals.
Simmons, like Locke, affirms an initial state of nature, which includes freedom from
political association. Individuals leave the state of nature and become citizens of some
state, with all of the duties that implies, only when they consent to be governed. What
should count as consent is still an open question. Second, this account of political
obligation turns on actual, lived history. Simmons thinks this is very important.
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How we have actually freely lived and chosen, confused and unwise and
unreflective though we may have been, has undeniable moral significance; and
our actual political histories and choices thus seem deeply relevant to the
evaluation of those political institutions under which we live.50
Appeals to what would move us, were we perfectly rational (according to whose
measure?), or even to what should move us (again, according to whom?), seem
paternalistic and to have only impersonal and indirect moral force, if they have any moral
force at all. Appeals to what I have actually chosen seem direct and personal: “I am
constrained only by how I have in fact lived and chosen.” This makes the moral
constraint of political obligation seem less external and more obvious, and also makes it
more likely to be efficacious. “And it seems appropriate to suggest that a state’s
authority over an individual ought to depend on some such personal transactions, given
the coercive, very extensive, and often quite arbitrary sorts of direction and control that
state authority involves.”51
But what counts as consent? One version of the consent account grounds political
obligation in express consent. Express consent is an explicit and solemn promise to obey
the government, to accept all valid laws and to be bound by them. Most believe that a
promise of this sort could ground political obligation.52 The main problem with this
account is that it fails to meet what political philosophers call the “generality
requirement.” The generality requirement holds that political obligation must bind all (or
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nearly all) citizens in a society.53 Those who insist on this requirement hold that if we
cannot give an account of why (nearly) everyone in some society has a duty to obey the
law, then we can only conclude that no one has such a duty. For this reason, the express
consent account fails. Few citizens, if any, have ever made any such promise to the
government. Nor, many think, is it reasonable to expect that citizens generally would
make such a promise, if (say) the government were to set up “pledge booths” in every
city, in an effort to correct this problem with political obligation. So most conclude that
express consent is an inadequate account of political obligation.
Express consent may not be the only way to promise to obey the government.
Some argue that voting in free elections counts as consent.54 Proponents of this view
argue that the act of voting is a promise to obey the government. It would be odd to say,
for instance, that someone who voted for Jane Smith did not consent to be governed by
her if she won the election. In this situation, a free vote constitutes consent. But what
about citizens who voted for the loser (say, John Kerry)? More broadly, voting
constitutes consent because it is one form of political participation in the processes of
government. From this perspective, a vote for a candidate is also a vote for a political
system. It would be odd to say that someone who participates in the actual processes that
constitute her government does not consent to that government as a political system.
But some simply deny that voting amounts to any such promise.55 Simmons
argues that we must distinguish acts that imply consent from acts that are signs of
consent. Consent is a deliberate act of acceptance, a promise. But an act that merely
53
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implies consent may not in fact be such a promise. For instance, if citizens do not know
that voting counts as consent—if they are not aware of the fact that voting constitutes
consent to be governed—then we cannot count a vote as consent in anything but a
“metaphorical” sense. We simply do not know if the consent-implying act of voting is in
fact intended by the citizen as consent to anything.56 While voting may imply consent,
since most people have no awareness or intention of consenting to anything when they
vote, we cannot assume it is a sign of consent. Some argue that it is possible for a state to
turn voting into such a sign, e.g., by altering political processes in ways that make
citizens aware of the fact that voting constitutes consent.57 But no states have done this.
Another consent account is based on residence. On this account, when adult
citizens have a right to emigrate, the fact that they have not exercised this right
constitutes a promise or agreement to be governed by their country of residence. This is
a common but controversial account of political obligation. Locke, Rousseau, and, more
recently, W. D. Ross, all affirm versions of this account.58 The heart of the controversy
over it is whether or not residence, or rather the unexercised right of emigration, can be
seen as a genuine choice situation. That is, is continued residence the kind of choice that
constitutes consent?
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In the Crito, the Laws insist that Athens did present itself to citizens as such a
choice situation:
We openly proclaim this principle, that any Athenian, on attaining to manhood
and seeing for himself the political organization of the state and us its laws, is
permitted, if he is not satisfied with us, to take his property and go away wherever
he likes. If any of you chooses to go to one of our colonies, supposing that he
should not be satisfied with us and the state, or to emigrate to any other country,
not one of the laws hinders or prevents him from going away wherever he lies,
without any loss of property. On the other hand, if any one of you stands his
ground when he can see how we administer justice and the rest of our public
organization, we hold that by doing so he has in fact undertaken to do anything
that we tell him.59
The question for us in the contemporary world, says Simmons, is whether or not we can
alter our political processes in ways that make continued residence a sign of genuine
consent.60 If so, this is a plausible account of political obligation.
One popular objection to residence accounts was first suggested by Hume.61
Residence simply cannot constitute consent, the argument goes, because it is possible for
self-professed revolutionaries, anarchists, spies, outlaws, and so on, to reside in a state.
But it is absurd to insist that such people consent, even tacitly, to be ruled by the
government in their state of residence. So, even if we did arrange our political processes
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so that continued residence did count as a choice, still we could not hold that residence
constitutes consent to be governed. The scoundrels scuttle the project.
Despite its popularity, Simmons thinks this argument misses the point. The
reason it seems absurd to conclude that (say) the anarchist consents to be governed is
presumably the fact that she actively rejects the authority of the government. But this
makes consent a matter of attitude, and not of residence. To make this scoundrel
objection work, we have to assume that the anarchist cannot consent to be governed, no
matter what she does. But, Simmons says, this is just false. Whether or not the anarchist
has an attitude of consent is beside the point, if we see consent as some deliberate act that
generates obligations (what Simmons calls the “occurrence” sense of consent). On this
account, the act of consent is residence. It simply does not matter how the scoundrel
feels about the government.
Another common objection to residence accounts is the difficulty inherent in
exercising the right to emigrate. Hume put the problem like this:
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or partizan has a free choice to leave his
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to
day, by the small wages which he acquires. We may as well assert that a man, by
remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he
was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the
moment he leaves her.62
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Hume makes two points here. First, just like the man who is carried on board ship while
asleep, none of us chooses our initial state of residence. We simply find ourselves in one,
either by birth or by being carried to one by our parents or guardians. Second, the social
nature and other exigencies of human life make it very difficult, if not impossible, for
most citizens to emigrate. The truth is this: fate simply plunks us down in one place or
another, and it is not easy or even possible for most of us to go someplace else. Thus,
continued residence cannot be considered voluntary, and so it cannot be regarded as
consent.
Not everyone finds this argument compelling. Joseph Tussman, for instance,
argues that it mistakenly conflates convenience with consent.63 As long as citizens know
that residence constitutes consent, and know that emigration is possible, then we need not
worry that emigration is unattractive or even difficult. The fact that a choice is
unpleasant does not render it involuntary. But this clearly understates the problem.
Emigration is not merely unpleasant or inconvenient. Many of the things we value most
in life—home, family, friends—cannot be moved. These are tied to our state of residence
and cannot be taken with us when we leave. For most of us, then, emigration would not
be merely inconvenient, but would be a catastrophe. It would mean leaving behind many
of the things that give our lives meaning and purpose. Thus, continued residence is not a
politically meaningful choice.64
So consent accounts do not justify political obligation. Express consent accounts
fail to meet the generality requirement, because few citizens have ever made an explicit
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promise to the government. Voting consent accounts also fail. Citizens do not generally
regard a vote to be a sign of consent, so it cannot be counted as such. And even if
citizens did regard a vote as consent, many citizens do not vote. Thus, the voting account
fails the generality requirement. Residence consent accounts fail because continued
residence cannot be seen as a politically meaningful choice. Continued residence does
not count as consent because there is good reason to doubt that continued residence
constitutes a politically meaningful voluntary act.

Fair Play Accounts of Political Obligation.

Another traditional account of political obligation grounds it in a duty of “fair
play.” Both H. L. A. Hart and John Rawls defended versions of the fair play account.65
The general idea is this. People are engaged in a cooperative practice or enterprise that is
widely beneficial. For instance, many people must work together to produce the
conditions necessary for a market economy, or to protect and preserve our environment.
These and other important social goods are only possible through the concerted and
coordinated efforts of large numbers of individuals. The benefits of these cooperative
schemes emerge only if many people join in and maintain them. Joining the cooperative
scheme comes with certain costs. People must restrict their behavior in certain ways if
many social goods are to be possible. The problem is that many of these socially
produced goods are free, in the sense any single citizen can gain the benefits, without
65
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contributing to the cooperative activity and incurring the associated costs of participation,
just as long as most of the other citizens continue to do their part. This is the free-rider
problem. The fair play account claims that a citizen who gets the benefits of some
cooperative scheme has a duty of fair play to do his part to contribute to their production.
Strictly speaking, the obligation each citizen owes is to other participants in the
cooperative scheme. This obligation to other citizens becomes an obligation to obey the
law because many of the beneficial cooperative schemes in question are organized
through laws. For instance, the conditions necessary for a market economy can be
maintained only if citizens follow the laws designed to promote and protect those preconditions. And government itself is a cooperative activity that produces important
social benefits, as long as large numbers of people do their share to maintain it and do not
cheat. It is not clear, though, if this argument is supposed to be voluntarist or nonvoluntarist. Both alternatives will be considered in due course.
Robert Nozick rejects the fair play account in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.66 He
makes his case through a series of examples. Here is his Public Address (PA) example:
Suppose some of the people in your neighborhood (there are 364 other adults)
have found a public address system and decide to institute a system of public
entertainment. They post a list of names, one for each day, yours among them.
On his assigned day (one can easily switch days) a person is to run the public
address system, play records over it, give news bulletins, tell amusing stories he
has heard, and so on. After 138 days on which each person has done his part,
your day arrives. Are you obligated to take your turn? You have benefited from
66

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), Chapter 5.

42

it, occasionally opening your window to listen, enjoying some music or chuckling
at someone’s funny story. The other people have put themselves out. But must
you answer the call when it is your turn to do so? As it stands, surely not.
Though you benefit from the arrangement, you may know all along that 364 days
of entertainment supplied by others will not be worth your giving up one day.
You would rather not have any of it and not give up a day than have it all and
spend one or your days at it. Given these preferences, how can it be that you are
required to participate when your scheduled day comes?67
Nozick recognizes that the PA example attacks a weak version of the fair play principle,
so he makes suggestions for improving it. For instance, he suggests that a stronger fair
play principle would build in the condition that the benefit should outweigh the cost of
participation. The cooperative scheme should be useful to participants. But Nozick has
an argument against this improved version of the principle too. For instance, what if
others benefit more from the PA system than you do? Or what if you prefer some other
joint activity to the one the group chooses, and you express your opinion by refusing to
take your turn at the PA? Suppose that you would prefer that the group take turns
reading the Talmud over the PA system instead of philosophy, and you believe that by
reading philosophy when your turn comes up, you reinforce the status quo and make it
harder to effect changes of the sort you envision. Nozick says even if the benefits
outweigh the costs in these cases, it would be wrong to enforce the principle of fairness.
And so on. Nozick further develops the fair play principle, in response to his own
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objections, and then provides more examples meant show its failings. In the end, he
rejects the fair play argument.
There are a couple of ways to respond to Nozick’s argument. Simmons provides
one voluntarist response. He argues that we need to distinguish participants from
innocent bystanders to make the fair play argument work. Participants voluntarily accept
the benefits of the cooperative scheme, and so owe something to other participants.
Bystanders do not. Nozick’s man is a bystander, not a participant, so his criticism of the
argument misses the mark. Klosko provides a non-voluntarist response. He argues that
Nozick’s examples are weak, because they all describe trivial benefits that are readily
available. On Klosko’s view, the fair play argument only works when the benefits are
indispensable and can only be provided by the government.
Simmons rejects Nozick’s arguments, because the individual in Nozick’s PA
example is not a participant in the sense that the fair play principle requires, but is instead
merely an “innocent bystander.”68 Nozick’s man has not volunteered for anything.
Participants voluntarily take part in the cooperative scheme. The most that Nozick’s
examples could show is that no one should be able to force just any scheme and its
obligations on us. But Simmons does not think that the fair play principle is meant to
work in this way. If it were, he says, it would be just as outrageous as Nozick thinks it is.
People who have no significant relationship to a cooperative scheme might benefit from
it in incidental ways, but this does not mean that they have any duties as a result. For
example, if your friend participates in a cooperative scheme that makes her a lot of
money, and you benefit from the scheme incidentally, in the form of expensive gifts she
68
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gives you, you have no obligation to do your part in the scheme. To put this in a political
context, citizens in Canada benefit indirectly from the efforts of the U.S. government to
maintain the rule of law in the U.S., but this does not mean that these Canadian citizens
have a political obligation to obey the U.S. government. The principle only works,
Simmons argues, if it applies to individuals who are participants in the scheme in some
significant sense. The dilemma faced by fair play theorists, then, is offering some
meaningful account of the distinction between participants and bystanders. One problem
to watch out for is that the participant/bystander distinction does not accidentally reduce
the fair play account to a consent account.
Simmons suggests that we can get past this problem by making a distinction
between accepting benefits and merely receiving them.69 This is the heart of his
voluntarist construal of the fair play argument. A participant in a scheme is someone
who accepts the benefits of the scheme. People who simply receive benefits, like
Nozick’s PA man, are merely bystanders and not participants. But isn’t accepting the
benefits of a scheme the same as consenting to the scheme? Doesn’t this move reduce
the fair play argument to a consent account? Not according to Simmons. You can accept
the benefits of a scheme without consenting to it. Suppose that Nozick’s neighborhood is
having trouble getting clean water. The water they get from the city lines is polluted, and
nearly everyone wants something to be done about it. The government is unresponsive,
so the neighborhood has a meeting to decide what to do. At the meeting, a vote is held
and the majority votes to dig a public well in the neighborhood, that members of the
neighborhood will pay for and maintain. But Jones voted against this scheme. He
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announces that he does not consent to this ridiculous plan, and that he will not support it
in any way. Despite his objection, his neighbors dig, pay for, and maintain the well.
Now that clean water is available to the neighborhood, Jones starts to envy his neighbors’
easy access to clean water. So he goes to the well each night and gets some for his home,
knowing that the water will never be missed. Simmons thinks this example shows two
things. First, since Jones accepted the benefits of the cooperative scheme, he now has a
duty to do his part. Second, Jones has not consented to this cooperative scheme. Jones
may think his neighborhood’s scheme is completely idiotic and absolutely the worst way
to get water, and so he frequently and loudly expresses his dissent. Thus, the fact that he
needs water and gets it from his neighborhood well instead of some other source does not
show that he consents to the scheme. However, there is no question that he accepts the
benefits of it. To Simmons, Jones has made himself a participant of the well scheme by
taking the water, and has thereby accepted the duties of a participant, despite the fact that
he refuses to give consent to it.
One serious problem for this voluntarist approach to fair play is created by open
or non-excludable benefits.70 These are benefits of government that citizens cannot
easily avoid. For instance, the benefits we receive from the efforts of police officers who
patrol our streets, catch criminals, and eliminate potential threats to our safety are open or
non-excludable. Other examples include goods like national defense, public health
measures, and efforts to protect the environment. The problem is this: does it make
sense to say that citizens accept open benefits? Is there some way in which citizens could
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refuse them? If not, then Simmons’s strategy for defusing Nozick’s objection does not
work.
Simmons argues that we can make sense of the idea that some citizens accept
open benefits, and that others do not. The crucial difference between them has to do with
the citizen’s attitude toward the open benefits received. We can say that a citizen accepts
open benefits if she receives them “willingly and knowingly.”71 To say that a citizen
knowingly accepts open benefits is to say that she understands that the benefits result
from a cooperative scheme. She knows how the benefits are generated. And to say that a
citizen willingly accepts open benefits is to say that she does not regard the benefits as
forced on her. Citizens who do not know, or who never think about, where the benefits
come from cannot accept them. Simmons is not clear about why this is so, but I think it
has something to do with the fact that such citizens do not really know (a) what they are
accepting, and (b) that what they are accepting comes with political obligations attached.
And citizens who regard the benefits as forced on them do not accept them. Thus, he
concludes, it is possible for citizens to accept even open benefits. However, this may be
a pyrrhic victory.
Simmons thinks the fair play argument ultimately fails the generality requirement.
It is implausible to hold that most citizens have accepted the benefits of government in
the relevant sense, so it does not explain why nearly all citizens have political obligations.
Many citizens barely notice the benefits they receive. Many other citizens think the
benefits they receive from the government are not worth the costs of participation (e.g.,
taxes, military service, laws restricting personal behavior, and so on). Still other citizens
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think that we buy benefits from the government (e.g., with our taxes). Thus, Simmons
argues, most citizens do not accept the open benefits of government, either because they
do not understand that the benefits result from a cooperative scheme, or because they
regard the benefits as forced on them by the government. Thus, the fair play account fails
the generality requirement.
Klosko offers a non-voluntarist response to Nozick. His account focuses on
features of the benefits received instead of on features of the individuals who receive
them.72 On his view, Nozick’s examples all share one fatal flaw—they describe
cooperative schemes that produce benefits of strikingly little value. How valuable, really,
is Nozick’s communal PA system? It certainly does not provide anything citizens need in
order to have decent lives. Nozick’s other examples describe similarly trivial benefits:
one example refers to a cooperative effort to sweep dirt from the street, while another
describes a cad who enters your house to thrust books into your arms. Who needs these
goods? No one, really. This, Klosko thinks, is what is wrong with Nozick’s argument:
Nozick’s rejection of fair play accounts relies too heavily on benefits that no citizen
really needs. To Klosko, Nozick simply misrepresents the fair play account. Fair play
generates strong obligations only when the goods supplied by the government are
“indispensable for satisfactory lives.”73 A good provided by the government is
indispensable when (1) individuals must have them in order to have satisfactory lives,
and (2) they can only be provided by the government. Examples of indispensable
benefits include physical security (national defense and domestic law and order),
72

Klosko, Political Obligations, p. 6.
Klosko identifies two other conditions as well: the goods must be worth the effort of recipients’ to
produce them, and have benefits and burdens that are fairly distributed (Political Obligations, p. 6).

73

48

protection from a hostile environment, and public health measures.74 To Klosko it does
not matter that these are open benefits, because the issue does not turn on whether or not
citizens voluntarily accept them. What matters is that citizens receive benefits from the
government that (a) they must have in order to live decent lives, but that (b) they cannot
secure on their own.
One problem with Klosko’s view is suggested by Simmons’s discussion of
Nozick. Simmons argues that the upshot of Nozick’s examples is that any plausible
account of fair play must make a distinction between participants and bystanders. But
Klosko makes no such distinction. Klosko seems to insist that bystanders do have an
obligation to do their part in cooperative schemes. Simmons claims that such a result is
outrageous. Bystanders have no duty to contribute to cooperative schemes, even when
they benefit from them. But we might defend Klosko on this point. Simmons’ claim
about the participant/bystander distinction seems to be informed by Nozick’s examples,
but, as Klosko points out, Nozick’s examples are weak because they describe trivial
goods. Klosko could admit that it is perfectly reasonable to make participation (in some
sense) a condition of a fair play obligation when the scheme in question and its benefits
are trivial. But the goods Klosko has in mind are not trivial. This may undercut
Simmons’ argument as much as it does Nozick’s. For it would be odd to claim that
participation is a requirement of obligation when a cooperative scheme provides
indispensable benefits, i.e., goods that a person cannot secure on her own, and cannot live
without. If participation is a requirement of obligation in this context, it may be so in
only a trivial sense (i.e., in the sense that non-participation amounts to death). Or it may
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simply be nonsensical to require (most) people to “participate,” in the sense of voluntarily
accepting goods that they need in order to live.
But the fact that Klosko’s view implies that bystanders have political obligations
does suggest that it doesn’t meet the particularity requirement. For example, Klosko
claims that the government’s provision of goods like public health and environmental
protection generates a fair play duty for citizens. But it is clear that these benefits do not
stop at national borders. For instance, people in Mexico and Canada, especially in border
towns, benefit from U.S. government efforts to maintain national security, to produce
internal social order, and to promote public health measures and environmental protection
schemes. If the provision of these goods by the U.S. government generates a fair play
obligation for U.S. citizens, then it would seem to generate the same obligation to the
U.S. government for Mexican and Canadian citizens who also receive the benefits. And
U.S. citizens who benefited from Mexican or Canadian government efforts at public
health or environmental protection would have a fair play obligation to those
governments. If this is correct, then Klosko’s version of the fair play duty may fail to
meet the particularity requirement. It does not explain why U.S. citizens have a
particular duty to their own government that they do not have to other governments.
Klosko might respond to this objection in a couple of ways. First, he might
simply deny that the benefits in question actually do extend much beyond the U.S.
border. I do not find this plausible for indispensable benefits generally, though it might
be true with regard to certain goods, such as certain public health measures. Second, he
might distinguish those who benefit directly from those who do not. For instance, he
could say that U.S. citizens in San Diego benefit directly from public health measures
50

provided by the government, and that Mexican citizens in Tijuana benefit only indirectly.
Third, he might concede the point the objection makes, and ground political obligation in
a more limited set of goods, e.g., domestic and national defense. This might weaken
political obligation a bit, but then it might escape the objection.
Thus, fair play accounts face certain difficulties as explanations of political
obligation. The main objection to fair play is the open benefits problem. It is not clear
that citizens who receive open benefits have any obligation to repay those who produce
them by contributing to their cooperative schemes (i.e., Nozick’s objection). One way of
getting around this problem may be to make a distinction between those individuals who
merely receive the benefits and those who accept them (e.g., Simmons’s strategy). Those
who make such a distinction, however, run the risk of reducing fair play to consent.
Simmons seems to find a way past this problem, but in the end he is forced to concede
that fair play does not meet the generality requirement, because few citizens accept the
benefits in a way that generates political obligations. Another possible way of getting
around the open benefits problem is to distinguish trivial from indispensable benefits
(e.g., Klosko’s strategy) and ground the duty in mere receipt of indispensable benefits.
This strategy has two serious problems. First, some might still insist that we need to
distinguish mere receipt of goods from acceptance of them. The fact that some good is
indispensable does not itself show that mental attitudes towards its provision are morally
insignificant, as I will explain below in my discussion of gratitude accounts. Second, the
mere receipt approach seems to fail the particularity requirement.
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Gratitude Accounts of Political Obligation.

Gratitude accounts ground political obligation in a duty of citizens to repay the
government for benefits received.75 This is one of the views that Plato considers in the
Crito. The Laws ask:
Are you not grateful to those of us laws which were instituted for this end, for
requiring your father to give you a cultural and physical education?... Then since
you have been born and brought up and educated, can you deny … that you were
our child and servant, both you and your ancestors?... We have brought you into
the world and reared you and educated you, and given you and all your fellow
citizens a share in all the good things at our disposal.76
On contemporary views, the benefits in question include things like public roads, schools,
parks, private property, social security, a police force to protect us domestically, an army
for national defense, and so on. The fact that the citizens receive these benefits from the
government binds them to repay the government. This debt is rooted in a principle of
gratitude. Repayment of this debt consists of supporting the government, which includes
obeying the law.
Several objections have been made to gratitude accounts. One common objection
points out that gratitude accounts imply that citizens of immoral and unjust governments
have political obligations to them.77 Even morally bad governments routinely provide
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some benefits to citizens. Thus citizens who received benefits from the Nazi government
or from Saddam Hussein’s government owe those governments a debt of gratitude, which
is cashed out as political obligation. But this seems absurd. Many simply reject gratitude
accounts for this reason.78 This objection seems to overlook an important point, one
made earlier in discussion of the general moral reasons approach. Political obligations
are not the only morally relevant factors in our deliberations about how we ought to act.
A citizen can have a political obligation to obey the laws of an immoral government, but
still have an all-things-considered obligation not to obey, if her other moral obligations
outweigh her political obligations. Political obligation is a prima facie duty, not an
absolute one. A citizen’s duties to fight injustice and cruelty might outweigh any duty to
obey an unjust government.
Another objection to gratitude accounts claims that the government has a duty to
provide citizens with benefits, so citizens do not owe the government anything for
providing them. Citizens have a right to things like roads and private property and
security. The government has a duty to provide these things. When the government
provides these things, it is simply fulfilling its obligation to its citizens. But no one
incurs a debt of gratitude for receiving benefits owed to them. So citizens owe the
government nothing. This objection has some merit, but it is not clear that duty-fulfilling
behavior cannot generate a debt of gratitude. Consider Simmons’ Porsche:
Suppose that I am driving through the country and come upon an accident victim.
I am a medical student and know that if he does not reach a hospital in twenty
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minutes, he will die. But I also know that the only hospital in twenty miles away
over rough back roads. So I drive the victim at sixty miles an hour over rough
roads in my new Porsche, saving his life and damaging its suspension. Now, I
think that there are two things which can truly be said of this case. First, what I
did, I had a duty to do; had I ignored the victim, or decided not to risk my
Porsche, I would have earned the most serious moral blame. Second, the accident
victim has an obligation to compensate me for the damage to my car, if it is
within his means.79
Still, it is equally clear that duty-fulfilling behavior does not always generate a debt of
gratitude. Consider: the accident victim has a duty to compensate Simmons for the
damage to his Porsche, which he discharges by paying to have the car fixed. But suppose
that Simmons’ car already had a few dents in it, before he took the accident victim to the
hospital. In discharging his debt of gratitude to Simmons, the accident victim ends up
benefiting Simmons, by fixing dents that he is not responsible for. Now, even though
Simmons has received a benefit from the accident victim, he does not now owe the
accident victim a debt of gratitude. In this case, receipt of a benefit does not generate a
debt of gratitude. In the end, the strength of this objection to gratitude accounts is not
clear. However, discussion of this objection does suggest a more straightforward
problem with gratitude accounts, grounded in the nature of debt-incurring acts.
Gratitude accounts often draw on an analogy between the relationship of a state to
its citizens and the relationship of parents to their children. Just as children owe a debt of
gratitude to their parents, for all the benefits provided during childhood, so too do citizens
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owe a debt of gratitude to the state. There are many reasons to question the aptness of
this analogy, but I want to set them aside and focus on something different. Part of the
reason we think a debt of gratitude is owed to parents is the fact that parents make special
sacrifices in order to provide for their children. Instead of going to Spain, they buy
diapers and medicine and food. Instead of buying Porsches, they put money away for
college. And so on. This idea seems to be at work in Simmons’ Porsche example too. If
Simmons had been able to transport the accident victim without damaging his car, or
making any special effort—he might have been going to the hospital anyway to work his
shift, and the road might have been smooth and clear—it is not clear what debt of
gratitude the victim might have had, if any. So a debt of gratitude is owed to a benefactor
only if the benefactor had to make some special sacrifice in order to provide the benefit.
This suggests a different problem with gratitude accounts, because the state does not
make any sacrifices in providing citizens with benefits. This does not mean that the state
does not work to benefit citizens—it does. But this is not the issue. The work that the
state does for citizens does not constitute a sacrifice made by the state. In fact, providing
for citizens seems to be the state’s raison d’etre. Why else have a state? Children owe a
debt of gratitude to their parents (if they do) in part because their parents might have done
other things with their resources. But what would the state do, if it were not providing
benefits for citizens? The state does not have other interests that it must give up in order
to provide for the needs of citizens. Providing for citizens is the state’s primary interest.
So the state does not make any sacrifices in providing for citizens, and no debt of
gratitude is generated by its duty-fulfilling behavior.
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Finally, some reject gratitude accounts because it seems unlikely that the state can
have the kind of attitude toward the transaction that is necessary for the provision of
benefits to generate a debt of gratitude. The provision of benefits generates a debt of
gratitude only when the benefactor provides them (a) voluntarily, (b) intentionally, and
(c) for the right reasons.80 For example, no debt of gratitude is owed to someone who is
forced at gunpoint to provide a benefit. Some debt may be generated by this transaction,
but it is not a debt of gratitude. The same is true when someone provides a benefit
unintentionally. If I were to leave some change on a restaurant table as a tip, and it
turned out that one of the coins I left was rare and worth quite a bit of money, the waiter
might owe me something for providing this benefit, but he would not owe me a debt of
gratitude. We are grateful to someone when they go out of their way to benefit us, but in
both of the examples above, the benefactor did not go out of his way to provide the
benefit. Finally, someone who passes out favors just because he hopes to benefit in
return might be owed something, but he is not owed a debt of gratitude. When someone
provides a benefit simply to advance his own cause, he is really just using the person he
helps as a means to his own ends. This is a problem for gratitude accounts, because the
state cannot have any of these mental attitudes towards its transactions with citizens.
Since the state is not the kind of entity that can have the appropriate mental
attitudes towards any transaction between it and citizens, the state’s activity cannot
generate a debt of gratitude. In fact, critics say, the state cannot have any mental attitudes
at all. One possible response to this would be to identify the state with the individuals
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who comprise it. However, while this allows us to attribute attitudes to the state through
individual government agents, it will not solve our problem if we cannot attribute some
common attitude to all of them. This seems implausible. There are undoubtedly some
government agents who do their jobs with the full, voluntary, intention of benefiting
citizens, but it is not clear that this is required of them (as, say, a condition of doing their
jobs well). Nor is it plausible to suppose that all or even most government agents have
this attitude. Many do their jobs simply to enhance their positions, or to bring home a
paycheck, or to have something to do and somewhere to go during the day. Now, we
might speak metaphorically about the state’s attitudes, but, if our politicians are any
example, it is not clear we should believe that the state provides benefits intentionally,
voluntarily, and for the right reasons. Even in good states benefits are often provided as
payment for future votes. Sometimes states provide benefits to citizens in order to
solidify claims to full and good standing in the international community. So this strategy
won’t work either. In the end, there is no obvious way to describe a state, such that we
could then say that it has the attitudes necessary for the generation of debts of gratitude.
So the gratitude approach fails to account for political obligation. First, the debt
of gratitude is only generated when the benefactor has the right kind of attitude about the
benefits provided. But a state is not the kind of entity that can have any attitudes at all.
We might anthropomorphize a bit, and suppose that the state does have attitudes about its
acts, but it is far from clear that the state’s attitudes would be the right kind for generating
debts of gratitude. For instance, the state often provides benefits for self-interested
reasons. We might try to equate the state’s attitude with the attitudes of the government
agents who comprise the state, but we will face the same problem. Second, the debt of
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gratitude seems to depend on sacrifices made by the benefactor. We owe our parents a
debt of gratitude (if we do), in part because they might have done something different
with the resources they ultimately decided to spend on us. But the state does not make
this kind of sacrifice for its citizens. The state’s raison d’etre just is providing for its
citizens. It has no other interests that it must give up in order to take care of us.

A Crossroads for Political Obligation.

The main traditional accounts of political obligation suffer from a number of
serious defects. As a result, there is a growing skepticism about the possibility of a
compelling account of political obligation ever emerging.81 This has pushed political
philosophers in three different directions. One group, undaunted by past failures, seeks to
develop alternative accounts of political obligation, accounts that avoid the problems that
plague the traditional accounts. I will briefly discuss two of these alternative accounts—
Rawls’s natural duty of justice and Dworkin’s associative account—in the next section.
A third alternative account, developed by Philip Soper, will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 3. A second group, now convinced that no citizen ever has a duty to obey the
laws of her state, simply rejects political obligation and legitimacy altogether, and affirms
instead philosophical anarchism. This move depends on something called the
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correlativity thesis. I discuss this position later in this chapter, after I examine some
alternative accounts of political obligation. A third group argues that the question of
political obligation has no implications for the question of political legitimacy. They
reject the correlativity thesis. Thus, the failure of political philosophers to offer any
compelling account of a citizen’s duty to obey the law says nothing about the
government’s right to enforce the law. I end this chapter with a survey of several of these
theories of legitimacy.

Alternative Accounts of Political Obligation.

One group of political philosophers is undaunted by past failures and is busy
developing alternative accounts of political obligation. One family of alternative
accounts are the theories that Klosko refers to collectively as reformist consent accounts.
Reformist consent accounts offer suggestions about how we might alter our political and
social institutions so as to rescue consent accounts from problems like those discussed
above. For example, our political institutions might be altered in ways that would make
voting into a sign of genuine consent, rather than simply a consent-implying act. Or we
might, as Tideman suggests, give citizens a right to secede from the union, with their
property intact, and insist that those who do not exercise this right thereby consent to be
governed.82 Another family of alternative approaches is founded on the belief that the
traditional approaches make a fundamental conceptual error by assuming that political
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society might somehow exist without political obligation. These constitutive or
conceptual arguments seek to show that political obligation logically must exist because
“membership” in a polity is simply unintelligible without it.83 Dworkin’s associative
theory of obligation is an example of this constitutive approach. In this section I briefly
discuss a third alternative, Rawls’s natural duty of justice, and then Dworkin’s view.
In A Theory of Justice (hereafter TJ), Rawls finally rejects the fair play account of
political obligation that he defends in his earlier work, and replaces it with an account
based on what he calls a natural duty of justice.84 Rawls rejects the fair play account
because he takes it to be voluntarist in nature.85 It requires that individuals freely choose
to take part in some cooperative scheme, in this case, that they freely accept their (just)
constitutional order. But he is ultimately convinced by Hume that there is no plausible
way to construe the association between (most) citizens and their political system in
voluntarist terms.86 Each of us is simply born into one political system or another, and
there is nothing really voluntary about it. So he is forced to give up on fair play as a
general account of political obligation.87
In TJ Rawls argues instead that the duty to obey the law is ultimately rooted in a
natural duty to support and further just institutions.88 According to Rawls, natural duties
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are distinct from obligations.89 Obligations are moral requirements generated through
voluntary actions. A promise is one kind of voluntary action that can generate an
obligation for a person. If P promises to do X for Q, then P has incurred an obligation to
do X for Q. Obligations are narrow in the sense that only the person who makes the
promise, P, incurs the obligation to do X, and only the person to whom the promise has
been made, Q, is owed X. Natural duties are different from obligations. They are not
rooted in voluntary actions, but are simply moral requirements all people must follow.
Further, they are owed to people generally. Natural duties are owed by all people to all
people. One example is a natural duty of mutual aid, a “duty of helping another when he
is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to
oneself.”90 Other natural duties include a duty not to harm others, and not to cause
unnecessary suffering.
In TJ, Rawls grounds the duty to obey the law in a natural duty of justice, which
has two parts:
This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and
apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established,
at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus if the
basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the
circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme.91
This does not imply that citizens have no duty to obey unjust laws. The natural duty of
justice requires that citizens support the basic social structure, the fundamental
89
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constitutional rules that define a society politically, when the basic structure is just. The
basic social structure is more or less the same as a constitution. It describes a society’s
basic social and political institutions, including its most fundamental procedures for
enacting law. The natural duty of justice basically requires us to support just
constitutional arrangements. However, no constitution, not even a just one, is perfect, in
the sense that it only issues just laws. Even just constitutions sometimes fail us in this
way. When otherwise just constitutional procedures result in an unjust law, the natural
duty of justice requires citizens to support the constitution by obeying that law, despite
the fact that it is unjust (within certain limits).
There are several problems with Rawls’s natural duty of justice. One commonly
noted problem is that it fails the particularity requirement.92 It does not explain why
citizens have a special relationship to their own government, a particular duty to obey its
laws, that they do not have with other governments. According to this account, it seems
as if people should have a duty to uphold just institutions, wherever they may be. If
Mexico and Canada have just constitutions, then U.S. citizens have a duty to support
those governments by obeying their laws too.
Horton has another worry.93 Rawls claims the natural duty applies to political
institutions that are “just or nearly just.” But what about institutions that are not nearly
just? Do we have no duty to obey the law in such situations? This is not a worry about
reasonable disagreement over what justice requires, which Horton recognizes as a serious
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problem. Rather, Horton doubts that it is true that people never or simply cannot have a
duty to support or comply with unjust institutions. He admits that some political
institutions are so unjust that the only decent response is full-fledged opposition. But,
Horton says, there is injustice and there is yet worse injustice. We need not accept
Hobbes’s general theory to see that it is sometimes reasonable to support unjust
institutions, when the only available alternatives are worse. Horton expresses this view
with caution, because it can easily be exploited in defense of various forms of tyranny.
But his point has merit nonetheless: there is no a priori argument that shows that we
never have an obligation to support unjust institutions.
Horton also worries that Rawls’s theory fails because, in his view, it is too
abstract and ideal to be helpful. Horton doubts that many states, if any, past or present,
can be considered even nearly just. If it is the case today that no state is nearly just, and
Horton thinks it might be, then no one has an obligation to obey the law. This would
make Rawls’s theory a failure. Horton recognizes the value of ideal theory, and the fact
that even non-ideal political philosophy cannot be done without some abstraction and
simplification, but there is always a danger that such abstraction may lead us astray, that
it will “degenerate into a philosophically idealized abstraction, bearing at best a very
distant and obscure relationship to the world as we experience it.” This, he thinks, has
happened in the case of Rawls’s natural duty of justice. Interesting though it may be as
an intellectual exercise, it is not very helpful. What we need an account of political
obligation to do is to make sense of people’s relationships to the political societies they
actually inhabit, not the societies they might inhabit if only they lived in a better world.
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Dworkin grounds political obligation in associative or role obligations.94 This is a
species of conceptual or constitutive argument. According to Dworkin, “political
association, like family and friendship and other forms of association more local and
intimate, is in itself pregnant with obligation.”95 It does not matter that people do not
choose their political communities. Horton puts it this way:
… familial obligations share several features with political obligations, and … the
family provides a good example of a context in which obligations are experienced
as genuine and rather open-ended, and are not the result of voluntary undertaking
…. A polity is, like the family, a relationship into which we are mostly born.96
Political obligations are like associative obligations, special moral requirements attached
to social roles and positions, whose content is specified by local practices. For Dworkin,
“we have a duty to honor our responsibilities under social practices that define groups
and attach special responsibilities to membership,” as long as certain conditions are met.
Group members must believe the obligations hold within the group and are not duties
owed to persons generally, that the obligations are run from each member to every other
member, and not to the group as a collective, and finally, that the obligations emerge out
of a concern for the equal well-being of all group members. These obligations do not
need independent or external justification. Justification takes the form of showing that
the obligations in question are constitutive of the community. Nor is it necessary that
people generally actually feel and think this way. Dworkin’s theory of law is
interpretive. In trying to understand the law and its requirements, e.g., to resolve
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ambiguities in the law, we try to interpret what has happened in our legal system in the
past in the best way possible given our present moral self-understanding. This helps us to
understand what we ought to do right now and aim for in the future. In doing this sort of
interpretation of law and political communities, we should suppose that people have the
right feelings and thoughts because these are the “practices that people with the right
level of concern would adopt.”
Dworkin’s view avoids the problem with particularity requirement that Rawls’s
view faced. However, one common complaint raised against conceptual views is that
they simply posit that membership in political society is a social or political fact about
people that requires no explanation or defense.97 But it is precisely this that is one of the
most contentious issues in traditional debates about political obligation. There is some
merit to this complaint. In any case, even if we grant that people are in communities that
they quite literally constitute through their shared feelings and attitudes, still we might
ask whether the feelings and attitudes they have imply any responsibilities that rise to the
level of a moral obligation to obey the community’s laws. This depends, in part, on how
strong we take political obligation to be. If it is a weak prima facie duty, then the feelings
and attitudes of community members may be sufficient to generate it. If it is a stronger
duty, then this may present a problem for conceptual accounts.

The Correlativity Thesis and Philosophical Anarchism.
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The correlativity thesis holds that a government has a right to enforce the law
against citizens only if citizens have a duty to obey the laws of that government, and vice
versa.98 This is what Anscombe means when she says that “obedience/disobedience are
the primary correlates of authority.”99 According to the correlativity thesis, there is a
strict correlation between the right to enforce the law and the duty to obey it. One cannot
exist without the other. This thesis is a key component in one kind of argument for
philosophical anarchism. This argument holds that the failure of political obligation,
when coupled with the correlativity thesis, implies that no state has a right to enforce its
laws. Since there is good reason to doubt that a compelling account of political
obligation is possible, we lose one end of the correlativity thesis bi-conditional. If
citizens do not have a duty to obey the government’s laws, then the government does not
have a right to enforce them. This is philosophical anarchism.
Philosophical anarchism does not imply that disobedience or revolution are
justified, or even that citizens do not have good reason to obey the law. Quite the
contrary. There are reasons to obey the law, even when the government has no right to
enforce it. For example, prudential self-interest and the obvious moral value of social
order and institutions like private property give all citizens reason to obey. What
philosophical anarchism holds is that citizens have no special duty to obey the laws of
their own country, just because they are the laws of their own country, and that no
government has a right, strictly speaking, to enforce its laws.
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The correlativity thesis argument for philosophical anarchism is different from
other arguments for anarchism. The correlativity argument ultimately grounds anarchism
in skepticism about the possibility of political obligation. Wolff’s anarchism is
different.100 Wolff argues that the state is simply inconsistent with the primary human
obligation to be autonomous. The state is defined by authority, or the right to rule. A
human being cannot submit to the state’s authority in any way that is consistent with her
obligation to be autonomous, to rule herself. Since the state is incompatible with the
primary human obligation, the state cannot be legitimate. Simmons defends yet another
kind of anarchism.101 He believes that a state could be legitimate, if (nearly) all citizens
consented to be ruled by the state. However, since no state in the world today can claim
that its citizens have given this consent, no state today can be considered legitimate. He
does not argue that it is impossible for a state to be legitimate, but only that no currently
existing state is legitimate.
Many now reject the correlativity thesis.102 In contemporary political philosophy,
this rejection can be traced back to Robert F. Ladenson’s “In Defense of a Hobbesian
Conception of Law.”103 Ladenson claims that political legitimacy—the right to rule, or
what he calls government authority—does not imply or depend on a duty to obey among
citizens.104 This is so because legitimacy is not a “claim-right,” but a “justification100

Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, second ed., (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
See, e.g., Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 192, 194-5.
102
Those who reject the correlativity thesis include, e.g., Allen Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and
Democracy,” Ethics, v. 112 (2002), pp. 689-719; Rolf Sartorius, “Political Authority and Political
Obligation,” Virginia Law Review, v. 67 (1981), pp. 3-17; and A. John Simmons, “Voluntarism and
Political Associations,” Virginia Law Review, v. 67 (1981), pp. 19-37.
103
Robert F. Ladenson, “In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law,” Philosophy and Public Affairs,
v. 9 (1980), pp. 134-159. Ladenson develops the account of claim- and justification-rights he uses in the
Hobbes paper in his earlier “Two Kinds of Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry, v. 13 (1979), pp. 161-172.
104
Ladenson, “In Defense,” p. 137-9.
101

67

right.” When a person asserts a claim-right, she makes a strong moral demand for
something or against someone. This implies that others are morally required to behave in
certain ways. In short, claim-rights are correlated with duties for others. This kind of
right depends on the existence of some institutional background sufficient for handling
such claims, e.g., sets of rules and procedures, political offices, military/police, and so on.
One example of a claim right is the right to basic subsistence, in the form of food, water,
and shelter. This right is a demand for something, and it requires others to behave in
certain ways.
Justification-rights are different: “when one asserts a justification-right in a
particular situation, one does not press a claim against others but rather responds to
demands for justification of one’s behavior.”105 Justification-rights do not require an
institutional background, nor do they imply duties for others. Asserting a justificationright amounts to claiming that an act is justified or otherwise all right. For example,
justification-rights are invoked when a person wants to justify an otherwise immoral or
illegal act, such as self-defense. According to Ladenson, the right to harm another person
in order to protect one’s self, or one’s family, is not a claim-right—a demand for
something or against somebody—but a justification-right—an insistence that the act is
justified, even if it appears immoral or unjust. In other situations, invoking a
justification-right “amounts to contending that what one did was all right.” Here
Ladenson cites Judith Thompson’s “famous violinist” example.106 In this example, a
person must allow his kidneys to be connected to a famous violinist, in order to keep the
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violinist alive. A person’s right to disconnect from the famous violinist is a justificationright. You are not asking for the provision of some good, or insisting that someone else
do something for you; you are simply asserting that it is ok for you to disconnect yourself
from the violinist.
Ladenson claims that the government’s authority in the broadest sense is
constituted by both justification- and claim-rights. The government’s right to use
coercive force in the name of law is a justification-right. When there are sufficient moral
reasons for the government to use coercive force against citizens, the government is
justified in using its power. Exactly what counts as sufficient reason is an open question,
one that philosophers have not yet answered. But this does not mean that the government
has blanket permission to do whatever it wants. There are limits and exceptions to the
government’s legitimate power. Again, philosophers have yet to determine just what
these limits are. The government also has a right not to be usurped. This is a claim-right,
a strong moral demand that citizens allow the government to perform the functions of
government, and not to take these matters into their own hands (e.g., as a lynch mob
might seek to carry out a death sentence on their own).
But this combination of justification- and claim-right does not imply that citizens
have a duty of allegiance to the government, or a duty of obedience to the law as such.
Strictly speaking, the government’s right to enforce the law is a justification-right, and so
it implies no such correlative duties. This does not mean that there is no duty to obey the
law; it just means that the source of any such duty, if such a duty exists, is not the
government’s right to rule. The right to enforce the law and the duty to obey the law are
distinct.
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Some think this distinction is not sound. For instance, Finnis wonders why
“arguments capable of justifying a claim to moral authority to make and enforce the law
would not equally (or by addition of only uncontroversial premises) justify the claim that
there is a generic moral obligation to obey the law.”107 Soper wonders the same thing.108
I believe that Simmons answers this challenge well.109 Ladenson goes too far when he
claims that a justification right is merely a liberty right that implies no correlative duties.
A justification right does imply some duties, but these duties do not rise to the level of a
duty to obey. For example, Simmons says, if I attack a would-be mugger in self-defense,
other bystanders should not interfere with me, nor should the mugger resist my efforts to
save myself. Thus, my justification-right to self-defense does imply some duties for
bystanders and for the person I use my coercive power against, i.e., the mugger.
Similarly, the government’s justification-right to enforce the law is correlated with a duty
of citizens not to interfere with the government’s legitimate use of its coercive power, or
to resist this power when it is applied against them. Thus, citizens have some duties
correlated with the government’s justification-right. However, these duties do not
amount to an obligation to obey the government or the law as such. The question we are
trying to answer, as Simmons correctly sees it, is this: “under what conditions is a
government morally justified in exercising the customary functions of government?”110
Whatever these necessary conditions are, the right to command and be obeyed is not one
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of them. The minimal conditions for justified or legitimate government do not include
the right to command and be obeyed, despite what Anscombe or Wolff might insist.
Strictly speaking, then, the correlativity thesis is false. Political legitimacy does
not imply political obligation, and vice versa. The government’s right to enforce the law
against citizens does not imply that citizens have a duty to obey the law, or the
government, or depend on citizens having such a duty of obedience. But this does not
mean that citizens have no duties to a legitimate government. Minimally, citizens have
duties not to usurp the legitimate powers of government, and not to interfere with the
government’s exercise of its coercive power against citizens. These political duties
amount to prima facie duties to acquiesce to, or to defer to, the government, when it
legitimately exercises its power against citizens. To distinguish these duties from
political obligation, I will refer to them as “political deference” or the “duty to defer.”111
Political legitimacy is not correlated with political obligation; it is correlated with
political deference, or a duty to defer.

The Problem of Political Legitimacy.
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duty is the same thing as political obligation.
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Since the correlativity thesis is false, we do not need to show that that citizens
have a duty to obey the government or the law as such, in order to show that the
government has a right to enforce the law against citizens. Instead, an account of
legitimacy must do two things.112 First, it must explain the conditions under which some
government has sufficient justification to use its coercive power against its citizens to
enforce its laws. Second, it must explain why citizens under these conditions have sound
reason to defer to, or to acquiesce to, the government when it seeks to exercise its
legitimate power.113 The problem of political legitimacy is not new, but it becomes
foundational in political philosophy beginning with the modern era, when the idea of a
divinely mandated or naturally given political order is rejected and we start to see persons
as naturally free and equal, and each as possessed of natural authority over him or
herself.114 Political power makes people unequal—some people get to tell other people
how to live—and inevitably involves restricting the freedom of some individuals, so the
legitimacy of political power is prima facie problematic. From Hobbes to the present
day, we have been trying to understand how, if at all, political power can be made
consistent with the freedom and equality of persons. Some have concluded that this
effort is futile, that there is no way to resolve this problem.115 Others reject this skeptical
view.116
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The problem of political legitimacy is not new, but it is not well understood by
political philosophers. Work in this area is nowhere near as developed as is work on
political obligation or justice. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, though
modern philosophers like Hobbes were interested in legitimacy, contemporary
philosophy has largely ignored the issue. It has spent its time working primarily on
justice. This is not time wasted, of course, but it is past time for work on legitimacy to
catch up, especially since it is now quite common to claim that it is reasonable for
citizens to disagree about what justice requires. And, in any case, legitimacy and justice
are not identical issues. It is not clear to most that what is just can be legitimately
enforced against all, simply because it is just. This requires argument. A second
impediment to work on political legitimacy has been a general, albeit uncritical,
acceptance of the correlativity thesis. Before Ladenson’s paper twenty years ago, few
seemed to think it possible to separate legitimacy from political obligation. Since the
failure of political obligation was regarded as complete well before that time by many
political theorists, few thought there was any point in talking about legitimacy. Until
some compelling account of obligation could be offered, many felt this strand of political
thought had reached a dead end. The recent rejection of the correlativity thesis has freed
work on legitimacy. However, this work is still in its infancy today.
Not surprisingly, there is a lot of confusion in the literature on legitimacy. For
instance, in one recent article noted political philosopher William Rehg claims that to say
a law is legitimate is to say that it deserves to be obeyed by citizens.117 This is exactly
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wrong. It confuses the fundamental issues of political obligation and legitimacy. More
confusion is revealed in a recent exchange between Richard J. Arneson and Christopher
G. Griffin, published as a debate in the Journal of Political Philosophy.118 Here I am less
interested in the merits of their respective positions, and more interested in the basic
confusion their debate reveals. Arneson argues that legitimacy (coercive power of
government) requires democracy. He defends the claim with an instrumental “best
results” account. On his view, democracy legitimates the coercive power of the
government, because it is reasonable to think that over time this scheme promotes
morally superior results to any other feasible alternative. Griffin rejects Arneson’s appeal
to instrumentalism. He argues that democracy is intrinsically just, because the practice
treats people appropriately, in this case by publicly expressing and affirming the equal
political status of all persons. Justice requires such public affirmation of equal basic
social status. This is a perfect example of the confusion that mars the current literature
on legitimacy. Arneson and Griffin are talking about fundamentally different normative
political ideas, legitimacy and justice respectively, and how each is related to democracy.
Since Arneson and Griffin are talking about distinct normative issues, it is clear that their
debate tells us little about either. It is never clear exactly what is at issue, nor is it clear
how each thinks the arguments he deploys should be taken by the other. For what it’s
worth, and despite the fact that the authors think they disagree with one another, one
could coherently (though perhaps not comfortably) argue that Arneson is right about the
link between legitimacy and democracy, and that Griffin is right about the link between
118
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justice and democracy. There are other examples of similar confusions. Political
philosophers need to spend more time on legitimacy.

Approaches to Legitimacy.

Approaches to the question of legitimacy can be divided into two broad camps:
descriptive and normative. Many follow in the tradition of Max Weber and offer
descriptive sociological accounts of legitimacy.119 From this social scientific perspective,
legitimacy is reduced to whatever the citizens of some society happen to believe
legitimacy to be. If a people believes its government to be legitimate, for whatever
reasons, then it is legitimate. The emphasis in this sociological project is on explaining
why people obey authority, and why regimes persist, and not on whether or not particular
regimes should continue to wield authority. One charge leveled against this approach is
that it simply overlooks the important questions about legitimacy.120 Another charge
made is that this narrow focus on attitudes fails to recognize what history has taught us
again and again—people easily come to feel obligated to those who wield power over
them, whether that power is deserved and rightfully used or not.121
The normative political approach, inspired by Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke’s
Second Treatise of Government, and Rousseau’s Social Contract, sees legitimacy as a
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normative notion, justifiable in terms of normative considerations. On this view, the fact
that people believe their government to be legitimate and are willing to acquiesce to its
demands does not determine whether or not the government in question actually deserves
to be considered legitimate. This does not imply that belief in the legitimacy of authority
could have no moral relevance. But normative theories of legitimacy ultimately have a
critical purpose—“to establish a standard against which individual rulers or regimes can
be assessed, and, where need be, found wanting.”122 This critical standard involves more
than just descriptive facts. Within the normative political camp sit a number of different
approaches to legitimacy.
One useful way of distinguishing normative approaches to legitimacy is by
grouping them according to the relative weight or value they give (a) to the capacity for
judgment of individual citizens, and (b) to some understanding of the interests of
citizens.123 At one end of the spectrum are respect for judgment views, views that give
great weight to the choices citizens make, in real or idealized situations, and less weight
to other interests. From this perspective, political authority and relations are legitimate
only if they are consistent with genuine respect for the capacity for judgment of
individuals seen as free and equal. Respect for judgment views are rooted in Hobbes,
Locke, and Kant, and find expression today in several places, most influentially in
consent theories124 and the work of John Rawls.125 The contemporary project here is to
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see whether free and equal citizens do affirm, or would all have reason to affirm (in some
real or idealized forum), or would at least have no reason to reject, the essentials of
democratic society. This project suffers from a host of serious problems. Some argue
that it simply cannot accommodate the breadth and depth of reasonable disagreement.126
There is simply nothing that even remotely resembles the kind of unanimity envisioned in
these projects, nor is there reason to expect any such consensus to develop. If consensus
is necessary, this is a serious problem. However, not all shared reason views are
consensus views. For instance, the shared reason views of Kant, Soper, and Rawls do not
depend on consensus. Others argue that the shared reason has an illicit secular slant, in
that it inappropriately rules out comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religious
commitments, and sneaks secular commitments in by the back door. This objection is
most frequently advanced by those attempting to preserve room for appeal to religious
belief in democratic public discourse,127 but it could be raised by others as well, e.g.,
those whose serious moral commitments to preserving nature are grounded in reasons not
generally shared by other citizens.128
At the other end of the spectrum are views that give great weight to the interests
of citizens, and less weight to their capacity for judgment, to make decisions. From this
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perspective, political authority and relations are legitimate only if they are consistent with
a genuine respect for the real or basic interests of each citizen (which may include an
interest in making judgments and having them respected by others). This general
approach focuses on the interest each citizen has in belonging to a political society that
advances her interests, whatever her interests might be. This approach draws on ideas
from the earlier utilitarian (e.g., Bentham and Mill) and constitutional republican (e.g.,
Rousseau) traditions and finds expression today in a number of approaches to democratic
legitimacy. The basic idea is that government action is legitimate only insofar as the
government acts to promote the common interests or good of its members. One problem
with such approaches is understanding just what the common good or interest is when
members see themselves as free equals possessing a wide range of conflicting interests,
some of which they might value above membership in political society. There are a
range of alternative positions, and all suffer from defects.
In the next few sections I will briefly discuss different respect for judgment and
respect for interest views of political legitimacy.

Respect for Judgment Views of Legitimacy.

Some theories of legitimacy give pride of place to respect for the judgments of
individuals. Two important families of views in this camp are consent accounts and
shared reason accounts. There are several consent accounts of legitimacy, mirroring the
variety of consent accounts of political obligation. The idea is roughly that a government
is legitimate only if citizens have consented to be ruled by it. One compelling approach
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to consent is the Lockean approach, represented in contemporary political philosophy by
A. John Simmons. There are also a variety of shared reason approaches to legitimacy.129
The idea here is roughly that government is legitimate only if it is reasonable from the
perspective of every individual. Exactly what counts as “reasonable from the perspective
of every individual” is an open question. It is fleshed out in different ways by different
political theorists.

Consent Accounts of Legitimacy.

There are many kinds of consent theories.130 In a number of works, A. John
Simmons has developed a modern Lockean “actual consent” account of legitimacy.131
Roughly, Simmons argues that a state’s legitimacy rights, held against specific subjects
bound by state-imposed duties, arise only from some morally significant relationship
between the state and its subjects. For the Lockean, the morally significant relationship is
one of consent. Before any person consents to be ruled, she lives in a state of natural
freedom from political association. According to Simmons, she need not join political
society at any time.132 States earn legitimacy by virtue of the unanimous consent of
members to transfer certain rights to a central authority. Governments are legitimate only
if they have been entrusted by the people with the exercise of those rights. What is most
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important here, to Simmons, is that actual consent theories recognize that “how we have
lived and chosen, confused and unwise and unreflective though we may have been, has
undeniable moral significance; and our actual political histories and choice thus seem
deeply relevant to the evaluation of those political institutions under which we live.”133 It
is this actual, lived sense of respect for individual judgment that Simmons takes to be
vital to any discussion of legitimacy. This is, he argues, the only way to really respect
individual judgments. And since this is what we must do, any proper claim to legitimacy
must be built on this ground.
There are several problems with this approach. First, as many have pointed out,
consent accounts of legitimacy are very demanding. Simmons concludes, as do many
other consent theorists, that no state in the world today can be considered legitimate,
because no state can reasonably claim that (nearly) all citizens have consented to be
ruled.134 But this seems like an absurd conclusion to many. Surely we want to be able to
say that some governments are legitimate. Perhaps, then, we should reexamine the basic
presuppositions of consent accounts, rather than reject the idea of legitimacy altogether.
One presupposition of consent theories that often gets questioned is the idea of the state
of nature. Rawls, for instance, rejects the idea that individuals persons are born free from
political associations, and enter into them only voluntarily. He holds instead that political
membership is a social fact—we are simply born into some political society. Thus,
instead of rejecting the idea of legitimacy, some prefer to reject basic assumptions made
by consent theorists.
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Of course, consent theorists say that they do not actually reject legitimacy. They
hold that a state could be legitimate, even if none actually are. But it is not clear what
purpose is served by talking about a goal no state can approach. If no state is legitimate,
the idea of legitimacy seems to have no value. Simmons recognizes this problem, but
insists that legitimacy remains an important evaluative tool, even though all states are
illegitimate.135 An ideal of legitimacy could serve as a goal toward which governments
might strive, or give us a way of establishing a scale of better or worse governments.
Finally, some criticisms Simmons levels against Weberian attitudinal accounts seem
equally challenging to his own view.136 He says, for instance, that we should reject
attitudinal accounts, because attitudes can be so easily manipulated. But it seems that this
also applies to his own actual consent account. The attitudes that might lead one to
consent to be ruled are surely not free from manipulation either. And he says that some
states may be legitimate, even when they do not receive attitudinal support, especially in
cases where people are stupid, immoral, deceived, manipulated, and so on. But it seems
that this charge could be leveled against actual consent theories as well. If stupid,
immoral or deceived people do not consent to be governed, why should this count against
the legitimacy of the state?

Shared Reason Views of Legitimacy.
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The idea behind shared reason views is roughly that government power is
legitimate if it is exercised pursuant to and in accord with rules, e.g., constitutional
essentials, that are reasonable from every individual’s perspective. What it means to say
that some rules are “reasonable from every individual’s perspective” is an open question.
Several issues distinguish different shared reason views, but here I will describe just two.
One has to do with the appropriate perspective from which individuals assess political
rules. The other has to do with whether shared reason requires consensus.
The first issue has to do with the appropriate perspective from which individuals
should assess political rules. On one end of the spectrum are views that take people as
they are, with their own actual and particular beliefs, desires and motives. This empirical
perspective roots shared reason in actual individual’s actual perspectives. On such views,
political rules are reasonable only if each person concludes that she supports them,
according to her own understanding of the issues she regards as relevant, and her own
standards of reasoning. This view respects individual’s actual beliefs and ways of
reasoning, not those individuals would have if they were better informed, or better
reasoners. At the other end of the spectrum are normatively loaded views. These views
take people as they could be, if they were better informed, or better reasoners, and ask
what they would judge reasonable, from some privileged, normatively significant
perspective. The question is not what actual people would affirm, given their actual
beliefs and modes of reasoning, but what they would affirm, if they had normatively
appropriate beliefs and modes of reasoning.
The empirical view has certain virtues, but it also has serious defects. It respects
each individual’s capacity for judgment by giving pride of place to actually held beliefs
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and standards of reasoning. It makes no demand that individuals conform to beliefs or
standards that others regard as better or otherwise more appropriate for the situation.
Unfortunately, people often believe and desire what they shouldn’t. Given this, it is
reasonable to worry that people might conclude that some governments are legitimate
when they do not deserve this status, and that other governments are illegitimate when
they ought to be considered legitimate.
This problem is less likely to occur on the normative end of the spectrum.
However, the normative views suffer from other defects. It is not obvious what the
proper normative perspective ought to be. There are good faith disagreements over what
we ought to believe and desire. And even if people could agree that some normative
perspective is the proper one, we should expect good faith disagreements over what
might be accepted from that perspective. And there are even good faith disagreements
over the demands of reason itself. If we could find an ideal perspective that is grounded
in norms generally shared by all, it might serve as an appropriate base for reasoning about
public political matters. But reasonable disagreements over what norms are appropriate,
and over how we ought to reason from any particular normative perspective, pose a
serious threat to this possibility.
The Rawlsian view I defend sits somewhere between these poles. Rawls holds
that the legitimacy of state action in a liberal democracy depends on a sincere
commitment of citizens to certain shared but abstract political values. Two things stand
out. First, Rawls excludes citizens who reject democracy. The legitimacy of state action
in a liberal democracy is ultimately rooted in the shared commitments of citizens not
opposed to liberal democracy. Second, he holds that there are reasons actually held by
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citizens that we can appeal to. However, he thinks that some of these reasons are very
abstract, and that others are only implicit in public political discourse and need to be
drawn out. Further, he does not deny that citizens might have self-interested reasons or
moral, religious, or philosophical reasons for affirming democracy, but he privileges
reasons drawn from the pool of political values for the purposes of legitimacy.
Nevertheless, he thinks there are normative reasons actually shared by all citizens
committed to liberal democracy.
The second issue has to do with whether shared reason requires consensus. This
issue was introduced in the Preface. At one end of the spectrum, shared reason requires
that we find terms of association that no reasonable person could reasonably reject. This
is a weak position, philosophically speaking, because it is too demanding to be
reasonable. The only terms of association that meet this requirement are too general or
abstract to determine any particular constitutional or institutional order for any real
polity. Values shared in this sense underdetermine any particular constitutional or
institutional structure, even in the realm of ideal theory. At the other end of the spectrum,
shared reason requires only that we believe that the terms of association we offer to
others are cogent or otherwise sufficiently grounded in reason, and that the terms could
be affirmed by all, from some suitable and shared point of view. (The nature of this
shared perspective is an open question.) The main worry about this is that it is not
actually shared reason. We can get around this worry, though, if we see shared reason as
a commitment to a kind of respect for persons. Minimally this view of shared reason
respects individuals by requiring something similar to what Reidy refers to as reciprocity
in advantage and reciprocity in justification. Reciprocity in advantage means roughly
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that terms of association must respect the basic interests of all to some degree. It is not
reasonable to believe people could affirm terms of association that fail to respect their
basic interests altogether. Thus, shared reason views require that the interests of all must
be considered when designing political institutions. Reciprocity in justification means
roughly that terms of association should be based on reasons that are publicly available to
all. This means that individuals must seek reasons that are part of their culture’s tradition
of moral and political thought. Some theorists, like Soper, have a relatively open or
broad understanding of what it means to say that reasons are publicly available, while
others, like Rawls, have a more strict understanding.

Respect for Interest Views of Legitimacy.

Another family of approaches to legitimacy bases it on some conception of the
common good or the common interests of individuals. The different members of this
family of approaches can be distinguished by how they understand the content of the
common good, or how they think we determine what the common good is. All of these
views take respect for judgment to be important. That is, they all recognize that one
important interest individuals have is the ability to make decisions and to have those
judgments recognized by others. But unlike advocates of respect for judgment views,
advocates of common good approaches do not see respect for judgment as the
fundamental value in settling questions of legitimacy. They place the emphasis
elsewhere in their political conception of persons as free and equal. Aggregative and
deliberative approaches to democracy represent two kinds of respect for interest views.
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They share the idea that the government’s coercive political power is legitimate when it is
exercised in accord with democratic outcomes that express the popular will, that is, when
such power serves the common good as it is expressed in these ways.137 They disagree
about how we find the popular will. Other kinds of respect for interest views dispense
with the idea of the popular will, or give it a less central place, and aim more directly at
fundamental or basic interests shared by individuals. One such view is Richard
Arneson’s best results account. Allen Buchanan grounds another such view in what he
calls the robust natural duty of justice.

Respect for Interests and the Popular Will: Aggregative and Deliberative Accounts.

On the aggregative approach, the common good is just what we get when we tally
up people’s votes with respect to their own interests. The common good is understood as
nothing more than a simple aggregation of individual goods. Each individual citizen is
taken to understand his own good best, and this knowledge is aggregated through
democratic institutions. One common criticism of this approach is that aggregative
arrangements, in themselves, “lack the “moral resources” required to generate and sustain
legitimate collective solutions to politically contentious issues.”138 One worry that gives
rise to this complaint is that electoral outcomes are vulnerable to distortion, since they are
susceptible to a wide variety of influences, including arbitrary social, cultural and
economic asymmetries. Social choice is a branch of rational choice theory concerned
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with aggregating individual interests into social outcomes.139 According to some, social
choice theory shows two main problems with voting: instability and ambiguity.140
Voting is said to be unstable because all aggregation mechanisms can generate cyclical or
intransitive social orderings.141 It is said to be ambiguous, because electoral outcomes
are, at least in part, artifacts of the process by which votes are counted. Here the problem
is not that all outcomes are subject to manipulation, but that some may be, and that we
have no reliable means for determining when this happens. All things considered, the
aggregative approach seems faced with possibly insurmountable difficulties.
On the deliberative approach, the common good is what people arrive at after
some appropriate deliberative process.142 Advocates of this approach claim that
deliberation transforms the substance of individual preferences, which serves to minimize
conflict and, in the ideal case, produces consensus among participants. This
transformation is said to occur in a number of ways, e.g., by exposing objectionable
preferences or inducing reflection on the grounds for holding otherwise unobjectionable
preferences. The main problem with this approach is that it hardly seems realistic to
expect any consensus in preferences or values in the large, modern, and diverse
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democratic societies under discussion. In fact, it seems clear that deliberation can and
sometimes does sharpen disagreement, rather than resolving it.143
Neither of these views seems promising. The main problem they share is that of
offering some compelling account of how we ought to determine the popular will. It
seems clear that each view faces very serious problems, and it is not obvious how, if at
all, these problems might be overcome.

Best Results Accounts of Legitimacy.

Another respect for interest view is what Richard Arneson calls a “best results
account.” According to Arneson, democratic governments can legitimately enforce their
laws because democracy produces better results for citizens over time than any available
alternative form of government. A government only has the right to use its coercive
power to direct individual’s lives when the exercise of this power works out well for all
concerned parties. Democracy alone is legitimate, because it works out best for all
concerned; any other available form of government would work out less well overall than
democracy. For Arneson, legitimacy amounts to a kind of stewardship: a form of
government is legitimate if it more reliably fulfills the fundamental rights of individuals
than other forms of government. Other best results accounts offer different
understandings of what it is reasonable to expect from democracy. For instance, Ian
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Shapiro offers a best results account in The State of Democratic Theory. One notable
feature of his account is his fairly dim assessment of what “best results” it is reasonable
for us to expect in modern democracies. I will discuss his view in detail in Chapter 3.
There are two main problems with best results accounts in general, both rooted in
reasonable disagreement. I will illustrate this briefly using Arneson’s best-results
account. Arneson argues that democracy works out best for all concerned because it
maximally fulfills fundamental rights. One sort of disagreement is over what we mean
by democracy. There are many different political institutions and decision procedures
that can be regarded as democratic. Exactly which democratic institutions would produce
the best results in terms of, say, individual rights, is not clear. In fact, it is likely that
people will disagree about this, even if we get them to agree that rights are the
appropriate metric to use. But other problems attach to the idea that rights are the best
way to measure political institutions. First, even if we agree that rights are the
appropriate metric for assessing political institutions, people reasonably disagree about
what our rights are, and even what our most fundamental rights are.144 Thus it is not
clear that any uncontroversial assessment of democracy in terms of fundamental rights is
even possible. Second, others argue that rights are simply the wrong metric to apply
when assessing political institutions. That is, there is reasonable disagreement over just
what terms are appropriate for such assessment. For example, contemporary utilitarians
would argue that we ought to appeal to some notion of utility, rather than rights, when
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assessing political institutions.145 And some communitarians would argue that we ought
to give some notion of the common good more weight in such assessments, and
individual rights correspondingly less weight.146 The point is that even if we agree that
political institutions ought to be assessed in terms of best results, it is not obvious what
results we ought to consider “best.” Without some general metric that (nearly) all
citizens affirm, it is likely that all assessments will be controversial, i.e., that political
institutions reasonably regarded as legitimate by some citizens, because they are thought
to produce the best results, will reasonably be regarded as illegitimate by others, because
they are thought to be suboptimal in terms of results, when some different metric is
applied.

Buchanan’s Natural Duty of Justice.

Allen Buchanan offers a respect for interest account of legitimacy that grounds it
in what he calls the robust natural duty of justice.147 On his view, a government is
legitimate if and only if it (a) does a credible job of protecting the most basic rights of
individuals, (b) provides this protection in ways (e.g., policies, procedures, actions) that
themselves respect basic rights, and (c) is not a usurper (i.e., has not come to power by
wrongly deposing the legitimate government). These conditions are rooted in what he
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calls the “robust natural duty of justice,” a limited obligation each of us has to help
ensure that all persons have access to institutions that protect their basic rights. This duty
is implied by the fact that we regard all persons as entitled to equal concern and respect.
This is obvious, Buchanan says, because we cannot plausibly hold that all persons are
entitled to equal concern and respect and then deny that each of us has an obligation to do
something to ensure that the basic rights of all persons are protected.
Buchanan’s robust natural duty of justice is not an account of political obligation.
Buchanan holds that only consent could ground political obligation, and he thinks that all
consent accounts fail. But Buchanan rejects the correlativity thesis, so the fact that
citizens have no duty to obey the law does not imply that government cannot be
legitimate, that it cannot enforce the law against citizens. Here the natural duty of justice
plays its role. It is the ultimate ground of Buchanan’s theory of legitimacy.
This robust natural duty of justice figures into political legitimacy in two primary
ways. First, it gives citizens weighty reasons to comply with governments that satisfy the
three conditions of legitimacy. Second, it provides a powerful normative justification for
government to wield coercive political power against citizens, especially if (as Buchanan
argues) individuals have no right not to be coerced into satisfying their duty of justice.
Where democracy is not possible, it is sufficient for a government to satisfy the three
legitimacy conditions. But where democracy is possible, legitimacy requires that leaders
and laws be chosen democratically. This is so because it gives citizens an equal say in
determining who wields political power, and in determining the content of the what laws
that limit and otherwise regulate the use of that power.
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Conclusion.

I do not share the general skeptical outlook of many regarding political obligation.
I believe that it is possible to establish at least a weak prima facie duty to obey the law.
In this I rely on Philip Soper, whose account of political obligation I discuss in depth in
Chapter 3. Nevertheless, I reject the correlativity thesis. It is false. But this does not
mean that there can be no relationship between political obligation and legitimacy. I
argue in Chapter 4 that Soper’s theory of political obligation forms the core of Rawls’s
theory of legitimacy. This is a big promise, and I hope to make good on it in Chapters 3
and 4. In Chapter 2, though, I will discuss two respect for interest approaches to law,
obligation, and legitimacy. I have two main reasons for doing this. First, these theories
are correct when they say that democracy protects and promotes certain important
interests shared by all, even if they are mistaken to think that this alone can ground
political obligation or legitimacy. Here democracy will be defended against some fairly
serious charges. Second, I want to examine the ways that respect for interest views try to
respect the freedom and equality of citizens without appeal to any notion of shared
reason. In the end, I reject respect for interest approaches because they do not fully
respect one of the most vital uses of our capacity for judgment: our capacity to determine
for ourselves exactly what our basic interests are.

CHAPTER 2
SHAPIRO AND WALDRON
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No liberal democratic society can constitute itself as a body politic without some
exercise of force in the face of good faith dissent and disagreement. We simply disagree
about too much, even from the shared moral point of view of democratic citizen. We
disagree about religion and morality and philosophy, and we disagree about how to
resolve disagreements between people who disagree about such things. We disagree
about politics. We disagree about what it means to be a citizen, about how to specify our
most fundamental rights, and about how to organize our most fundamental political
institutions. And even when we agree on certain political issues, for instance, that all
citizens are free and equal, politically speaking, we disagree about just what this commits
us to. What this means for us, as citizens who constitute and work to continually sustain
and improve our democratic polity, is that in the case of nearly every political dispute, the
will of some must rule all. Each side to a political dispute can only present its case, and
then (after some appropriate decision procedure is invoked or engaged) one side wins and
the other side loses. In this sense, the continual constitution of a democratic body politic
is always at the same time an act of political power and acquiescence.
This exercise of power in the face of good faith dissent is not merely a practical
problem, but is also a theoretical problem. Political theory cannot be done without some
abstraction and simplification. This is true of both ideal and non-ideal theory. But
whatever else we might wish to simplify for the sake of political theory, we must not
pretend that good faith disagreement will soon fade away. To do this is to distort our
self-understanding and to turn democratic theory into something wildly utopian. Modern
democratic society is characterized by good faith disagreement. We must not ignore this.
This fact encompasses all citizens, including political philosophers. What this means for
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political philosophers as philosophers is that they cannot even hope to say what political
justice ultimately requires in a democracy, even under ideal conditions. What justice
requires can only be worked out by actual citizens through real-time political processes.
What political philosophers can do is mark out the conditions under which citizens have
reason to respect the outcomes of these real-time political processes, even—and perhaps
especially—those outcomes they find deeply morally troubling in some way.
A central historical reason for our faith in democratic politics, and for its claim on
our allegiance, has been the Enlightenment conviction that public deliberation and
rational inquiry will lead citizens to converge on some rational and robust conception of
justice and the common good. But we have to give up on the idea that reason will lead us
to some rational and shared moral vision. Reason is plural, fragmentary, and incomplete.
It leads people in different directions, and so is inadequate to the task set for it during the
Enlightenment. Unless we want to give up our faith in democracy too, we need some
other explanation or account of it. This is a central task of post-Enlightenment political
philosophy. Does democracy deserve our allegiance? Can democracy legitimately
authorize the exercise of coercive state power?
Some argue now that a mere modus vivendi is the most we can expect from our
post-Enlightenment situation. Good faith disagreement infects politics all the way down,
since no political decision procedure is immune to the burdens of judgment, so every
political decision can (and likely will) be seen as an illegitimate or unjust exercise of pure
political power. Proponents of this view think the best we can hope for is that the
different factions that wield the greatest political power will see a tolerable peace as
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preferable to a war for supremacy. In essence, our post-modern condition has returned us
to our pre-modern one. A modus vivendi is the best we can achieve.
Shapiro, Waldron, Soper and Rawls think we can hope for more. Each develops
an account of democratic law and political authority that is normative and not merely
prudential, but that also takes seriously the depth of good faith disagreement. What each
aims to do is mark out conditions under which all citizens would have sound normative
reason, and not mere prudential reason, to respect the outcomes of real-time democratic
political processes. Shapiro and Waldron are discussed in this chapter. Soper and Rawls
are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
Shapiro defends a normative conception of democracy rooted in principles of
non-domination and “affected interest.” He argues roughly that democracy deserves our
respect because it is the best way (among the available alternatives) to manage power
relations between citizens who disagree about the good but who cannot move away from
one another. When Shapiro calls it our “best” option, what he means is that democracy is
the least worst form of government open to us. It does not work well, if our goal is
realizing some robust understanding of justice or the common good. But, then, no other
form of government does this well either. What distinguishes democracy from the
alternatives is its capacity to minimize domination in a society. Democracy has this
capacity when it requires politically powerful individuals and groups to compete for the
votes of the individuals whose basic interests are most likely to be affected by any
particular political decision. This is a respect for interests approach to political obligation
and legitimacy. (Shapiro seems to assume that the correlativity thesis is true.)
Democratic law can be rightfully enforced by the government, and citizens have a duty to
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obey the law, because democratic decision procedures do a better job of securing nondomination than available political alternatives.
Waldron offers a normative conception of democracy rooted in the idea that
democratic law embodies important social achievements. On his view, although citizens
recognize that they disagree about justice and the common good, they also recognize the
need for concerted action to produce important social goods, such as the conditions
necessary for a market economy, a system of health care, environmental protection, and
so on. Waldron refers to this situation as the Circumstances of Politics. Law enacted in
the Circumstances of Politics deserves respect as the embodiment of the achievement of a
common plan of action in the face of disagreement over what we should do about our
common problems. Waldron argues that majoritarian democratic decision procedures
have special virtues that play an important role in generating the law’s normative force.
Waldron’s view is a weak shared reason view. His version of reciprocity in advantage
focuses on social goods created through democratic activity, and each person’s interest in
being respected in certain ways by the political process of voting. His version of
reciprocity in justification is mentioned, but it’s never really explained.
One of my aims in this dissertation is to discover the limits of reasonable hope for
a liberal democratic society, to discover if it is at all possible to realize or achieve
important elements of our liberal democratic ideals, once we acknowledge the fact that
political power, even in democracies, must be exercised in face of reasonable
disagreement and dissent. While both of the normative accounts discussed in this chapter
are morally preferable to the prudential modus vivendi view, I will argue (in the last
chapter) that they fall well short of key liberal ideals. In my view these liberal ideals are
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plausible, to some extent at least, so the respect for interest views discussed here fall a bit
short of our reasonable goals. Rawls’s view is morally preferable to Shapiro’s and
Waldron’s because it is more faithful, in spirit if not in practice, to the liberal ideal of
shared reason. However, Rawls’s view may turn out to be unworkable. If Rawls’s vision
cannot ultimately be sustained, and the best we can hope for is represented by views like
Shapiro’s, we may be forced to conclude that there is little hope of realizing many of our
liberal democratic ideals.

Ian Shapiro and The State of Democratic Theory.

In The State of Democratic Theory, Ian Shapiro defends a normative conception
of democracy founded on principles of non-domination and affected interest.148 He
argues that a democratic society’s political institutions ought to be structured in ways that
ensure that the basic interests of all members are protected from the politically powerful.
The best institutional framework for achieving this goal of non-domination is a form of
competitive democracy, which protects citizens by having political agents (e.g., officials
and parties) compete for their votes. Here Shapiro draws on the work of Joseph
Schumpeter. Exactly what we ought to do to protect the interests of citizens is something
of an open question, because solutions to particular problems depend on many variable
conditions, including just what interest or interests might be at stake, how basic they are,
how they are threatened, and a variety of local conditions or contingencies, including,
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e.g., local history, economy, geography and so on. Thus, what needs to be done in
Shapiro’s native South Africa might be a bit different from what needs to be done in an
established democracy like the United States.
At the heart of Shapiro’s approach, though, is what he calls the “principle of
affected interest.” Institutional reforms are positive to the extent that they make
democracy more responsive to those citizens whose interests are most likely to be
affected, or whose interests are most strongly affected, by any particular decision,
especially when the interests at stake are essential or fundamental interests. Sometimes
this principle requires only that everyone whose interests might be affected by a decision
gets to vote. At other times, when it seems like voting cannot adequately protect
fundamental interests, the principle requires that we have experts redesign political and
social institutions in ways that reduce or eliminate threats to fundamental interests.149
Nevertheless, democratic decision procedures can still sometimes foster domination.
When this happens, Shapiro argues that a limited form of judicial review is appropriate.
Shapiro’s principle of affected interest is not a conception of justice, nor does it
presuppose or entail one. It is a much thinner respect for interest view than, say,
Buchanan’s robust natural duty of justice view. Buchanan seems to think we can answer
the question of what justice requires with some certainty, and in a fairly robust and
determinate way. Shapiro doubts that this is so. There is no reason to think any robust
and determinate conception of justice will be affirmed by democratic citizens generally.
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This does not give due respect to good faith disagreements. Of course, politically
powerful individuals can seek to use their power to promote their own conceptions of
justice, but this is not what Buchanan seems to imagine. Further, Buchanan seems to
think that democracy can do a more or less good job of fostering some conception of
justice. Again, Shapiro doubts that this is so. On his view, democratic decision making
is controlled by politically powerful individuals. Democracy does not allow citizens
generally to express or institute some conception of justice. All democracy provides for
citizens is a means for replacing those politically powerful agents who threaten our
fundamental interests with other politically powerful agents.

Shapiro’s Method.

It is natural to ask, at the very start, if democracy is necessary at all, given
Shapiro’s stated aim of protecting the basic interests of persons. For unless a person has
a basic interest in democratic participation, which Shapiro does not assert, it is not
obvious that democracy is the only way, or even the best way, to protect basic
interests.150 If basic interests are normatively fundamental, and democracy’s value is
merely instrumental, then it is an open question whether any society ought to have
democratic institutions.151 Why not some form of guardianship instead?152 It might be
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the case that ordinary people simply cannot articulate and defend their own basic interests
as well as, say, a group of philosopher-kings could, and thus that the aim of protecting
basic interests is best served by putting society in the hands of a small group of persons
specially qualified to govern (by virtue of, e.g., their high intelligence, or profound virtue,
or both). It does no good to insist that people have a basic interest in justice, and that
justice in turn requires democracy, because the relationship between justice and
democracy (if any exists) is not at all clear.153 In any case, people might simply prefer,
all things considered, to have qualified guardians handle most, if not all, collective action
problems. Now, whether or not one finds guardianship a compelling alternative to
democracy is not the issue. The point is just that once democracy’s value is seen as
merely instrumental, it becomes an open question whether democracy is the best means
for achieving whatever ends are sought. Thus, one might think Shapiro simply errs in
asserting a need for democracy in the name of basic interests. At the very least, doesn’t
he owe us a defense of democracy?
Shapiro does not approach this question directly, but there is a response in his
work. He acknowledges that democracy has for some time had a bad name among
certain political theorists, especially the rational choice camp that follows in the tradition
of Kenneth Arrow, and that some seek to justify alternative forms of government (or nongovernment, in the case of anarchists). But despite this theoretical skepticism, Shapiro
says, “the democratic idea is close to nonnegotiable in today’s world.”154 Democracy is
more or less a given for the vast majority of people in the world—many already have it,
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and those who do not have it hope to. There are, of course, parts of the world that are
ruled by dictators, but even these rulers tend not to reject democracy outright. Dictators
generally argue instead that their societies, while not fully democratic, are transitioning
toward democracy or are actually more democratic than they appear. Thus even
authoritarian rulers understand the importance of democracy. There is, of course, good
reason to doubt the sincerity of many such claims. Still, there was a surprising and
dramatic increase in the number of democracies in the world between 1980 and 2002.
According to the United Nations, eighty-one countries moved from some form of
authoritarian government to democracy during this twenty-two year span. In thirty-three
of these countries, military dictatorships were replaced by civilian governments. Thus,
despite democracy’s supposed defects as a form of government, and despite the many
doubts and worries raised by political theorists, it is clear to Shapiro that democracy has
“legitimacy in the world.”155
But democracy’s nonnegotiable status does not imply that people agree about
what democracy ought to be. To the contrary, different people have different ideas about
what democracy can and should be. And in every democracy, some people will feel that
their society is not working as it should. But Shapiro thinks problems like these only
serve to strengthen his point. Insofar as these are worries over what democracy should
be, or objections that target malfunctions or corruptions of democracy, democracy’s
nonnegotiable status is affirmed. Within democratic systems, he says, no one doubts that
people are free to despise their democratically elected leaders. However, neither does
anyone doubt that the elected government has the right to be the government.
155
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And so we get to a key element of Shapiro’s method and purpose. Democracy
has “legitimacy in the world,” but people disagree about what it should be. This is where
Shapiro enters the discussion. His aim is not to defend democracy, but to improve or
perfect it. He assesses the state of democratic theory, not with an eye toward justifying it,
but with an eye toward making it better. He complains that too many theorists act as if
we can start over, as if we can begin anew. But, he says,
Despite the presuppositions behind much academic literature, human beings do
not generally design institutions ex nihilo; they redesign existing institutions
along the lines suggested by such metaphors as rebuilding a ship at sea.156
Thus, Shapiro intends to rebuild democracy. Democracy is the decision-making system
we, U.S. citizens, have inherited. It is already the decision-making system of many
peoples around the world. And where democracy is not already in place, people
generally aspire to it. This understanding of the status democracy already has in the
world shapes Shapiro’s overall approach in The State of Democratic Theory.
Shapiro identifies two common metrics for assessing democracy. One is
normative. This literature assesses normative justifications of democracy as a form of
government. The other is explanatory. It assesses accounts of the dynamics of
democratic institutions and practices. One of Shapiro’s problems with current democratic
theory is the fact that these two literatures have developed in relative isolation from one
another. But speculation about what ought to be, when not informed by relevant
information about what is possible, often has little real-world value. And explanatory
theory, when divorced from significant normative concerns, often becomes “banal” and
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“method-driven.” So Shapiro intends to take “an integrative tack, focusing on what we
should expect of democracy, and on how those expectations might best be realized in
practice.”157
For example, rational choice theorists have long argued that democracy is an
irrational decision procedure, because it can lead to arbitrary and irrational outcomes.158
Suppose (for the sake of argument) that three voters—I, II, and III—are faced with three
policy choices—A, B, and C. If voter I ranks her choices A > B > C, and voter II ranks
her choices C > A > B, and voter III ranks her choices B > C > A, then there is a majority
for A over B (voters I and II), a majority for B over C (voters I and III), and a majority
for C over A (voters II and III). This is known as a voting cycle, and it presents
proponents of democratic decision making with certain problems. First, since a voting
cycle violates the principle of transitivity, which is considered a basic feature of
rationality, the rationality of democracy as a decision procedure can be questioned.
Second, it opens up the possibility that whoever is in control of the order of voting can
manipulate the outcome, if they know the preferences of voters. Third, even if there is no
conscious manipulation of the order of voting, still, it seems, the outcome must be
arbitrary, insofar as outcomes seem to have more to do with the order of voting than with
actual voter preferences.
As a result, some argue that we should hem in democratic decision making (e.g.,
legislative action) with courts and multiple veto points. Since voting is irrational and
subject to manipulation, it represents a potential threat to individual rights and welfare.
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This threat can be reduced through the institution of counter-majoritarian practices,
practices that reduce or restrict legislative activity.
At least, this is what rational choice theory says about democratic decision
making. Fortunately for us, empirical research on democratic decision making does not
support such dim conclusions.159

A couple of recent studies suggest that voting cycles

are actually quite rare. Other observers note that legislatures do not seem to show the
arbitrariness, irrationality, and instability that rational choice theory predicts. These and
similar empirical findings are surprising, and have led some to reevaluate the proper role
of rational choice theory in political theory.160 None of this shows that rational choice
theory cannot contribute to democratic theory. What this does show is the need to draw
together, to integrate, normative theory and empirical, explanatory research.
Despite all of this, one might still reasonably worry that Shapiro has not yet
addressed the general concern, namely, whether democracy is necessary at all if our goal
is to protect the basic interests of persons. I do not share this worry, though it is not
without some merit. Shapiro doesn’t answer this particular challenge. In this respect,
however, Shapiro’s work is not unlike Rawls’s or Dworkin’s. Rawls takes the
democratic practice we have inherited as a starting point and asks, not whether we ought
to have it—we do—but whether we can make it morally compelling or attractive in terms
of our own best moral self-understanding. The goal of democratic theory, then, is to
redeem what history has bequeathed to us. If, in the end, we cannot redeem it—if we
simply cannot make our best understanding of our democratic practice fit with our own
159
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best moral understanding of who we are, both as individuals and as a people—then the
question of what form of government we ought to have, if any, would take on a special
urgency, one that would put it solidly at the center of political theory. But we have not
yet reached that point. So I agree with Shapiro, Rawls, Dunn, and others in this camp.

Domination and the Common Good.

Shapiro argues that democracy deserves our allegiance, not because it is a reliable
means of expressing or institutionalizing the general will, but because it is “the best
available system for managing power relations among people who disagree about the
nature of the common good, among many other things, but who nonetheless are bound to
live together.”161 The main problem with viewing democracy as a means to producing
the common good, says Shapiro, is just that there is no common good. At least, there is
no common good in any robust sense. People’s interests simply conflict. There is no
reason to think public democratic deliberation can reduce such conflicts.162 In fact,
deliberation may do exactly the opposite, by highlighting and sharpening disagreement,
or by revealing to us the fact that some disagreements are simply irresolvable. We can,
of course, simply aggregate people’s expressed interests, but such calculations can hardly
be taken as expressions of the general will or the common good.163 Why not? To
Shapiro the main problem is that people’s expressed preferences may have been shaped
or influenced by politically powerful agents. Different citizens control vastly different
161
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amounts of political and economic power. Some citizens have enough of both to shape
political agendas and maybe even to influence the development of others’ sense of their
own interests. Other citizens have very little power of either sort. So before we can
aggregate people’s expressed interests in any meaningful way, we need to make sure the
relevant citizens are not dominated.164 Fortunately, minimizing domination is something
that democracy can do.
Shapiro offers non-domination as a “stripped down” version of the common good.
The common good is just every individual’s interest in avoiding domination.165 This thin
understanding of it is preferable to the versions offered by the aggregative and
deliberative theorists, Shapiro says, because it does not have to contend with the
collective rationality problems facing the others, and it is more sensitive to the reality of
power. Further, this limited understanding of the common good is one that democratic
government can achieve.
On Shapiro’s view, democracy is valuable because it represents our best chance
of reducing domination in society. But we should not expect too much from democracy,
even when it is working properly. Shapiro follows Winston Churchill in this regard:
democracy is “the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time.”166 What Shapiro means when he says that democracy is the best
way to manage power relations is that democracy provides at least the possibility of

164

“The decisive role played by money in politics means that politicians must compete in the first instance
for campaign contributions and only secondarily for the hearts and minds of voters. By ignoring this,
Gutmann and Thompson attend too little to the ways in which power relations influence what deliberation
should be expected to achieve in politics.” State, p. 32.
165
State, p. 3.
166
Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, November 1947. See
http://adamsharp.com/RAVES/QUOTES/index.asp [9/2/02].

106

diminishing or curtailing domination in any given society. This possibility is what draws
people to it. But while democracy has this “constitutive commitment” to nondomination, there is no guarantee that democracy will reduce, even less eradicate,
domination in any or all of its forms. There are no perfect decision procedures, and, even
if there were, in real democratic societies many factors influence the contexts in which
democratic decision-making takes place. The current distribution of wealth and political
power are facts we must contend with, not facts we can wish away. Despite all of this,
democracy still represents our best hope for reducing domination.
Ilya Somin complains that Shapiro’s theory of domination is vague, but we can
get some idea of what he means from the way he contrasts his account of domination
with Max Weber’s.167 Weber defined domination as “the probability that a command
with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”168 Thus, Shapiro
says, for Weber “the existence of domination turns only on the actual presence of one
person successfully issuing orders to others.”169 Shapiro sees domination differently. He
holds, roughly, that domination requires duress, i.e., that the dominated person acted as
he did because some sort of threat had been made against his continued well-being. This
understanding of domination is both wider and narrower than Weber’s. It is wider,
because it does not require the actual presence of agents who issue explicit orders. While
Shapiro does not go so far as someone like Foucault, who claims that domination does
not require human agency at all, Shapiro does think domination can occur in a number of
subtle and indirect ways. Domination can occur when a person or group can shape
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agendas, or constrain options, or influence preferences and desires, in ways that affect
people’s interests. For example, domination occurs when group A secures the support of
group B, largely because group A controls resources that are essential to group B’s basic
interests. This is domination, even if no identifiable member of A issues explicit
commands to any member of B. It may simply be the case that A makes its desires wellknown, and that B understands that A will be displeased with any group that acts to
thwart A’s aims.
Shapiro’s insistence that domination results only from the illegitimate use of
power is what makes his account narrower than Weber’s. Power relations and hierarchy
are common features of human life and interaction. Compliance is compelled in many
human social institutions, including armies, companies, schools, and families, just to
name a few. But requiring people to do things is not the same as dominating them. For
instance, there is nothing wrong with using sanctions (grades) to compel students to do
their homework. There is, however, something wrong with using the gradebook to secure
money or sexual favors. Since hierarchy can easily facilitate domination, Shapiro says
we have good reason to always view hierarchical relations with suspicion. We should
take care to reform hierarchical social institutions in ways that reduce the likelihood of
domination. But hierarchy is not itself a form of domination.
Then when are people subject to domination as Shapiro understands it? When
their basic interests are threatened by others. Shapiro does not explicate our basic
interests in any robust way, but he says that “we can think of people’s basic interests by
reference to the obvious essentials that they need to develop into and survive as
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independent agents in the world as it is likely to exist for their lifetimes.”170 He says his
view is similar to the “resourcist” views of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya
Sen.171 These different theorists each affirm a list of basic goods, the possession of
which would make possible the pursuit of any one of many different conceptions of the
good life. Anyone who can threaten a person’s basic interests can exercise a great deal of
power over her. This presents a serious threat of domination. For instance, an employer
who can fire an employee when there is no unemployment compensation has the
opportunity to dominate the employee.

Controlling Government Power—Constraints and Incentives.

Governments wield an enormous amount of coercive power. One main function
of government is the deployment and maintenance of this coercive power for the good of
citizens. This is not the only function of government, but it is one of its most important
ones. For Shapiro, the good of democratic government is just that it represents our best
chance at minimizing domination. The question that arises now is how to control the
exercise of state power so as to ensure (to the extent that we can) that the government
limits and does not facilitate domination.
Two general institutional strategies for controlling power are constraints and
incentives. Constraints are institutional roadblocks designed to make government action
170
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difficult, or walls designed to keep government out. For example, multiple veto points
are constraints meant to slow or reduce government action. The separation of powers is a
constraint of this sort. The different branches of government are charged with resisting
the overreaching of the other branches. Other constraints are private spheres defended by
counter-majoritarian institutions such as the Supreme Court, the constitution, and so on.
Incentives, on the other hand, are institutional features designed to give government
reason to find solutions to problems that in some way satisfy everyone. There is an
element of this in the separation of powers, insofar as this separation gives each branch
incentive to seek solutions to problems that will not be rejected by the other branches.
The authors of The Federalist argued that the best system would be comprised of both
constraints and incentives. Unfortunately, Shapiro points out, there are serious problems
with constraints, and relatively little work in the literature on incentives. This leaves us
in a bad spot. The great virtue of Schumpeter’s democratic theory, according to Shapiro,
is that it is primarily an incentive-based account of democratic government.
According to Shapiro, constraints on government action are fraught with serious
problems. Two of the main problems that constraints are meant to solve are the
possibility of irrational and/or manipulated collective action. Multiple veto points are
supposed to reduce this threat by making it harder for the government to do anything at
all, thereby limiting government. The main problems with this, according to Shapiro, are
that it is something of a false dilemma, and that it privileges the status quo. Proponents
of multiple veto points tend to describe our choice as one between (a) more collective
action and (b) less collective action. This is misleading. Even minimal government
would be a massive collective undertaking, involving at least social institutions designed
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to protect basic interests from both domestic and international threats, and to keep track
of things like private property and to enforce contracts. That is, even minimal
government would be very expensive and demand a lot from citizens. Thus, Shapiro
says, we will have a massive collective action scheme, one way or the other. The real
question is what do we want from our collective action? Our real choice is this: do we
want (a) government institutions that protect everyone from domination, or (b)
government institutions that protect the status quo?172 Choosing multiple veto points is
the same as choosing b. This does not mean that veto points cannot help us. They can,
but only when used judiciously. What is wrong is to employ them willy-nilly, as a
general strategy for managing irrational or manipulative uses of governmental power in a
democracy.
Other constraints are meant to identify and protect private spheres of human life
through institutions such as the Supreme Court, a constitution, and so on. However, these
constraints have just as many problems as veto points. One problem with this strategy,
according to Shapiro, is that such institutions are themselves often majoritarian
institutions. The Supreme Court contains nine members who deliberate and then vote.
This means that the Supreme Court may suffer from exactly the same pathologies that
plague democratic decision making. Again, though, Shapiro does not argue that there is
never a time for this kind of constraint. They can be helpful. But it is a mistake to see
constraints as general strategies for controlling the problems associated with collective
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rationality. They are not a cure-all, but must instead be carefully and thoughtfully
applied only in situations where they can do some good.
Thus, while constraints may help us reduce some of our collective choice
problems, they are not an ideal solution, and should not be used indiscriminately. They
can sometimes protect us from the possibility of irrational or manipulated collective
action, but if they are not used carefully, they can contribute as much to the problem as to
the solution. This is why it is important that we also have incentives. The great promise
of Schumpeter’s account of democracy is its focus on incentives.

Competitive Democracy.

Shapiro’s model of competitive democracy draws heavily on the account Joseph
Schumpeter develops in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.173 The core of
Schumpeter’s view is the idea that government power can be controlled by making it the
prize in regular and competitive elections. Political agents must win control of the
government by garnering more votes from citizens than competitors do. The winner gets
control of the government for some specified period of time. When that time is up, then
political power is put up for grabs again. For example, the U.S. holds a presidential
election every four years. Power is controlled in such a system by making political actors
compete for the hearts and minds of citizens every few years.
Schumpeter makes an analogy between political and economic competition. He
says that we can think of voters as consumers, political parties and candidates as
173
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companies, votes as profits, and government policies as political goods and services.
When parties are seen as companies competing for the votes of citizens, Shapiro says,
“leaders can be seen as disciplined by the demands of competition.”174 Competition is
thus valuable for two reasons. First, leaders are disciplined by the threat of losing power.
Second, leaders have incentive to be more responsive than their competitors to the needs
of voters.
Some criticize Schumpeter’s view on the grounds that it really rewards those with
the most resources.175 In theory, the ideal of one-person-one-vote is supposed to negate
this. But in the U.S., for instance, politicians must compete first for campaign
contributions, before it is even possible for them to compete for votes. Perhaps, Shapiro
says, voters would support strong confiscatory taxation of estates worth over ten million
dollars, but no party proposes this. Why not? Shapiro’s view is that politicians are
probably afraid of the effect increasing taxes on the wealthy would have on their
campaign coffers. He admits that empirical studies of such claims are inconclusive, but
“it seems reasonable to suppose that the proposals politicians offer are heavily shaped by
the agendas of campaign contributors; why else would they contribute?”176 When this is
added to the fact that most political systems have few major parties, what we end up with
is oligopolistic competition.
Some criticize Schumpeter’s view on the grounds that the high rate at which
incumbents are reelected suggests that electoral competition does not do much to
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discipline politicians.177 But, Shapiro asks in response, compared to what? Electoral
competition may provide only modest incentives when measured against some ideal
standard, but that ideal standards prevails nowhere. In the real world, even the modest
discipline imposed by electoral competition would be a great benefit to the many who
live under leaders who are not disciplined at all.
Shapiro acknowledges the force of the criticisms, but he is not discouraged by
them. These criticisms do not attack the idea of competitive democracy per se, but
instead point to imperfections in currently existing competitive systems. These can be
remedied. Reforms can be made that reduce the power of campaign contributors and that
allow more parties to be competitive. And in any case, Shapiro does not wish to limit the
disciplining force of his version of competitive democracy to the incentives found in
Schumpeter’s account. It is likely that constraints will have to be added to discipline
politicians in any real world case. For example, we might want to force political decision
making into the open, and enact terms limits to fight incumbency.
Shapiro buttresses his account of competitive democracy with a limited form of
judicial review.178 He has two main reasons for this. First, we need some way of settling
disputes between political agents and parties that is acknowledged by them to be more or
less independent and legitimate. As Shapiro puts it, “the players of a game are not well
situated to act as their own umpires.”179 Here institutions like the Supreme Court have a
legitimate role to play in a democracy. Second, no decision procedure is perfect. Even a
democratic system that is fully competitive in Shapiro’s sense will sometimes enact
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legislation that dominates individuals. When this happens, judicial review is appropriate.
However, Shapiro does not think any court should create law itself, in effect usurping one
of the legitimate functions of the legislature. This just hampers democracy. Rather,
when such a court judges that some legislation dominates individuals, the court should
simply repeal the law and tell the legislature to try again. What the courts should do is
protect and promote every individual’s ability to participate in the democratic process.
This it does by limiting domination. When the court tries to do more than this, it actually
interferes with a citizen’s ability to participate.

Problems for Shapiro.

Shapiro is never clear about whether he is offering an account of legitimacy or
political obligation. He says that “we should recognize its [democracy’s] claim to our
allegiance,” but this is vague.180 I suspect he holds some version of the correlativity
thesis, and thus thinks the problems of legitimacy and political obligation are one and the
same problem. But as we saw in Chapter 1, the correlativity thesis (strictly speaking) is
false. I will not pursue this issue further, however, because it does not make a difference
to my analysis of Shapiro’s account. The problems I will discuss in the next sections
apply to his view in either case.
The first problem I will discuss is the vagueness of Shapiro’s idea of basic
interests. At least one commentator finds his view “too vague to be useful.”181 I do not
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think this is a serious problem for Shapiro, but it is similar to a more serious problem.
The more serious problem is that people can and do disagree in good faith over just what
our basic interests are. This is a broad problem that affects all respect for interest views.
These problems—the vagueness and disagreement problems—raise issues internal to
Shapiro’s view. Internal problems have to with the coherence or feasibility of a view. If
they are serious, they raise questions about the plausibility of a view, insofar as they
suggest it would be hard or impossible to realize or instantiate the view in a real society.
A third problem I will discuss is rooted in the kinds of reasons Shapiro’s
democratic officials have for wielding power, and the kinds of reasons citizens have for
obeying or acquiescing. Shapiro places no restrictions on the sorts of reasons
government officials can appropriately appeal to in exercising their power. This may be
a problem.
Two other problems I want to discuss are external ones. External problems
assume that we can implement Shapiro’s view, but raise worries having to do with the
implications or long-term consequences of such implementation. One external problem
has to do with just how competition shapes or disciplines politicians. Competition does
not guarantee an ever-increasing search for good among politicians. All that it guarantees
is that citizens have the ability to choose the least of the evils they face. This is
something, but it may not be much. Another external problem for Shapiro’s view is that
it seems to be consistent with benign neglect. Shapiro’s competitive democracy allows
powerful political agents to ignore almost all of the judgments or views of weaker
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agents.182 Citizens remain sovereign, in the sense that they choose which powerful
agents take control of our political institutions, but citizens otherwise have no meaningful
role in ruling themselves. We have to ask if this is an attractive understanding of
democracy, of government by the people, for the people, given our democratic values and
our moral self-understanding. The last problem I will consider is related to the problem
of benign neglect. Rawls was very concerned about how political institutions might
shape or influence the character of citizens raised in different societies. One reason for
this is that Rawls sees one of the proper roles of political philosophy to be giving citizens
reasonable hope for or faith in their society. Another reason has to do with stability.
Political institutions deemed unattractive by citizens will not be voluntarily maintained
by citizens. For reasons like these it is not clear that Shapiro’s democracy provides the
kind of utopian vision that we can expect citizens to freely and willingly endorse.

“Basic interests” are too vague to be useful.

Ilya Somin complains that Shapiro’s theory of non-domination is too vague to be
useful.183 In her estimation, this is the most serious shortcoming of his work. Shapiro
makes a brief attempt to define non-domination in terms of basic interests, which he
describes as “the obvious essentials that [people] need to develop into and survive as
independent agents in the world as it is likely to exist for their lifetimes.”184
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Unfortunately, Somin points out, there is extensive disagreement over just what these
essentials are, and Shapiro never makes any real effort to develop and defend an account
of them. He does provide one example as an illustration: the employer who can fire an
employee in a world where there is no unemployment compensation can threaten an
employee’s basic interests. Somin does not find this example compelling. Its value is far
from obvious, she says, and it involves all sorts of unexpressed assumptions about, e.g.,
labor markets, alternative employers, and so on. And although Shapiro says he need not
attempt to resolve these issues right away, Somin insists that “some degree of resolution
is essential if we are to understand what Shapiro’s theory entails and what its institutional
implications are for democracy.”185
While much of what Somin says is true, I do not think this is a serious problem
for Shapiro. Shapiro says that his view is one of a family of “resourcist” views. He
includes Rawls, Dworkin and Sen in this group, because each offers a list of basic goods,
the possession of which would make possible the pursuit of any one of a number of
different conceptions of the good.186 Presumably, then, Shapiro’s list of essentials would
be similar to these others, if he were to flesh it out.
I think that Shapiro’s goal is broader or bigger than Somin gives him credit for.
That is, I think Somin’s criticism is unfair in a way. Shapiro is not really worried about
exactly what the essentials are, but is instead trying to show how some set of essentials
(however defined) might serve as a sound normative foundation and practical guideline
for democratic reform. His goal is really just to set out the broad terms of his novel
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approach to democratic theory. Someone will eventually have to develop and defend a
list of basic interests, and explain their implications for democratic theory and practice, as
part of the long-term evaluation of Shapiro’s proposal. But Shapiro’s goal in The State of
Democratic Theory is just to get this view off the ground, so he can be excused for
glossing over some of the details.

Good Faith Disagreement over Basic Interests.

A more serious problem for Shapiro is the fact that citizens can and do disagree in
good faith over just what our basic interests are.187 In fact, good faith disagreement is a
problem for all respect for interest views. On respect for interest views, the moral
underpinning of political authority (whether we are talking about legitimacy or political
obligation) is the fact that some political arrangement or action protects or secures some
normatively significant basic interest(s) of citizens.188 In the case of legitimacy, this fact
is said to give the government normative justification to enforce laws, and to give citizens
sound normative reason to acquiesce to the government’s demands. In the case of
political obligation, this fact is said to obligate citizens to obey the government or its
laws. The fundamental problem with all respect for interest views is the fact that citizens
can and do disagree in good faith over when their basic interests are being met or
threatened.
187
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In Shapiro’s case, the basic interest in question is our interest in avoiding
domination. For him, the moral underpinning of democratic political authority is the fact
that democracy represents our best chance at securing for all citizens the essentials they
need to develop into and survive as independent agents in the world. But what exactly
are these essentials? Somin points out that citizens disagree about this, but she misreads
the significance of this fact. The problem is not that we cannot develop lists of such
essentials, but that citizens will always disagree about what it means to have their basic
interests threatened, or what it means to be dominated.
One might defend Shapiro by pointing out that he does not claim that democracy
eradicates domination, but only that it will do a better job of minimizing domination than
other available forms of government. It is reasonable to disagree about exactly how
much democracy can reduce domination, and exactly when it does reduce it, but it is not
reasonable to claim that democracy is not the best form of government for reducing
domination overall. This response does not solve the problem. First, Shapiro never
actually compares democracy with other available forms of government. He never
indicates what these other forms might be, or makes any effort to demonstrate their
inferiority to democracy. Second, and more importantly, this response seems to overlook
Shapiro’s claim that what he is after is a way of morally grounding institutional reform,
and not a way of defending democracy as such. On his view, democracy already has
legitimacy in the world. The justificatory claim is not the one that he wants to defend.
What he seeks is an account of democracy’s constitutive elements that shows it in its best
light (even if that light is fairly dim) and that allows us to make meaningful institutional
reforms. This is where the problem of reasonable disagreement crops up.
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Shapiro claims that institutional reforms are positive to the extent that they make
government more responsive to the citizens whose basic interests are at stake in any
given situation. But what are these basic interests? People reasonably disagree about
what these are. Some citizens think women have a basic interest in abortion, and some
disagree. So is legislation prohibiting women from getting abortions a threat to their
basic interests or not? Some citizens think homosexuals have a basic interest in marriage,
and others disagree. So is legislation prohibiting gay marriage a threat to the basic
interests of gays or not? Some citizens think we have a basic interest in keeping guns for
protection, and some disagree. So does gun control legislation threaten basic interests or
not? And so on at the level of actual policy.
One might respond that this objection misses the point. What institutional reform
needs to protect is the right to democratic participation, to a say in what policies will be
enacted. This possible response has several problems. First, Shapiro’s stated
understanding of our basic interests seems to be broader than this. He identifies basic
interests with the essentials people need to survive as independent agents. This requires
more than democratic participation. Second, citizens disagree in good faith over what it
means to make government more responsive. There are many good faith disagreements
over what kind of democratic institutions we ought to have, even if we understand the
purpose of democracy to be limited to non-domination.189 For instance, should we have
winner take all democracy, or some form of proportional representation? Is it better to
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have a parliamentary or a presidential system? Citizens will disagree in good faith about
how to answer such questions.
The point of this is that there is no obvious way to answer the question of just
which democratic institutions best serve the common good, even when the common good
is understood thinly as a each person’s common interest in avoiding domination. People
can and do disagree over what even something as thin as this might require.

No Restrictions on Reasons.

Shapiro does not place any restrictions on the kinds of reasons that government
officials may reasonably appeal to when making decisions regarding law. What matters
is that basic interests of citizens are met, and that they have the potential means to
remove public officials from office when they judge that others might better protect them.
But it does not matter to Shapiro why officials make the decisions they do. For example,
Shapiro seems to allow public officials to shape public policy in ways intended solely to
promote their perceived self-interest, just so long as this activity does not threaten the
basic interests of citizens. This is troubling. For example, if this is a theory of
legitimacy, the idea seems to be roughly that democratic officials have sufficient
normative justification to enforce the law, just as long as the law does not threaten the
basic interests of citizens. It does not matter if this is why officials enforce the law, nor
does it matter that they may have intentionally shaped the law to maximally promote their
own self-interest. And citizens have sound reason to acquiesce, just because their
political system meets their basic interests better than alternatives, but regardless of
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exactly why their public officials make the demands they do on citizens, or whether or
not the law is intended to benefit them in some way. This is a problem, because under
these conditions, citizens can reasonably regard government action as directed only at
official self-interest. Officials need not be concerned with the basic interests of citizens,
just so long as their personal political agendas are more amenable to the basic interests of
citizens than their competitors. Competitive elections will drive out powerful political
agents who show too little regard for the interests of citizens, but it does not guarantee
that those interests will be seen as a priority by officials, or serve even as a reason for
acting. Nevertheless, competitive elections may ensure that the basic interests of citizens
are met, even if they are met accidentally or peripherally.

The Lesser of Two Evils.

Shapiro argues that competitive democracy makes politicians more responsive to
voters because politicians depend on voters to win access to political power. It would be
a mistake, though, to think that this means that competition will lead to ever-increasing
improvements in the social goods offered to voters by politicians. The analogy to
economic competition might suggest that some political version of Adam Smith’s
invisible hand will force bad politicians out and lead good politicians to offer more and
more to voters. But this will not work any better in politics than it does in markets.
Whether or not such improvements are offered depends on who chooses to run for office,
and what they offer to citizens. Shapiro and Schumpeter’s analogy may deserve greater
scrutiny. In Shapiro’s democracy, all a politician needs to do to win is offer more than
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her competitors. This may not be very much. What this suggests is that Shapiro’s market
analogy deserves further scrutiny. Still, electoral competition does guarantee citizens the
potential means to choose the least of the evils they face. This should count for
something.

The Problem of Benign Neglect.

Power friendly views of democracy may be susceptible to the problem of benign
neglect. When the right to exercise power and the duty to obey or acquiesce are divorced
from consensus, it becomes possible for the minority to become bound to the will of the
majority, even when the majority ignore the judgments of the minority. In this case, the
citizens are sovereign in name only. They practice self-rule only to the extent that they
get to choose the least objectionable option offered to them. Citizens get to choose which
powerful agents will control their government, but they otherwise have no meaningful
role to play in the myriad governmental decisions that will shape much of their lives.
And it is entirely possible that some segment of society will always lose, and never have
even the minimal say in how things are organized that you get from choosing political
officials. This is a problem, because democracy has a constitutive commitment to
meaningful participation.
Shapiro’s proposed competitive democracy may be particularly susceptible to the
problem of benign neglect. Shapiro holds that democracy deserves our allegiance
because it represents our best chance at minimizing domination. This is a very weak
understanding of democracy’s constitutive commitments. It seems to allow citizens to be
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pushed to the margins of society, just so long as their essential interests are not
threatened. Or, rather, it holds that a citizen is not marginalized, as long as her basic
interests are met.
For instance, it is not hard to imagine the Christian right coming together in an
effort to control U.S. politics. We can imagine them making many of their political
decisions solely on the basis of their Christian convictions, regardless of the fact that
others disagree with them in good faith over the nature of the good life for human beings,
and over the proper role of religious convictions in democratic politics. We can imagine
further that opponents of the Christian right are marginalized and have no effective or
real role to play in their politics. Now, my point here is not that it is wrong to base voting
or other political activity on religious convictions (though this issue will come up later).
My point is rather that this provides an example of what I mean by benign neglect. The
Christian right might have no reason and no interest in considering the views of nonChristians when making political decisions that affect everyone. This would not
necessarily mean that the fundamental interests of non-Christians would be in danger.
What it would mean is that non-Christians would be denied a meaningful role in selfgovernment.

Is Shapiro’s Democracy a Stable and Realistic Utopia?
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Rawls was very concerned about the ways that the fundamental social and
political institutions in a society might shape or influence the character of citizens raised
under them. One reason for his concern has to do with his understanding of the proper
role of political philosophy. One of its most important functions is to give citizens a
reasonable hope for their society, and thus to give them reason to participate in good
faith. Another reason has to do with stability. Political institutions deemed unattractive
by citizens—as immoral, unfair, unjust, or what have you—will not be voluntarily
maintained by citizens. Such institutions will be unstable and may fall, unless they are
propped up by force. Neither option is attractive, so we should aim to avoid this
problem. But it is not clear that Shapiro’s view provides the kind of utopian vision that
we can reasonably expect citizens to freely and willingly endorse.
It is hard to imagine citizens having much faith in Shapiro’s democracy. It is not
an attractive vision of democratic politics, and is certainly not the kind of political society
likely to inspire anything in citizens but apathy, cynicism, and hopelessness. It falls well
short of many of the ideals citizens voice regarding democratic politics, and seems
instead to be exactly the kind of political society that many citizens claim to reject. To
the extent that it seems unfair, or unjust, or immoral to citizens, we have reason to
wonder if it could and would be voluntarily affirmed and maintained by citizens.
This is, of course, mere speculation. How citizens might be shaped by Shapiro’s
democracy is ultimately an empirical question that only time can answer. The same is
true of the question of whether or not citizens might come to voluntarily affirm and
maintain it. But this sort of speculation is one way of testing an account of democratic
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politics. We can make some educated guesses about Shapiro’s democratic citizens might
eventually become, and I think we might have reason to worry.

Summary of Key Points.

Shapiro correctly judges that our worries about democracy’s alleged irrationality
may be overblown. It can protect important basic interests of democratic citizens, and in
this limited sense can promote the common good. Further, hierarchical relationships are
not necessarily immoral or unjust. This seems obvious, but it has long been a bone of
contention in political philosophy. But under the conditions of modernity, it is a mistake
to think that politics can work without exercises of power under conditions of good faith
disagreement and dissent.
Unfortunately, the widespread belief among democratic citizens that nondomination is the best they can hope for from their political order may not be sufficient to
sustain a reasonable hope for their future or the future of their society. It may end up
encouraging only cynicism and apathy, and not conscientious and thoughtful
participation. The problem of benign neglect, which may plague all power friendly
views, seems especially troubling for Shapiro’s democracy. We will have to see if other
views do better on this score.

Jeremy Waldron and Majority Rule.
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Citizens in modern democracies disagree not only about the nature of the good for
human beings, but also about political issues such as what justice requires. Citizens
disagree about how to order fundamental but abstract political rights like liberty and
equality, and even citizens who agree on how to order these abstract values are likely to
disagree over just what particular rights follow from them. In Law and Disagreement and
The Dignity of Legislation, Jeremy Waldron argues that decisions reached by majority
rule deserve a certain kind of respect from all citizens, even from those who reasonably
disagree with the outcome on the grounds that it is unjust in some way.190 Majority rule
is often denigrated by legal theorists, many of whom feel that it amounts to little more
than a mindless counting of heads. This hardly seems like a reasoned way of resolving
disagreements over matters of principle and complex social policy. Surely something as
important as law ought to result from reasoned debate and reflect some rational
consensus as to what ought to be done. Waldron argues that this is a mistake. Rational
consensus is not possible. However, this does not mean that majoritarianism is nothing
more than the least worst option. Majoritarianism deserves more respect than it gets,
because law produced in this fashion represents a significant social achievement—action
in concert in the face of deep disagreement. This is the ultimate basis of legal authority
for Waldron. But majoritarianism has other virtues as well. It has the “technical” virtue
of not assuming controversial normative positions, it respects disagreements about justice
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and the common good, and it embodies a principle of respect for each person in the
process by which laws are made.
Waldron’s view is a weak shared reason view. It requires both reciprocity in
advantage and reciprocity in justification. Reciprocity in advantage in satisfied by the
appeal to our common interest in important social goods achieved through law, and to
each person’s interest in having a political system that respects her as a voter. Waldron
also appeals to reciprocity in justification, because he holds that the law’s normativity
also requires that citizens participate in good faith. This means citizens must base their
votes on their considered and sincere views about justice or the common good, and not
solely on their sense of their own narrow self-interest. Unfortunately, Waldron never
explains just what this requires of citizens. This is a significant oversight. Soper and
Rawls, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, do offer accounts of what it means to
responsibly engage in public political activity. In this way their views represent
important correctives or extensions of views like Waldron’s.

Waldron’s Method and Purpose.

One of Waldron’s aims is to correct an imbalance he finds in political theory
today.191 The same political theorists who denigrate majoritarianism and legislation write
in rosy terms about the courts and judicial review as sources of law. Majority rule has
been marginalized by political theorists. Empirical research on legislation reveals the
practice to involve deal-making, pandering, pork-barreling, Arrovian cycling, and a host
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of other activities that suggest to many that it is anything but principled political decision
making. As a result, many question the law’s claimed authority. But some are now
beginning to defend legislation against such criticisms. For example, there is a growing
body of evidence that suggests that legislatures generally do not act in the irrational or
manipulated ways that Condorcet and Arrow predict. Nevertheless, many are still
skeptical about the possibility of virtuous civic deliberation in legislatures. Legislation is
often treated as a last-ditch means of producing law, to be tolerated only until a more
refined and reasoned method becomes available. Until then, we have institutions like
judicial review to protect us from our legislators. In fact, though, while a great deal has
been said about how judicial review ought to get done, relatively little has been said
about whether or not it is justified. Political theorists tend to move quickly from their
dim accounts of the failure of legislation to their rosy accounts of how the courts can save
us. But Waldron wonders why we think the courts are any less messy than legislatures.
The collective rationality problems that plague legislatures apply equally to courts as
deliberative bodies. This, then, is the imbalance Waldron wants to correct. He wants to
develop a rosy picture of majoritarianism and legislation as sources of law.
The many books and articles that disparage the legislative process work to
undermine the claimed authority of law produced by legislatures. Waldron works against
this trend, by developing an admittedly rosy normative account of legislation and law that
links the law’s claimed authority to the legislative process. He admits that this may seem
naïve, but this does not mean that he is satisfied with the conditions of the enactment of
law today. To the contrary, he feels we have good reason to be cautious about the law’s
claimed authority in our current situation. But “unless we propose to treat the authority
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claimed for legislation as pure superstition, eventually that claim requires philosophical
explication.”192 This explication is what Waldron attempts to provide. In any case, even
if one judges that the conditions of the enactment of law today invalidate the law’s
claimed authority, there is still value in describing the conditions under which law would
have genuine authority. We need to know what we should measure the current context of
law-making against.
Waldron spends a good deal of time performing a detailed normative analysis of
important structural features of legislatures. Three important features are textuality,
intention, and voting. The issue of textuality has to do with the fact that laws are written
down, that a statute is in actuality an enacted form of words. The issue of intent has to do
with just how we are to understand what a legislature meant to do when it enacted some
particular form of words and not another. Both of these issues are complicated by the
fact that legislatures are composed of individuals who have and represent diverse points
of view.
The third issue is voting. Voting has a bad name: “It seems so mindless—
counting heads and letting a single vote at the margin decide, when what is at stake is
some great issue of principle or some complex matter of policy.”193 But Waldron thinks
voting deserves a better hearing. In his defense of voting, Waldron switches his attention
from legislatures and representative democracy to direct democracy. In a representative
democracy, citizens (usually) vote only for representatives, and their representatives vote
on laws and policies. This adds a layer of complexity that Waldron wishes to avoid in his
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project. His normative analysis thus focuses on direct democracy, in which citizens vote
directly on issues that affect them and their society. He confesses that this is one of the
main failings of his argument in Law and Disagreement, but it cannot be helped. His
purpose is to sketch out the broad outline of a new and better understanding of
democratic law and authority, and for this purpose theorizing direct democracy is
sufficient, even if not ideal.
My analysis will focus on Waldron’s account of voting. His normative analysis
of the other features of legislatures is important, but his understanding of democratic law
and authority are most directly linked to his arguments about the kind of achievement
majority decision making represents, and the way majority rule respects citizens.

The Achievement of Law in the Circumstances of Politics.

One of the main demands that the law makes is that citizens comply with it.
However, the law makes other demands too. One of these is a demand for recognition or
a certain kind of respect. In Waldron’s words, the law demands “that we not immediately
disparage it” as an enactment, or simply try to get around it. This does not mean that
respect for the law forbids us from seeking to overturn or repeal it. It has more to do with
the attitude people have toward the initial enactment. What the law demands is this:
It is a demand for a certain kind of recognition, and, as I said, respect—that this,
for the time being, is what the community has come up with and that it should not
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be ignored or disparaged simply because some of us propose, when we can, to
repeal it.194
The law makes this demand even of people who think the law is a mistake. This demand
for respect is not predicated on the moral worth or the correctness of the law’s content,
but on something else. For Waldron, this something else has to do with the special
virtues of voting and majority decision making. He puts it this way:
The dignity of legislation, the ground of its authority, and its claim to be respected
by us, has to do with the sort of achievement it is. Our respect for legislation is in
part the tribute we should pay to the achievement of concerted, cooperative,
coordinated, or collective action in the circumstances of modern life.195
The circumstances of modern life Waldron refers to he calls the Circumstances of
Politics.
Two conditions characterize the Circumstances of Politics.196 The first condition
is disagreement among citizens over what laws and policies are best in terms of justice
and the common good. The second condition is the felt need among the citizens for
large-scale coordinated action. Most of us understand that many important goods can
only be achieved through the concerted and coordinated efforts of large numbers of
individuals. Protecting the environment, operating a health care system, maintaining the
conditions necessary for the operation of a market economy, and so on, all require that
large numbers of citizens act in concert by following a variety of rules, practices and
procedures. These goods will disappear if citizens do not act together. For this reason,
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many of us think we should act and organize things together. This sort of coordinated
activity is not easy to achieve, especially when individuals realize that large-scale
coordination often requires the sacrifice of individual projects. Thus, when citizens come
together and actually enact a law, despite their disagreements about exactly what should
be done, it is a big achievement. Law commands respect as one kind of embodiment of
that achievement.197
Waldron draws out his understanding of the Circumstances of Politics by
comparing three kinds of coordinated action problem (CAP).198 Two kinds of CAP are
Prisoners’ Dilemmas (PD) and pure Coordination Problems (CP). Since most are
familiar with the PD, I won’t rehearse the details of the thought experiment here. The
point of the PD is that sometimes the rational strategy—judged from the perspective of
individual self-interest—actually prevents individuals from reaching the outcome
preferred by all. The CP is exemplified by the driving example. In the driving example,
motorists can drive on either the right or the left side of the road. The best pay-off is
achieved when all motorists choose to drive on the same side of the road, but it doesn’t
matter which side of the road they choose. Each chooser prefers either of two
coordinated outcomes to non-coordination, but choosers have no real preference for one
coordinated outcome over the other. All that matters is that they coordinate their activity
by choosing to do the same thing.
Law can contribute to the solutions of both PD’s and CP’s. In the case of PD’s,
law can provide an incentive/sanction that discourages choosers from giving in to the
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temptation represented by the difference in value between S and Q. In the case of CP’s,
law can mark either doing X or doing Y as salient for choosers, thereby making
coordinated activity more likely. But neither the PD nor the CP capture the
Circumstances of Politics. For this we need a Partial Conflict coordination problem (PC).
The PC best represents Waldron’s understanding of law and the Circumstances of
Politics.199 In the PC, each chooser prefers either of two coordinated outcomes to noncoordination, but they differ over which coordinated outcome they prefer. One example
of a PC is the “Battle of the Sexes:” “he prefers to go to a boxing match, she prefers to
the ballet; but most of all they want to go out together rather than each to his or her
favourite entertainment alone.”200 Waldron does not claim that law solves PC’s, and that
this is why we should respect it. Of course, law can contribute to the solution of PC’s, by
attaching sanctions to the options in ways the reduce the difference in value between P
and Q. But this is not what grounds the law’s claim to respect. Before sanctions can be
attached to any outcomes, “the society must have decided which of the coordinative
outcomes to select as the one to be bolstered by sanctions in this way.”201 Any group
decision of this sort is an important social achievement, and “it is by embodying that
achievement that law commands our respect.”202
Raz argues that pure CP’s (e.g., the driving example) tell us little about legal
authority, because many legal rules simply don’t resemble these problems. For instance,
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“laws like the prohibition of rape and murder differ from laws which coordinate the
efforts of large groups.”203 Waldron admits this, and also that it would be a mistake to
force laws of all kinds into one group. But he discusses one of Raz’s examples, to
demonstrate how PC’s might be more useful than Raz imagines.
In his discussion of rape law, Raz argues correctly that our reasons for refraining
from rape should have nothing to do with respect for law, and everything to do with
respect for persons. And our reasons have little to do with collective action: rape is
wrong, even if it is a common practice. So, Raz concludes, analysis of rape law in terms
of collective action problems looks like a non-starter. But Waldron points out that the
issue is more complicated than Raz realizes. For when we consider the controversial
aspects of rape law, we can see that many legal issues do resemble PC’s. Many aspects
of rape law are controversial, such as statutory rape, marital rape, homosexual rape, the
possibility of inferred consent, the bases on which consent might be inferred, mistakes
about consent, and so on. Reasonable people will disagree on such issues. Nevertheless,
we may all share an interest in a common scheme of rape law that deals with these
matters. Each of us may prefer some rape law, even rape law we oppose, if the option is
no rape law, or rape law that is limited only to uncontroversial and simple matters.
Waldron’s point is that when we move from simple prohibitions (e.g., rape is wrong) to
the complex sets of rules and procedures that are law (e.g., contemporary rape law), it
appears that law is more like a PC than Raz understands.
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I think Waldron makes a good point here, but I still think this is a problem for
him. I am not convinced that Waldron’s account is general enough to account for respect
for law as such. If not, his account may be inadequate and we will have to consider
whether a partial account of respect for law can help us. But for now I just want to get
his view on the table, so I will set aside further discussion of this issue until later in this
chapter. My point now is to emphasize the nature of the claim law makes for respect.
When people are able to produce law in the circumstances of politics, they have achieved
something important. The law deserves respect because it embodies this social
achievement. But so far Waldron has said little about majoritarianism. There are a
number of ways that laws might be produced under the circumstances of politics. Does
law produced through majoritarianism have any special claim on us? Yes it does,
Waldron argues, because of certain special features of majoritarianism.

The Virtues of Majoritarianism.

Laws produced through majoritarian decision procedures deserve respect from
citizens because they embody a significant social achievement in the circumstances of
politics. But majoritarianism has other virtues as well. First, it has the “technical” virtue
of not assuming controversial moral positions. Second, it respects individual citizens by
taking seriously the disagreements that divide them. Third, it embodies a principle of
respect for each person in the process by which the group decides on a view as “theirs.”
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The Virtue of “Technicality.”204

In the Circumstances of Politics, it is important that a group’s decision procedure
be a neutral, technical device. Suppose we feel we have good reason to act together, but
we disagree about what we should do. Suppose too that we face a rapidly approaching
deadline—that if we don’t act now, we will surely lose the good we might have gained
from some (from any) concerted action. In this situation, we might settle on a common
course of action by tossing a coin. But would a decision reached by a coin toss deserve
any respect? It would, insofar as a coin toss is neutral between our choices. That is, a
coin toss can be seen by all not to assume any substantive values that might bias it toward
one or the other of the options that we might pursue as a group. A bit of
anthropomorphism may help to make this clear: the tossed coin appeals to no substantive
values when making its choice—it simply chooses one or another of the options before it.
The coin’s special virtue is that it really is a neutral agent. Waldron argues that
majoritarianism has this same virtue. He is not claiming, though, that majoritarianism is
a better decision procedure than others because it alone has this virtue. Many arbitrary
decision procedures share it. What Waldron does here is cut off an objection to
majoritarianism, namely, the objection that it is morally suspect because it amounts to a
“mere” headcount or a coin-toss.
Some complain about this neutral or technical aspect of voting. To many, voting
is a poor decision procedure just because it appears to be arbitrary. If voting is really just
counting heads, then it is not a reasoned decision procedure. Well, so what? We must
204
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take care when creating law, because the dangers of oppression and injustice are serious
and real. Creating law through a reasoned process seems to be important, because of the
high stakes of questions of policy, morality, and justice. But voting—if it is really just
counting heads—does not seem to the kind of careful and reasoned process that justice
requires. It seems a lot like flipping a coin. Surely the authority of law requires more
than this. Why take law seriously when it is enacted in such an arbitrary way? The
problem with reasoned decision procedures is that they tend to invoke controversial
values.
Suppose, Waldron says, that some of us face a Partial Conflict (PC) decisionproblem regarding a matter M. We agree that the common policies under consideration
(X and Y) are each preferable to no policy, but we disagree about which policy to enact.
Some of us think it is better to follow X, and some of us think it is better to follow Y.
Each policy X and Y requires individuals to play an independent but necessary part in the
common scheme. No one has good reason to think that one of us is a better judge of M
than any of the others. We have to find a way of choosing a common policy that all of us
can participate in, despite our disagreements about what to do. We know that this won’t
work: “each does whatever he thinks it is important to do about M.” We need a way to
identify one of the policies as “ours” that does not depend on any criterion such as “what
it is important to do about M,” because disagreement over this issue is why we face a
decision problem in the first place. So the way we identify a policy as ours must be
arbitrary in relation to our different understandings of “what it is important to do about
M.” Majority voting satisfies this requirement. Each of us can see that (say) Y is the
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policy favored by the majority, regardless of how we individually feel about Y as a
response to M.

Respect for Disagreement.

Another virtue Waldron sees in majoritarian decision making is the way it
respects disagreements about justice and the common good.205 Majoritarianism “does not
require anyone’s view to be played down or hushed up because of the fancied importance
of consensus.”206 Majoritarianism does not pretend there is consensus when there really
is not. It does not pretend that opposing views do not exist. And more importantly, it
does not treat opposing views “as beneath notice in respectable deliberation by assuming
that it is ignorant or prejudiced or self-interested or based on insufficient contemplation
of moral reality.”207 Waldron sees this as a dangerous temptation. It is right to think that
truth about justice and the common good are important. But it is mistake to think that
consensus is the natural expression of our search for truth, and dangerous to think that
some special explanation—defects of character or mind—are needed to excuse our
failure to reach consensus.
Waldron argues that it is wrong to think that consensus is the natural expression
of our search for truth. In defending his claim he draws on Rawls’s burdens of judgment.
These burdens are “the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise
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of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life.” 208
Roughly put, Rawls’s claim is that citizens trying to answer questions that involve
abstract value judgments and complex empirical issues will inevitably reach different
conclusions. Given the imperfect and limited nature of our common human reason, and
peoples’ different experiences and social positions, it is just not reasonable to expect even
conscientious persons who possess full powers of rationality to reach the same conclusion
on many important questions about human life. Waldron argues that the burdens of
judgment apply not only to disagreements over the nature of the good for human beings,
but also to disagreement over justice and the common good. Thus, it is simply
unreasonable to expect citizens to reach a consensus on political questions.
Majoritarianism takes seriously the burdens of judgment and their implications for human
political activity.
Thus, Waldron argues, we ought to reject the “dangerous temptation” to see our
inability to reach consensus on important questions as a failure somehow rooted in the
ignorance or selfishness of our fellow citizens. In fact, Waldron claims that most citizens
do act conscientiously, that is, from their own considered and impartial understandings of
justice and the common good.209 We tend to doubt this when people disagree with us, but
Waldron says that our reasons for this doubt are often “quite disreputable.” This does not
mean that citizens never fail to act conscientiously. Still, it is better overall—less
disrespectful—to acknowledge that disagreement is often quite reasonable.
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None of this implies that we must reject the search for a singular truth. Waldron
is not arguing for a kind of relativism. Rather, “respect has to do with how we treat each
other’s beliefs about justice in circumstances where none of them is self-certifying, and
not how we treat the truth about justice itself.”210 And he is not talking about fallibility,
though no one ought to ignore the possibility that they may be wrong about justice.
Rather, each of us must understand that ours is not the only mind working on our
problems, and that it is not unexpected or unreasonable for citizens to disagree about how
to solve them.

Respect for Individuals.

Majoritarianism respects individuals by giving each a full and equal say in
collective decision-making.211 Waldron illustrates this point by comparing
majoritarianism to the coin toss and the Hobbesian sovereign as decision-methods.
The coin toss has virtues that make it a respectable method for making collective
decisions under certain conditions, but it does not respect citizens in the way the
majoritarianism does. Unlike majoritarianism, the coin toss does not give “positive
decisional weight” to the fact that a given individual holds a view. Waldron’s view here
is more or less the same as Ackerman’s idea of “minimal decisiveness.”212 Ackerman
illustrates this idea in terms of tie-breaking:
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If, say, there are 99 people in the Assembly, then majority-rule gives me a
decisive voice when the rest of you are split 49-49; and the same is true of your
decision as well. When confronted with the prospect of a tied vote, the
majoritarian does not appeal to some unresponsive decision-procedure, but
instead recognizes each citizen’s right to have his considered judgment determine
the social outcome.213
The problem with the coin toss, says Ackerman, is that it does not give each citizen’s
view minimal decisiveness. Waldron agrees: majoritarianism’s special value over the
coin toss is that it holds that “in the case of each individual, the fact that that individual
favours option X is a reason for the group to pursue option X.” One individual’s
judgment does not constitute a conclusive reason for the group to act, of course, because
there is disagreement, but it counts in favor of the group’s doing X. This is one important
way that majoritarianism respects each person.
Consideration of the Hobbesian method reveals another way that majoritarianism
respects individuals. The Hobbesian method gives great weight to the fact that one
individual holds a certain view, and relatively little weight to the fact that others hold
different views. But it is not the case that the Hobbesian ignores disagreement. Rather,
the way the Hobbesian handles disagreement is to put one person—the sovereign—in
charge of everyone else. Majoritarianism is preferable to the Hobbesian method because
it “involves a commitment to give equal weight to each person’s view in the process by
which one view is selected as the group’s.”214 In fact, Waldron says, majoritarianism
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gives each person’s view the greatest weight possible without giving any person’s view
more weight than any other’s.
Thus, majoritarianism respects each individual in the process of selecting the
group’s view on some issue. In contrast to the coin toss, majoritarianism makes each
person’s view minimally decisive, by making sure that each person’s view counts as a
reason for the group to pursue some course of action. And in contrast to the Hobbesian
method, majoritarianism makes each person’s view maximally decisive, by giving it the
greatest weight possible consistent with the equal weighting of other persons’ views.

Summing Up Respect for Law.

To sum up, law produced through majoritarian decision procedures deserves our
respect for several reasons. First, law produced this way embodies an important social
achievement in the Circumstances of Politics. Second, majoritarianism has the technical
virtue of not assuming controversial moral positions. It is a neutral decision procedure.
Third, majoritarianism respects disagreements between citizens. It does not try to quiet
anyone in the name of some (implausible) ideal of consensus. Fourth, the majoritarian
process respects the contribution of each individual, by giving each person’s view both
minimal and maximal decisiveness.
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The Authority of Law.

Although Waldron feels that he has shown why law produced through
majoritarian decision procedures deserves the respect of all citizens, he admits that he has
yet to account for “the sense of constraint associated with authority.”215 Waldron is not
very clear here, but I think he is referring to the fact that law binds citizens. Waldron
seems to be saying that it is one thing to show that law has genuine normative force, and
another thing to show why we ought to feel bound to enforce and obey the law.
Majoritarianism has virtues that make it a respectable source of law. This is why law
does not lose its claim to normativity just because it is enacted through majority decision.
For example, rape law does not lose its claim to being genuine law just because it is
enacted through a statistical and mechanical “head count.” But this does not explain how
the law binds us. The law requires us to act in certain ways. This constraining sense of
the authority of legislation is missing from his account of majoritarianism. This is not a
flaw in his account, he says; it is just that the source of the law’s normativity is a bit
different from the source of its binding force. The constraining sense of law’s authority
must come primarily from our sense of the moral urgency and importance of the
problems that it is necessary for us to address—the things that (morally) need to
be done and must be done by us, in our millions, together, if they are to be done at
all.216
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The source of the law’s binding force is our shared sense of the moral importance of the
social issues that require concerted action.

The Authority of Law and the Moral Attitude.

Waldron assumes in his account that citizens generally base their votes on their
considered and impartial opinions about justice and the common good.217 He does not
spend a lot of time on this, but it is an important part of the authority of legislation as he
understands it. Citizens must vote responsibly if the law is to have genuine authority. If
citizens vote solely out of self-interest, the authority of legislation comes into question.
But Waldron doesn’t worry much about this, because he thinks that, as an empirical
matter, people generally do vote for the right kinds of reasons. In any case, he has also
stated that his work is an effort at ideal theory. His goal is to draw a rosy picture of
majoritarianism, in order to show how and why it might be a normatively respectable
source of law. He is trying to show how it could be the case that law produced through
majoritarian institutions is dignified. Still, it is reasonable to think that some citizens will
always vote out of self-interest. And it is reasonable to think that even responsible
citizens will sometimes slip up, disregarding their considered and impartial opinions, and
voting out of self-interest. So one issue we need to consider is the possibility of a mixed
situation, in which some citizens base their votes on their views on justice, and others on
self-interest. Waldron anticipates this possibility, and says that if it happens, “we must
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face the fact that we have a mixed and indeterminate situation so far as legitimacy and
authority are concerned.”218
In effect, Waldron acknowledges the problem and then puts it off for another day.
This is not a problem, really, since Waldron admits that this work is ideal. Nevertheless,
there are a host of questions raised by the possibility of a “mixed and indeterminate”
situation, and I want to list a few of them here.

(a) Is there some minimum percentage of voters that must be reached before
legislation can be said to have any authority at all? If so, what is this threshold?
Must at least half of all citizens vote responsibly, i.e., on their considered and
impartial convictions about justice and the common good? I think the figure
should be higher than one percent, but that one-hundred percent is too much to
expect. So what number between these is appropriate? Are all choices arbitrary?
Is a simple majority sufficient?

(b) If a politician wins an election largely as a result of irresponsible voting among
her supporters, does this pollute her authority? Does it mean that every time she
votes (in Congress), her vote is suspect, even if she votes according to her own
considered opinions about justice?

(c) Would it be better to think of legislation as having authority just to the degree that
citizens voted responsibly? In other words, should we think of policies as more or
218
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less authoritative, depending on just what percentage of citizens voted
responsibly?

(d) What are citizens supposed to make of legislation whose authority is “mixed and
indeterminate”? How is it supposed to factor into their calculations about how to
act?

(e) What if citizens disagree about what counts as responsible voting? For example,
what if one citizen’s understanding of justice appears to be absurd or
unreasonable to another citizen? What if one citizen’s understanding of justice is
based on moral and metaphysical beliefs not shared by most other citizens? What
is citizens disagree in good faith over whether some particular vote was cast from
self-interest alone?

Despite these problems, I believe that Waldron is right to link citizens’ attitudes
toward the law to the law’s normative force. I will explain why in the next two chapters.
Many of these questions I mentioned above will come up again when I discuss Soper’s
and Rawls’s accounts of law and authority. Since my ultimate goal is to defend a
Rawlsian approach to law, I will put off answering these questions for the time being. In
my discussion of Rawls, I will consider the questions that seem to raise the biggest
challenges for the Rawlsian view. Here my intention is only to get some of them on the
table, as a way of pointing out unresolved issues that such an approach must consider. I
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do not know if there are good answers to these questions. If not, the link between
attitudes toward law and the law’s authority may come into question.

Is Waldron’s Account of Law Too Limited?

Waldron’s account of the law may be too limited in scope, because it only applies
to situations relevantly similar to the Partial Conflict (PC) collective action problem.
Waldron’s account of the law’s authority is rooted in his Circumstances of Politics. He
makes an analogy between the Circumstances of Politics and a PC problem. In a PC
situation, choosers prefer concerted action to no concerted action, but they disagree over
which possible common course of action they should follow. One example is the Battle
of the Sexes—he prefers the boxing match, she prefers the ballet, but both prefer a night
together over a night apart. He would rather accompany her to the ballet than go to the
boxing match alone, and she would rather accompany him to the boxing match, rather
than go to the ballet alone. Waldron illustrates this in the legal context by discussing the
way rape law might profitably be seen as a PC situation. However, many voting
situations do not resemble the PC problem at all.
The situation I have in mind is one where the different proposals under
consideration are mutually exclusive or cancel each other out. For example, votes over
proposed laws that would prohibit or allow gay marriage do not seem to be PC situations
at all. In the gay marriage case, for instance, one side would prefer a law restricting gay
marriages, and the other side would prefer that this law not be enacted. One side hopes to
enact a proposed law, and the other side would rather leave the matter unresolved. This
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makes the gay marriage situation seem different than a PC situation. The same may be
said of the abortion debate, and perhaps many other debates.
Waldron could respond in two ways. First, he might say, as he does in the case of
rape law, that the issue of gay marriage should be viewed in the broader context of
marriage law. All citizens would rather have some marriage law than none, even though
there are some controversial issues that all acknowledge as problem areas. From this
perspective, he might say, gay marriage law is a PC situation. But I do not find this
response compelling. There is no reason to think that are choices are (a) some gay
marriage law or (b) no marriage law. This seems to be something of a false dilemma.
Second, Waldron might admit that gay marriage law is not a PC situation, but
deny that it is representative of a large class of laws. He could just insist that gay
marriage law is one of a handful of exceptions to his general account. He might hold that
issues like gay marriage and abortion are exceptions, rather than the rule.

Does Waldron’s Majoritarianism Escape The Burdens of Judgment?

According to Christiano, Waldron grounds his majoritarianism in the fact of
disagreement and the moral demand for respect for judgment. But, Christiano argues,
this strategy is self-defeating.219 Disagreement over political matters extends to
disagreement over the proper authority of collective decision procedures themselves. For
example, Christiano points out, people disagree about the basic principle of equal respect
for judgment. Some argue that people’s judgments are not worthy of respect, and others
219
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that they are not worthy of equal respect. Some people who agree that people’s
judgments deserve equal respect disagree about what this requires of us. Some think it
requires majority rule or consensus, while others think it requires plural voting.
One response to Christiano’s objection is to appeal to higher order procedures.
For example, we might try to design a fair constitutional convention, and hold that some
lower order decision procedure is legitimate because it was chosen according to the
higher order decision procedure. But as Christiano points out, there are two problems
with this. First, it seems to lead to an infinite regress. Why think there won’t be
disagreement over the nature of the higher order procedure too? Since we cannot agree
on a lower order decision procedure, there is no reason to think we can agree on a higher
order procedure. Appealing to some even higher order procedure just pushes the problem
back. Second, if the regress did stop somewhere, there is every chance that the process
might not issue a majoritarian decision procedure at all. Suppose, Christiano says, the
regress stops at the third order. We have somehow agreed on a procedure for
determining what our second order procedure ought to be. At this point, Christiano says,
it is a contingent fact whether those who must choose will decide on a majoritarian
decision procedure at all. The lowest order decision procedure might not turn out to be
majoritarian at all, even if the higher order procedures are.
A second response to Christiano’s argument is to simply insist on majoritarian
decision procedures and ignore disagreement. Christiano claims that proponents of this
view think that “disagreement about the best procedures ought not to be taken seriously
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when choosing majority rule.”220 But, he asks, why not? He sees no relevant difference
between disagreements over substantive matters and disagreements over procedures. The
insult done to dissenters when substantive views are forced on them appears to be no
different from the insult done to them when procedures are forced on them.
Christiano is not entirely fair here to Waldron. Waldron does not argue that
fairness or equal respect for persons requires majority-decision.221 He argues instead that
majority decision is not only an important technical device, but also a respectful one. He
admits, for instance, that there are perfectly plausible arguments in favor of plural voting.
Fairness need not require us to regard the view of a wise and intelligent person as having
the same weight as the view of someone ignorant and thoughtless; in fact, fairness might
require the opposite. Proven or acknowledged differences in wisdom or intelligence
could justify plural voting of some sort. But Waldron worries about whether any such
criteria of wisdom or intelligence could be justified in the circumstances of politics, since
citizens are likely to disagree over what counts as wisdom or intelligence, or even
whether high marks in either of these merits greater voting power.
Waldron illustrates his view by turning something Charles Beitz said on its head.
Beitz said that an inference from equal respect to majority decision would “reflect an
implausibly narrow understanding of the more basic principle [i.e., equal respect], from
which substantive concerns regarding the content of political outcomes … have been
excluded.”222 Waldron admits that Beitz is right about this. When people talk about
equal respect they usually do mean to refer to both the way the decisions are reached and
220
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the substantive impact that outcomes may have on individuals. From this point of view,
it is not clear that equal respect requires majority-decision, because it can lead to
outcomes that do not equally respect persons. However, Waldron says, this broad notion
of respect won’t help us in the circumstances of politics, because citizens disagree in
good faith about what counts as a disrespectful outcome. This is why we need a decision
procedure. Adding substance to a decision procedure merely privileges one controversial
view at the expense of others. So, Waldron insists, “in the circumstances of politics, all
one can work with is the ‘implausibly narrow understanding’ of equal respect.” Majority
decision is the only procedure consistent with equal respect in this “necessarily
impoverished sense.”
My sense is that the root of the disagreement between Waldron and Christiano is
whether or not there is some default position or starting point that is ontologically or
morally simple and beyond disagreement. I think Waldron takes majoritarianism—oneperson-one-vote—to be a default or fundamental (ontologically and morally simple)
starting point, such that moves away from this point require justification. Christiano, on
the other hand, thinks that majoritarianism is as much in need of justification as any other
voting scheme. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that Christiano could give a
justification of majoritarianism? Would Waldron object? I think that Waldron might
object, on the grounds that no such defense of majoritarianism could be immune to the
burdens of judgment. All such arguments would be subject to good faith disagreements.
In any event, I find Waldron’s view more compelling than Christiano’s, but I am not sure
it is unreasonable to disagree with me.
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There is something simple and compelling about the idea that each one of us—
each individual unit—has the right to determine how his or her life should go, and so also
a right to an equal say in how our common life should go. In this sense, majoritarianism
just seems naturally fundamental. It doesn’t seem necessary in a way to have to defend
the claim that each person deserves an equal vote. However, the claim that some
people’s votes ought to count for more than other people’s votes does seem to require
defense. For reasons like this, it seems to me that majoritarianism is the default position.
Still, I am not sure that anyone who disagrees with me is thereby unreasonable.

Summary of Key Points.

Majoritarian voting does not deserve the scorn it often receives. Its many virtues
show that it is a respectable source of law. Whether majoritarianism is immune to the
burdens of judgment is open question. My own sense is that it represents a primitive or
default position and that we cannot in good faith reject it, but I am not strongly
committed to this. In any case, the creation of law in the Circumstances of Politics
represents a significant social achievement. For these reasons, democratically produced
law deserves some significant measure of respect.
But, as Waldron admits, his account is insufficient as it stands. It is also
important for citizens to base their votes on their considered beliefs about justice and the
common good, and not solely on their sense of their own narrow self-interest. This effort
to vote responsibly is one component of the law’s authority. Unfortunately, Waldron
never explains the difference between responsible and irresponsible voting. This is a
154

significant missing piece. In essence, he does not explain reciprocity in justification.
Soper and Rawls do offer accounts of responsible voting and other public political
activity. These views will be discussed in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
HART AND SOPER

This chapter describes the development of a line of thought that Rawls takes up as
a core element of his theory of legitimacy. It comes from the works of H. L. A. Hart and
Philip Soper. Hart offers an influential account of the law and its normative force. Soper
modifies Hart’s view in certain ways and develops a shared reason account of political
obligation. Rawls turns Soper’s account of political obligation into a shared reason
account of political legitimacy. In this chapter I discuss Hart and Soper. I discuss Rawls
in Chapter 4.
The law claims to give those subject to it at least prima facie reasons for behaving
in certain ways and not in others. Theories of legal validity attempt to define exactly
what is to count as a law, strictly speaking. There are two aspects to this problem. First,
we need to know what distinguishes law from similar phenomena such as religion,
morality, or convention. Second, we need to know how to distinguish actual or genuine
laws from proposed or potential laws that somehow fail to become law. Theories of legal
obligation attempt to account for the normative aspect of law.
Legal obligation is not necessarily the same thing as political obligation or
legitimacy. An account of legal obligation seeks to explain what makes law the kind of
command that merits the respect of citizens. Accounts of political obligation and
legitimacy seek to explain why citizens have a duty to obey the law and when the state
has a right to enforce it. Though it seems clear that there might be some significant
relationship between legal obligation and political obligation and legitimacy, this
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relationship is not well understood by either legal or political theorists. This chapter
considers one important effort to make sense of this relationship.
John Austin, an early legal positivist, sought to define law so as to distinguish it
from similar social phenomena (such as morality) and to clearly demarcate the
boundaries of a science of law.223 He defines law roughly as those commands backed by
threats that are issued by a sovereign who is habitually obeyed by most people in the
society. For Austin, the law is essentially coercive. Insofar as his approach equates
might and right, people are now rightly skeptical of it.224 Nevertheless, in its day, it was
an influential theory of legal obligation. Both Hart and Soper compare their theories to
Austin’s.
In The Concept of Law, Hart rejects Austin’s account and seeks to replace it with
a better one.225 He offers a descriptive, positivist theory of legal validity and legal
obligation. A key element of his account of legal obligation is the attitude of government
officials toward the law-making process. Roughly, Hart argues that the law-making
process must be rule-governed. Officials must take the rules that constitute the legislative
process to be shared and enforceable standards of behavior. This distinguishes law from
the arbitrary exercise of power and sets the ground for his account of legal obligation.
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In A Theory of Law, Philip Soper uses some of Hart’s premises to develop
accounts of legal and political obligation.226 Soper rejects Hart’s positivism and his
descriptive approach to legal theory, but accepts the idea that officials must have a certain
shared attitude toward the law. He worries about Hart’s non-moral understanding of the
official attitude, however, and argues instead that this attitude must be explicitly moral, if
the law is to be the kind of thing that might merit the respect of citizens. Only in this way
can work on legal obligation move in a meaningful direction. One virtue of this
approach, he argues, is that it gives us a way to solve the problem of political obligation.
By connecting legal and political theory in this way, Soper hopes to rescue them both
from what he perceives as a period of stagnation and irrelevance.
Rawls accepts the broad strokes of Soper’s accounts of legal and political
obligation. One key difference is that where Soper talks about legal and political
obligation, Rawls talks about political legitimacy. Rawls’s intent in making this
conceptual shift is not entirely clear, but it introduces new issues to the discussion. In
any case, Soper’s theory is generic and flexible enough to apply to many (if not all)
societies with legal systems. In several of his works, Rawls applies Soper’s generic
account to specific types of societies. In The Law of Peoples, for instance, he applies it
to what he calls “decent” societies. These are non-democratic and non-liberal
constitutional republics, similar to the political societies described by Cicero,
Machiavelli, and Rousseau. In his work on liberal democratic societies—the setting for
his liberal principle of legitimacy—Rawls applies Soper’s theories to the context of
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democratic political culture, where all reasonable citizens regard one another as the free
and equal co-authors of their law.
This chapter describes and critically assesses the works of Hart and Soper that
most influenced Rawls. The next chapter critically assesses Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy. All three accounts represent viable approaches to key issues in legal and
political philosophy today. Thus, while this chapter is primarily a prelude to the next, the
ideas of Hart and Soper deserve consideration on their own. Since both Hart and Soper
compare their theories to Austin’s command theory, it is helpful to begin this chapter by
briefly describing Austin’s account. This sets the stage for more complete discussion of
Hart and Soper.

Austin’s Command Theory of Law.

Austin’s command theory holds that laws are general orders, backed by threats of
sanction.227 The orders are issued by an independent sovereign, a person or group of
persons who generally take orders from no one. They may also be issued by
representatives of the sovereign. In general, commands from the sovereign are laws
when most subjects comply with them, and they believe that punishment is likely to
follow disobedience. On this view, the law is essentially coercive. It gives people reason
to act because people want to avoid punishment.
One problem with this command theory is that it seems to distort as many kinds
of legal rules as it explains. It appears to fit criminal law fairly well. This area of law is
227
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comprised of commands forbidding certain types of behavior, and sanctions to be meted
out to those who disobey. But Austin’s command theory does not fit many other kinds of
law. For instance, some laws tell people how to make wills and contracts. These acts
create new rights and obligations between parties. When people violate one of these
power-conferring laws, no one is punished. Instead, their efforts produce nothing. No
will or contract is created when power-conferring laws are violated. Some argue that this
“nullity” represents a sanction, but this seems to misrepresent what happens. A nullity is
not a sanction the government imposes upon rule violators. In such cases, the
government simply denies that the efforts of the parties have produced a valid will or
contract.
A deeper problem is revealed by Hart’s criticism of Austin’s idea of legal
obligation. Hart claims that coercion alone cannot produce obligations. When a gunman
threatens a person—“your money or your life?”—the person may suffer great harm if he
does not comply with the gunman’s request. He has sound reason to do what the gunman
wants. In fact, we might even say it would be foolish or dangerous to disobey the
gunman, and thus that this person is actually obliged to do what the gunman wants. But
it would not be right to say that the person has an obligation to obey. While it would be
unreasonable to resist the gunman in this case, there is no reason to think the victim owes
the gunman anything, or that the gunman’s claim is morally sound. Might does not make
right. The deeper problem with Austin’s theory of legal obligation is that the sovereign is
the gunman “writ large.” The sovereign can oblige subjects to comply with her
commands, by threatening to harm them if they do not comply, but her threats can never

160

obligate them to obey her. Since laws create obligations, commands from Austin’s
sovereign are not laws. Austin’s theory fails to distinguish governments from gunmen.

H. L. A. Hart and The Concept of Law.228

In The Concept of Law (hereafter Concept), Hart attempts to develop a
philosophically sound account of the essential features of law. Chief among his aims are
accounting for legal validity and legal obligation. The question of legal validity has to do
with identifying the laws of a legal system. A theory of legal validity describes criteria
for distinguishing genuine laws from other kinds of rules, and from rules incorrectly
claimed to be laws. The question of legal obligation has to do with law’s claimed
authority. A theory of legal obligation explains how the law binds subjects, or generates
obligations. It is about how law produces reasons for subjects to act in certain ways.
Hart’s method is descriptive.229 We can describe rule-governed social practices,
like law, from both “internal” and “external” perspectives. The internal perspective is the
point of view of a participant, someone who is part of the group and affirms its rules.
The external perspective is the point of view of an outside observer, someone who is not
part of the society and does not affirm the rules. Methodologically speaking, Hart’s legal
project is a particular kind of external account: he argues that a sound external
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description of the internal perspective can answer many philosophically important
questions about law. He accounts for the important features of law by describing the
different external behaviors and internal mental attitudes of group members immersed in
law as a rule-governed social practice. Thus he accounts for legal obligation by
describing the law’s rule-governed internal aspect, and he solves the problem of legal
validity by describing a certain kind of legal rule, the rule of recognition, which he claims
is common to all legal systems.
Hart is a positivist, so he makes no attempt to morally justify the legal structures
he identifies. While the law is often influenced by a society’s beliefs about morality and
justice, its validity and normativity need not be a function of either. The law is ultimately
a matter of social convention.

Rules and Obligations.

In Concept, Hart holds that legal obligation is ultimately a matter of social
convention or practice. His account of social rules has come to be known as the “practice
theory.” A practice rule exists when four conditions are met: (a) members of a group
generally conform to some behavioral standard; (b) they see deviation from the standard
as a lapse or offense that merits criticism and correction; (c) criticism of deviation is
generally regarded as appropriate; and (d) at least some have an internal attitude toward
the standard, using it as a guide and a tool in evaluating their own behavior and the
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behavior of others.230 At least one commentator doubts that Hart intended this account to
be a complete theory of rules, rather than simply a test for the existence of rules.231 A test
for the existence of something need not say much of the nature of that thing: Geiger
counters detect radiation but tell us little about it.232 Hart may have meant to do nothing
more than distinguish rule-governed behavior from habit or coincidence.
The distinction between rule-governed behavior and social habits and coincidence
is important to Hart’s account. When we say that a group follows a rule, we mean more
than most group members behave in a certain way. Social habits also cause convergence.
What distinguishes rule-governed behavior from social habits are the ways people
respond to deviations from established behavioral patterns. Suppose Dan goes to a
church that has a rule against wearing hats during the service, and no rule about where
people must sit. Dan never wears his hat during church, and he always sits in the front
left pew. Suppose now that Dan forgets to take his hat off one Sunday. Since there is a
rule against this behavior, other church members will see Dan’s behavior as a lapse that
merits criticism and ought to be corrected. They will regard his behavior as Something
One Should Not Do. Someone may give him a look, or point to his head, in an effort to
get him to change his behavior. At the extreme, someone might interrupt the service and
insist that he remove his hat, or challenge him to explain his unruly and offensive
behavior. Both Dan and his critics will regard such efforts as reasonable or justified.
Many church members will correct Dan unreflectively, without considering the nature of
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what they are doing, but some will correct him because they see his behavior as a
violation of a standard of behavior that applies in the church setting. Some will have
internalized the standard and use it to guide the community. These kinds of responses
and attitudes toward patterns of behavior and deviations often indicate the presence of a
rule.
Now suppose Dan sits in the front right pew one Sunday. It is not unusual for
people to become accustomed to sitting in certain seats in social settings like church, so
other church members may regard this as odd, or surprising. However, since there is no
rule requiring Dan to sit anywhere in particular, no one will regard his behavior as an
offense or lapse in judgment. If someone did try to force him to move to the front left
pew, others would regard this effort as unjustified, in the absence of some further
explanation. These differing internal attitudes toward behavioral patterns, and deviations
from them, are what separate coincidence and social habit from rule-governed social
practices.
Whether Hart’s practice theory successfully distinguishes rule-governed behavior
from coincidence and habit is an open question. A common objection to the practice
theory is that it does not distinguish rules from generally applicable reasons.233 Many
examples are thought to show this point. One common example has to do with chess. In
chess, there are several standard openings. These are standard sets of initial moves,
commonly regarded by serious players as the best or proper way to begin the game.
Those who know chess well can sometimes tell which opening a player has chosen by
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observing which piece he moves first, and where he moves it. These openings are not
required by the rules of chess, but serious players generally use them, and those who do
not tend to get criticized for it. This criticism is regarded as appropriate and justified, at
least by serious players, and at least some see the standard openings as the way chess
ought to be played: “if you’re going to play chess, this is how you should do it.” Of
course, chess can be played like checkers, with each player simply attacking the others’
pieces willy-nilly, until only one king is left standing. But to chess aficionados, this is
like watching a chimp bang on a piano, or watching elephants paint. Chess, at its best,
pits intellect against intellect in a complex game of strategy and misdirection. Many
think this chess example (and others like it) shows that the practice theory incorrectly
characterizes generally applicable reasons (e.g., standard chess openings) as rules. They
have a point. Still, some doubt that these counterexamples prove decisive.234 For
instance, while the rules of chess say nothing about the standard openings, it is possible
that there are rules of teaching chess. In any case, in the Postscript (published 30 years
after Concept) Hart concedes that the practice theory is inadequate as a general account
of rules. Nevertheless, he maintains that it successfully accounts for key elements of
legal systems.235
Rule-governed behavior is different from merely patterned behavior. A special
kind of social rule is what Hart calls a “rule of obligation.” On Hart’s account, all social
rules give subjects reasons for action—this is just what it means to have a rule—but only
some impose obligations. Rules of obligation are distinguished from weaker rules by
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three features: (a) they are vigorously enforced by group members; (b) they are thought
to promote essential or prized features of social life; and (c) they are recognized as rules
that often require sacrifices from individuals.236
The main characteristic separating rules of obligation from ordinary social rules is
the strength and insistence of the social pressure members exert against rule violators and
those who threaten to break the rule.237 A rule imposes an obligation when group
members take the rule very seriously and enforce it with a great deal of social pressure.
Hart admits that the line separating ordinary rules from rules of obligation is a bit
fuzzy—all rules are enforced with social pressure; how much is needed to make an
ordinary rule into a rule of obligation?—but this does not obscure the fact that some rules
are more vigorously enforced than others. Rules enforced with great determination and
strong social pressure clearly impose obligations.
Hart adds two features to this characterization of rules of obligation.238 First,
rules of obligation are thought to protect or promote essential or “highly prized” features
of social life. These include rules that restrict the use of violence, or that require honesty
and the keeping of promises. For example, since child-rearing is essential to social life,
there are rules of obligation that define certain duties parents have to their children. No
particular rule is essential in this case, but the common fundamental needs of children
give some content and place some limits on what can be done. Children need certain
kinds of nurturing and basic care in order to develop and grow into healthy adults. The
nature of parental obligations varies cross-culturally, but this does not mean that anything
236
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goes. Minimally children need to be given the tools they will need to reproduce their
society, and to be successful members of it. In our own society, parents are typically
given some latitude in determining how they will raise their children. However, this does
not mean that just any parental behavior is permitted. For example, parents who leave
their young children alone while they run off to Las Vegas for the weekend deserve at
least social censure and probably legal censure as well.
Second, people generally recognize that rules of obligation often require conduct
that conflicts with the particular self-regarding desires of the agent. This is why
obligations are generally thought to require sacrifices from people. (You simply cannot
leave your young children alone while you run off to Vegas!)
Hart anticipates one objection to his analysis of rules of obligation: if the primary
characteristic of these rules is strong social pressure to conform, why insist that the
internal attitude is so important to understanding obligation? It just seems superfluous.
Hart’s view is just the opposite. He says that if we do not see the significance of the
internal attitude, “we cannot properly understand the whole distinctive style of human
thought, speech, and action which is involved in the existence of rules and which
constitutes the normative structure of society.”239 The distinction between the “external”
and “internal” aspect of rules is essential to any understanding of law or even of human
society.
Here Hart contrasts two kinds of external comments an outside observer can make
about a society. She can assert that group members accept certain rules, and in this way
describe their internal attitude, without herself affirming the rules. Or she can simply
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record regularities in the external behavior of group members. Hart calls this the extreme
external point of view.240 The outside observer can learn quite a bit about a society from
this extreme position. She could correlate deviations with sanctions and develop a fairly
robust ability to predict the kinds of reactions different behaviors will provoke. She
could learn enough to get along fairly well with those she observes. But she will miss out
on a key dimension of social life. The extreme external perspective never reveals how
group members view their own patterns of behavior. In this way it fails to account for
why people behave as they do. It overlooks the way rules function in society. Austin’s
command theory is an extreme external account. It is based solely on the external aspect
of law—observable patterns of behavior as responses to perceived threats of sanction—
and misses completely the internal aspect of law (or any other system of rules).

The Legal System and Validity.

Hart holds that the core of every legal system is a union of primary and secondary
rules.241 Some primary rules simply tell people what they must or must not do. They
include rules against theft and the free use of violence. Other primary rules confer
powers on subjects, enabling them to create new rights and duties. These primary powerconferring rules make it possible, for instance, for people to get married, or to make wills
and contracts. Secondary rules are about primary rules, and there are three kinds: the
rule of recognition, rules of change, and rules of adjudication.
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The rule of recognition specifies the characteristics that identify the rules of a
group. Every legal system must have an authoritative way of resolving questions about
the existence of other legal rules, a conclusive way of identifying the rules that belong to
a group. The rule of recognition defines these criteria. In doing so, it serves as the
ultimate rule for identifying the “valid” laws of a legal system. Valid laws are just those
that meet all the requirements of the rule of recognition. In the U.S., the rule of
recognition is a complex mix of the Constitution and the three branches of government.
Laws are produced in a couple of ways. The legislature enacts some laws. Some law is
created when judges decide hard cases. The ultimate rule of recognition in the U.S. is the
Supreme Court’s power of judicial review. The Court now has the authority to
conclusively decide whether any proposed law is Constitutional, and thus whether it is
one of the laws of the U.S. or not. Laws judged unconstitutional are not U.S. laws and
have no legal authority. What makes judicial review the ultimate rule of recognition is
not that it is written down somewhere, but rather that public officials generally accept this
as the Court’s appropriate role.
Rules of change specify procedures for introducing new primary rules, and for
modifying or eliminating old ones. The rules that create and define the legislature’s
power to create or repeal laws are rules of change. They explain who has the power to
make laws, the procedure for implementing that power, and its scope or reach. They are
often closely associated with the rule of recognition.
Rules of adjudication specify procedures for determining whether primary rules
have been violated on any particular occasion. They define who has the power to make
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such determinations, the procedures that must be followed in making them, and the
jurisdiction covered by various judicial officials.
A legal system exists when two conditions are met. First, valid laws must be
generally obeyed by citizens and officials. In many cases citizens will see valid laws as
common standards of behavior and sources of obligation, but this is not necessary. If
citizens and officials generally obey the valid laws, for whatever personal reasons each
may have, the first condition is met. Second, the secondary rules must be accepted as
common public standards of behavior by officials. In particular there must be shared
official acceptance of the rule of recognition. Officials must take the secondary rules to
be rules of obligation that apply to all them in their public roles as officials. It is not
necessary for private citizens to have this attitude toward the secondary rules.

Law and Morality.

Hart holds that the law need not be a function of morality. Some genuine legal
systems are completely separate from what are generally recognized as moral codes. But
the belief that there is some necessary relationship between law and morality is not
entirely wrong. Every legal system has two moral elements: the formal aspect of justice
and minimum natural law content. While these conditions are part of every legal system,
they are not sufficient to guarantee the morality of any legal system.
Every human legal system contains the formal aspect of justice. Justice claims
have two parts: (a) the formal principle that like cases be treated alike, and (b) criteria
used to determine when cases are alike. The first feature appears in all cases of justice
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claims, but it offers no guidance until the second feature is filled out. The claim that a
law is unjust often means that the first feature is missing, i.e., that the law treats people
unfairly, because it does not treat like cases alike. This same formal principle of
justice—that like cases should be treated alike—is also a key feature of all rule-governed
social practices. Treating like cases alike is just part of what it means to follow rules.
Rules identify sets of conditions that people ought to respond to with particular more-orless well-defined patterns of behavior. When people treat like cases differently, it is hard
to see their behavior as rule-governed. This applies to legal systems, since they are rulegoverned social institutions. Thus, a legal system must treat like cases alike, or else it
risks losing its claim to being rule-governed. Thus every legal system necessarily shares
with justice claims this formal principle. In this way, every legal system contains an
element of morality.
Every enduring human legal system also has laws containing the “minimum
content” of natural law.242 In order to survive, every human society must have certain
minimal standards of behavior. Simple reflection on human nature, the purpose of
society, the natural environment, and so on, makes this evident. For instance, social life
requires restrictions on the free use of violence. Such rules are necessary because human
beings are vulnerable to attacks by others. If there were no rules restricting the free use
of violence, there would be little point in having any rules at all. Every legal system must
recognize such standards. Hart calls these universally recognized standards the minimum
content of natural law. But while this minimum content is necessary for the continued
existence of human society, and thus must be recognized by all legal systems, it is not a
242
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necessary characteristic of law as such. The minimum content is necessary because of
the kinds of beings we are, but human nature is a contingent fact. If human beings were
different than they are now, e.g., less vulnerable, the minimum content would be
different, or might not exist at all. Laws restricting the free use of violence are universal
only because human beings are vulnerable in certain ways, not because the concept of
law requires any specific moral content. The continued existence of human society
requires this content, not the concept of law.
Since Hart admits that these two elements of morality can be found in every legal
system, why does he deny the claim that law is founded on morality in some way?
Because these two moral elements do not guarantee the morality of any society or its law.
A society need not extend the minimum natural law content to all, nor need it treat all
individual persons as “free equals.” In a caste society, for instance, people in different
castes may be thought of as naturally superior or inferior to others, and so to have more
or less moral value, rights or permissions than others. Formal justice requires that
members of one caste be treated in similar ways, but it does not require that all castes be
treated the same. And the minimum natural law content needs to be extended to most of
the castes, but it need not be extended to all castes. In slave societies, masters may be
morally sensitive to each other, while at the same time treating slaves as objects. Law
generally follows conventional morality, so where this morality allows discrimination,
the law will too. Hart identifies the Nazi regime and South Africa during Apartheid as
contemporary examples of societies that have genuine legal systems, in part because they
meet the conditions of formal justice and the minimum content of natural law, but that are
nevertheless immoral and unjust regimes.
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Potential Problems for Hart’s Theory of Law.

Hart’s philosophical account of the law has two main aims. The first is
explaining legal validity. The second is accounting for the law’s normativity. A great
deal of critical work has targeted both of these projects. Since I am not primarily
concerned with the validity question, I will set this issue aside. In the next few sections I
will consider three objections to Hart’s account of legal normativity. First, some object
that Hart’s notion of legal obligation is obscure. If legal obligation is not moral or
prudential in nature, then what exactly is it? Some see no middle ground. Second, some
object to Hart’s account because it implies legal duties to immoral and unjust
governments. Could one really have a legal obligation to the Nazi regime? Third, some
think Hart fails to distinguish law from force. If this is true, Hart’s account of legal
obligation fails, because he claims force cannot generate obligations.

Is Hart’s Legal Obligation Too Obscure?

Hart tries to develop an account of legal obligation that does not reduce it to either
morality or force, but if legal obligation is not one of these, what exactly is it? The
prudential ought is fairly straightforward. It says that you ought to do some X, because X
is in your self-interest in some way. The reason you should do X is because doing X
would benefit you. The nature of the moral ought is not quite as clear as the prudential
ought, but we do have some idea what it means too. Broadly speaking, morality has to do
173

with what it means to be a good person, or what is ultimately good for human beings, or
what it means to do the right thing. The moral ought describes behavioral requirements
based on such moral considerations. But what is legal obligation if it is distinct from
moral and prudential concerns? What kinds of reasons does it give people for
conforming to the law’s demands? Our notions of prudential and moral obligation
provide more or less clear ways of answering these questions. On the prudential account,
you ought to obey the law, simply in order to avoid punishment or sanction. On the
moral account, legal obligation is based on moral considerations. You ought to obey the
law, because the law is based on or in some way contributes to the ultimate good of
human beings. It is not clear how, if at all, a distinct notion of legal obligation answers
these questions. (This has implications for political obligation and legitimacy, but I want
to put off explaining just how until a little later.)
As a result, one might claim, as Philip Soper does, that Hart makes a mistake in
trying to account for legal obligation in non-moral and non-prudential terms. Soper
seems to have two problems with Hart’s approach. First, Soper sees no clear middle
ground between moral and prudential obligation. What else could legal obligation be?
So he thinks it must be moral or prudential in nature. Second, Soper thinks it just
muddies the water to introduce an obscure notion like Hart’s legal obligation. Prudential
and moral obligations and reasons for action are complex and difficult enough to sort out
and compare on their own. Introducing some distinct legal notion of obligation adds
unnecessary complexity to an already messy situation. Soper thinks we need to approach
legal obligation from the common sense point of view of the average citizen. Citizens
can understand prudential and moral duties and reasons for action. They want to plan a
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course of action through life, so they want to know if they will be punished for behaving
in certain ways, and how to act morally. On Soper’s view, these concerns exhaust the
average citizen’s interest in the law. They want to know what the law forbids, and how
the law connects to their moral duties. But if the law is distinct from morality and
prudence, it is not clear how citizens should regard it, or factor it into their calculations
about how to live. How much do legal obligations weigh against moral or prudential
ones? This question is easier to answer (so Soper argues) if we characterize legal
obligation as either moral or prudential in nature. This is one reason Soper gives for
rejecting Hart’s approach to legal obligation.
Hart could respond that he distinguishes legal obligations from moral and
prudential ones because, as a matter of descriptive fact, legal obligations are distinct from
the others. That legal obligation may be hard to understand, or that it may add
complexity to an already difficult situation, is irrelevant from this descriptive perspective.
Descriptively speaking, the law is what it is, even if it is difficult to understand. Soper
ultimately rejects Hart’s descriptive approach, for reasons I will explain later. I will set
this issue aside for now, but it will come up again. The point I wish to emphasize here is
that some find Hart’s notion of legal obligation too obscure to be helpful. Soper and
Rawls agree with Hart that legal obligation is not the same thing as moral obligation, but,
unlike Hart, both link the law’s normative force to a kind of moral sincerity among
individuals (officials or citizens) responsible for the law. According to Soper and Rawls,
this link gives the law a distinctively moral quality. In this way they avoid Hart’s
problem.
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Alternatively, one might claim, as Michael Martin does, that Hart does not think
law creates “real” obligations at all, but only “descriptive” ones.243 Hart’s descriptive
account of obligation is anthropological. It describes the duties a person is said to have,
according to the behavioral standards of his society. But descriptive obligations are not
real obligations, Martin says. He seems to think Hart’s “merely descriptive” obligations
have no genuine moral claim on a person’s behavior. Martin thinks this is why Hart
insists that we should always morally evaluate the law’s demands, before we decide to
comply with the law. On Martin’s account, the obscurity of Hart’s notion of legal
obligation is not a problem, because so-called legal obligations have no real genuine
moral claim on citizens. Citizens will recognize, of course, that it would be prudent to
obey the law, since laws will be enforced by the state. As a result, citizens will factor
their “legal” obligations into their deliberations about how to act, but for prudential
reasons only, not legal or moral ones. And they will do this despite the fact that legal
obligations are not real moral obligations.
I think Hart would resist Martin’s claim that legal obligations are not real. Martin
seems to think moral obligations are essentially different from legal ones, because legal
ones are conventional and (Martin assumes) moral ones are not, but on Hart’s account
both are fully conventional in nature. From Hart’s perspective, if legal obligations are
merely descriptive, then so are moral obligations. But I do not believe he would say
either kind of obligation is merely descriptive, if this means not real or genuine. Rather,
he would say that real obligations, moral or legal, are rooted in conventional social
practices.
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In any event, I do not hope to resolve this issue here. I will leave that to Hart
scholars. But I wanted to bring the issue up, because both Soper and Rawls will take a
different approach. While both reject the claim that legal obligation can be reduced to
morality or justice, each sees the law’s normative force as essentially connected to the
moral values of a society.

Can there be a Legal Obligation to Immoral and Unjust Governments?

On Hart’s account, even the worst Nazi laws may have been genuine laws.244
Nazi laws were generally obeyed, so if Nazi officials had the proper internal attitude
toward their secondary rules, their laws gave German citizens genuine prima facie
reasons to comply with even the worst and most immoral laws of that regime. Of course,
Hart does not think people should obey the Nazis. But for positivists, the question of the
law’s normativity is distinct from the question of its moral value. It may be that no one
ought to obey immoral Nazi laws, all-things-considered, because the moral obligations
outweigh the legal ones. Nevertheless, an immoral law is still a law, so even immoral
laws may generate genuine prima facie duties to comply. Some see this as a major
failing of Hart’s theory of normativity and of positivism in general. No plausible account
of legal normativity could hold that people have reason to comply with the immoral
interests of such an evil government. Thus, there must be something wrong with Hart’s
approach to obligation.
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For instance, Edmundson rejects accounts like Hart’s on these grounds.
Edmundson insists that citizens have a prima facie obligation to obey only sufficiently
just laws, and no duty (not even prima facie) to obey laws as such. Why? When a person
fails to perform a prima facie duty, because it is overridden by other considerations, it is
appropriate for there to be a “residue of regret or remorse.” This is because the reasons a
person has for performing a prima facie duty still exist, even when a prima facie duty is
overridden. But no one should feel regret or remorse for failing to obey clearly immoral
or unjust laws. In Nazi Germany, for instance, no one should have felt regret for
violating laws requiring them to turn in Jews. Such regret is just not consistent with our
considered moral convictions. Thus accounts of legal normativity like Hart’s fail. They
imply positions that are not morally sound.
Hart could respond in a couple of ways. He might reject Edmundson’s claimed
account of our considered moral convictions. Edmundson insists that our considered
moral convictions indicate that regret is not an appropriate response for one who violates
immoral Nazi laws, but this might not be as obvious as he says it is. Hart could respond
that a weak or mild form of regret is appropriate, simply because a valid law has been
broken, even when the law is clearly immoral. This regret need not imply any undue
sympathy for the Nazi cause. If one thinks that law as such is valuable, then some regret
may not be inappropriate. This just seems to be a battle of intuitions.
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Alternatively, Hart might argue that legal reasons that get overridden by moral
reasons are not simply defeated, as Edmundson insists, but silenced altogether.245 A
defeated reason is one that is overridden by another reason, but continues to apply to the
situation. A silenced reason is one that is overridden by another reason and, as a result,
ceases to apply. Thus Hart might hold that a person’s legal obligation to the Nazis is
silenced by that person’s moral obligations. It is probably wrong to say that just any
moral reason can silence a legal one, but it is plausible to claim that some especially
weighty moral reasons could silence legal ones. In such cases, there would be no residue
of regret, because the legal duty would no longer factor into the deliberation about how to
act. This would not mean that the legal duty was not real. It would just mean that the
competing considerations changed the situation in some key way. In the first instance I
had only prudential and legal reasons to consider, but now I have moral reasons to weigh
too. When certain weighty moral reasons apply to a situation, one might hold, the other
kinds of reasons cease to. There is no obvious or a priori reason to rule out the
possibility.
Hart might also respond that the appropriateness of regret depends on the content
of the obligation that gets overridden. He might admit that overridden moral reasons still
apply to a situation, and generate an appropriate residue of regret, but deny that
overridden prudential reasons follow the same pattern. That is, one might hold that
overridden prudential reasons still apply to a situation, but insist that they need not be
accompanied by any residue of regret. A moral reason is a fairly serious matter, having
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to do (in at least a minimal sense) with the welfare or dignity of some morally salient
agent. Prudential reasons need not be related to such serious matters. Thus, while an
overridden moral reason may always be an occasion for regret, an overridden prudential
reason need not always be such an occasion. If this is plausible, Hart might insist that
overridden legal reasons are more like prudential reasons than moral reasons in this
respect.
One issue this problem raises is the relative weight or strength of legal
obligations. Should we think that all legal obligations have equal weight? Or should we
hold that the normative force attached to different laws can vary from law to law? On
Hart’s account, all legal obligations seem to carry the same weight, to have same amount
of normative force. So Hart cannot easily claim that some legal obligations are weaker,
and more easily overridden, than others. Soper claims that both legal and political
obligation can vary in strength. On his account, any particular law has normative force in
part because (he argues) having a legal system is better overall for everyone than having
no laws at all. It might seem that we would be better off without some particular law, but
other laws are clearly beneficial. The strength of the obligation correlated with any
particular law depends in part on the plausibility of the claim that the particular law
contributes something to the common good that having a legal system generally
promotes. We can hold consistently that a legal system is good overall, and still have
good reason to think some particular law is especially good or helpful, that some other
law is particularly harmful, and that the bulk of particular laws fall somewhere in
between. Given this kind of variation, Soper holds, some particular laws have greater
normative weight than others. And political obligation—the duty to obey the law—is in
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part a duty to respect those officials who are responsible for the law. On Soper’s account,
the normative weight a particular law carries depends in part on how much officials want
that law to be obeyed by citizens. Thus citizens have the strongest duty to obey the laws
officials feel strongest about, and less of a duty to obey the laws officials are least
concerned that citizens obey.

Does Hart Distinguish Law from Force?

Some critics question whether Hart’s account of obligation distinguishes it from
force. There are a couple of ways of advancing this charge against Hart. One approach
focuses on the reasons citizens have for complying with law. Another focuses on reasons
officials have for accepting the secondary rules. In each case, it is argued, citizens cannot
distinguish law from force, so we have reason to doubt that the law has genuine
normative force.
The first challenge to Hart’s distinction between law and force is based on his
claim that citizens need not have any particular attitude toward their laws. Hart says that
in order for a legal system to exist, private citizens must obey the primary rules.
However, he does not require that citizens accept the rules for any particular reason.
Each citizen can accept them for any reasons whatsoever.246 At the extreme, Hart says,
we can imagine a genuine legal system in which all citizens view the law as a set of
demands backed by threats of sanction. Citizens may comply with the law just because
they fear harm or punishment. The problem with this is that it is the same reason people
246
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have for complying with the gunman. When the gunman demands obedience and
threatens to punish disobedience with violence, people have reason to comply, because
they fear being hurt. If this is the only reason citizens have for complying with law, then
it is not clear how Hart’s account distinguishes law from force.
Hart rejects this, because for him the issue does not turn on the way citizens
understand law and force, but on whether or not official conduct is constrained by rules.
The key distinction is between governments that conform to the rule of law and
governments that do not. The gunman does not follow rules. He controls citizens
arbitrarily, in any way he chooses. The government that is not constrained by secondary
rules is like the gunman. In such a situation, official exercise of government power is
merely an arbitrary act of official will. On the other hand, officials guided by secondary
rules cannot exercise their will on citizens in this arbitrary way. Their conduct is
constrained by the rules they accept. Government control of citizens cannot be
distinguished from force when government power is exercised arbitrarily. When
government power is exercised according to rules, it is not reducible to force. This is the
key to understanding Hart’s view of legal obligation.
One response to Hart is to ask why he ignores citizens’ attitudes toward the law.
After all, law is supposed to create obligations for citizens. Why, then, is their attitude
toward the law irrelevant? Citizens need to know what their obligations are. This means
they ought to be able to distinguish situations that obligate them from those that merely
oblige them. Hart could answer that his view does not contradict this. Citizens can
distinguish law from force, by paying attention to what officials do. They can see, in
principle anyway, whether officials are following the rules or not. Hart insists only that
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the law’s normative force does not depend on the knowledge of citizens. But if some
citizen does not understand the law to create obligations, can it create obligations for her?
There is nothing odd about this. People can have obligations that they do not know they
have. For instance, I might join a club, and agree to participate in all of the club’s
functions, even before I know what all of the club’s functions are. In this situation, I
would have obligations to the club that I do not yet know that I have. It would be a
problem to claim that people have obligations that they cannot know that they have. If it
were simply impossible for me to know that I have an obligation to R, it might be odd to
claim that I in fact have an obligation to R. But Hart does not claim this about law.
Citizens can understand the difference between law and force—it is located in the rule of
law. Hart just does not want to make this a necessary condition of legal obligation. In
any case, both Soper and Rawls will move away from Hart’s position, and insist that it is
important for citizens to actually see that their laws generate genuine moral obligations.
A second challenge to Hart’s distinction between law and force focuses on the
reasons officials have for accepting the rules. Hart claims that officials who accept the
rules voluntarily need not do so for moral reasons.247 They can accept them for selfinterested reasons, or because they have some non-moral interest in others (as, say, an
amoral social engineer might). They can inherit them unreflectively, or merely because
they want to do what others do. In fact, those who accept the rules can conclude that they
have sound moral reason to reject the rules, but accept them anyway for any number of
reasons. Hart says that none of this changes the fact that the rules generate obligations
for citizens. However, some critics think maybe it should. One consequence of Hart’s
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view is that it makes law arbitrary in a way. Hart thinks that the key difference between
law and force is that law is governed by rules and force is not. Force is an arbitrary
exercise of power. But by allowing officials to take up the rules for any reason
whatsoever, Hart adds an element of arbitrariness to the rule of law. When a citizen asks,
“why are these rules being enforced?”, the answer is “no reason in particular.” Some
officials enforce them unreflectively, out of habit, while others enforce them because the
rules benefit them personally in various ways. And so on. This makes the exercise of
power, even when it is governed by rules, seem arbitrary, and so law seems to collapse
back into force. Hart can respond that there are two senses of “arbitrary” at work here.
The complaint that acceptance of the rules is arbitrary indicates a worry about the
ultimate justification for some set of rules. To ask about reasons for acceptance is to ask
if there are good reasons for accepting the rules. But on Hart’s view this is irrelevant,
because law is ultimately a matter of social fact, not of critical reason. This is a different
sense of “arbitrary” than the one that distinguishes law from force.
A third challenge to Hart’s account comes from another consequence of officials
accepting rules for non-moral reasons. On Hart’s view, citizens can reasonably see
official exercise of power as force and not law. Suppose an official accepts the rules for
self-interested reasons. When this happens, citizens have reason to worry that the laws
enacted through the legislative process serve only the interests of officials. If the official
is involved in law only because it benefits him, this gives citizens reason to worry about
the law’s purpose and its proper role in a citizen’s life. If the law serves primarily the
interests of officials, and not (or only incidentally) the interests of citizens, then for
citizens the only reason to comply with the law is fear of punishment. But this seems to
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turn law into force, and force cannot generate obligations. It does not matter that the
exercise of force is rule-governed. For example, there is nothing contradictory about the
idea of a gang exercising power over citizens according to some set of rules accepted by
gang members. Consider the Mafia. So if Hart allows officials to accept the rules for
non-moral, self-interested reasons, his distinction between force and law collapses, at
least from the perspective of citizens.

Key Points.

1. A legal system must be rule-governed if it is to generate genuine legal obligations.
This is a necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, condition of the law’s having
normative force.
2. If legal obligation is not prudential or moral in nature, it is hard to understand
exactly what it is. There is good reason not to equate legal obligation with force,
so it may be helpful to think of legal obligation as essentially connected to
morality in some way.
3. If legal obligation is moral in nature, the acceptance of the rules (by officials
and/or citizens) that constitute the legal system may need to be moral acceptance
of some sort. This is consistent with a respect for judgment approach to law and
legitimacy.
4. Since legal obligations create duties for citizens, it may be important to take
seriously the perspective of citizens.
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Philip Soper and A Theory of Law.248

In A Theory of Law, Philip Soper claims that the central problem in political
theory is the question of political obligation: why should I, or anyone, obey the law?249
But he feels that neither legal nor political theory have made much progress. Legal
theory asks the wrong question—“what is law?”—and is now of no interest to anyone but
professional philosophers.250 Political theory asks the right question—“should we obey
the law?”—but assumes poor accounts of law that make inevitable a negative
conclusion.251 We can avoid this “remarkably counterintuitive” negative conclusion, and
make excursions into both political and legal theory profitable again, by bringing them
together to answer this question: “what is law that it should be obeyed?”252 A
philosophically sound answer to this question makes legal theory meaningful, and also
makes it possible for political theory to solve the problem of political obligation.253
Soper’s work has two main parts. In the first he develops his theory of law, which
is primarily aimed at accounting for legal obligation. His account is guided by his
concern for what law must be like if it is to deserve the respect of citizens. Only law so
understood can have genuine normative force. In the second part he builds on his theory
of legal obligation, and develops a solution to the problem of political obligation. Given
that law deserves the respect of citizens, how should it figure into their thinking about
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their moral obligations? In the end he argues that all citizens who are concerned to act
morally have sound moral reason to obey the law.

What Is Law That It Should Be Obeyed?

Soper finds the oft-heard contemporary claim that there is not even a prima facie
duty to obey the law to be “remarkably counterintuitive.”254 He takes the existence of
this duty to be part of the data to be explained by theories of legal and political
obligation. Some contemporary philosophers argue against the existence of such an
obligation, but “most moral philosophers who have shaped Western consciousness, from
Plato to Kant, seem to have assumed or explicitly argued for the opposite view.”255 So
Soper locates himself in good company. The question for him is not “does law
obligate?”, but “if law is to obligate, what must it be like?”
Soper’s theory of law is aimed primarily at accounting for the law’s normativity.
The claim that law has normative force amounts to the claim that law as such deserves at
least minimal moral respect from citizens.256 What Soper has in mind is accounting for,
and justifying, the difference in attitude a person tends to experience when confronted
respectively by the mugger and the tax man. When the mugger demands money, and
threatens to punish disobedience with sanctions, a person tends to feel outrage. When the
tax man does the same, and with no more care for the personal interests or desires of the
citizen than the mugger, a person tends to feel at least a minimal kind of respect. What is
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the difference? The tax man represents the law. This is why there is at least a minimal
moral response to the tax collector that is absent in the case of the mugger. This minimal
moral respect is what Soper means by the law’s normativity. His theory of law is aimed
at explaining when and why this moral response is justified.
Soper emphasizes differences between his theory and Hart’s, but he also draws
much from the positivist tradition. Soper does not offer a full-blown definition of law, as
positivists like Hart do, but instead works with a citizen’s rough, “common sense,” idea
of law: “a set of directives issued or accepted by officials who enforce the directives with
organized sanctions.”257 Here Soper’s theory both resembles and differs from Hart’s.
Soper distinguishes descriptive theories from definitional ones.258 A descriptive
theory, like Hart’s, identifies common features of standard examples of legal systems.
Definitional theories identify conceptually necessary features of legal systems. Soper
rejects descriptive accounts like Hart’s. He argues that Hart’s emphasis on the external
perspective prevents him from adequately accounting for the internal perspective. For
instance, this is why he thinks Hart seems to vacillate on the reasons officials must have
for accepting the rules. Early in Concept, when Hart talks about rules of obligation, he
says that they are often thought to protect or promote prized or essential features of
society. Later, when discussing morality and law, he seems to back away from this
claim, and allows that officials might accept the rules for all kinds of non-moral reasons.
This waffling, Soper thinks, is a result of Hart’s insistence on maintaining an external,
descriptive perspective. He seems to feel that Hart is so worried about maintaining a
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distinction between law and morality that he cannot fully appreciate the internal
perspective. At times, Soper even seems to go so far as to insist that the internal
perspective can only be understood internally.
Soper’s theory of law is definitional. He makes definition proper a function of
human purposes. A sound definition of a thing identifies its essential features by
determining what human beings can do with it, or how they can use it. This is how Soper
approaches the definition of law. He seeks to define law’s essential features, including its
normative force, by identifying the ways that law connects with significant human
practical interests. One interest citizens have is knowing when they might be punished
by officials for violating laws. But citizens also have a second practical interest in law:
they want to act morally, so they want to know how the law is connected to their moral
obligations. Soper says Austin’s command theory was on the right track, because it
attempted to define law in terms of human interests, but it ultimately failed because it
defined law in terms of the first interest alone. Soper thinks that an adequate definition
law must take account of both interests. Thus he seeks to develop a definition of law that
conceptually connects it to moral obligation.259
So we can summarize Soper’s normative project in the following way:
Law is a set of directives issued and accepted by officials, and enforced by them
with organized sanctions; what traits must these directives have if they are to
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deserve at least minimal moral respect from citizens, and thereby fit into citizens’
moral calculations about how to act?
Soper answers that “legal systems are essentially characterized by the belief in value, the
claim in good faith by those who rule that they do so in the interests of all.”260 The law
deserves the respect of citizens when citizens have good reason to believe that officials
sincerely regard the law as promoting justice or the common good. Soper uses the terms
“the interests of all,” “the common good,” and “justice” interchangeably as placeholders,
and they must be read loosely.261 He makes no strong claims about what should count as
a theory of justice, or a commitment to the common good, for two main reasons. First, he
intends his theory to be generic, to account for the law’s normativity in all societies with
genuine legal systems, and not just in liberal democratic ones. He does not presume that
only liberal democracies have legitimately enforceable law. Second, he recognizes that
individuals in all societies disagree about what justice requires. If he were to say much at
all about justice or the common good, he would run the risk of violating his own
commitment to reasonable disagreement. Soper insists on only two things. First, a
theory of justice must give some consideration to the interests of all citizens. Second,
officials must appeal only to theories of justice that are publicly available to members of
their society, that are part of a known discourse or tradition of political thought. This is
necessary, Soper holds, because citizens will not see any normative reason to respect the
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law if they cannot see it as grounded in some commitment to justice. These two
conditions form the core of Soper’s approach to reciprocity and shared reason.
This is what makes Soper’s theory a shared reason view. It requires two kinds of
reciprocity. First, it requires something similar to what Reidy calls “reciprocity in
advantage.”262 Soper requires that officials sincerely consider the interests of all citizens
when proposing and enforcing law. Reciprocity in advantage is a central component of
shared reason. We cannot expect citizens to authorize law if they have reason to regard
having a legal system as worse than not having one. If the law ignores a citizen’s
interests altogether, or, worse, if it threatens her interests, she has no reason to regard law
as preferable to anarchy, to the state of nature or of no law. It is not reasonable to expect
citizens to accept law under these conditions. Thus, a minimum condition of law being
something citizens could affirm is that citizens can see the law as something that respects
(in some way) their interests. While this requires the law to show some consistency (e.g.,
what Hart calls the law’s “formal aspect of justice” and its “natural law content”), it does
not imply that all citizens must be treated equally. The interests of citizens could be
respected in many ways short of full and equal status, and we might expect to find just
this in societies that do not share modern, liberal democratic values.263
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Second, Soper’s theory requires something similar to what Reidy calls
“reciprocity in justification.”264 Soper holds that if the law is to have genuine normative
force, officials must make a sincere appeal to a theory of justice or the common good that
is part of a publicly available or known discourse or tradition. Every society with a legal
system also has a public discourse about things like law, justice, the common good, the
good for human beings, citizenship/membership, and so on. In any given society, this
public discourse is typically vast and contains many conflicting ideas. The exact nature
of these ideas also varies from society to society. For example, in the U.S. today it is
unreasonable to deny women the right to vote, but this was not so early in the 19th
century. At that time this was a question over which reasonable people could disagree.
Today, of course, this is no longer the case in the U.S., but in other societies it still may
be deemed reasonable to deny women the vote. On Soper’s view, the law’s normativity
does not depend on whether or not women get to vote. What matters instead is that
officials draw the reasons they offer in support of such laws from their publicly available
discourse on political society. Here is another example. Today in the U.S. we affirm the
ideal of one person, one vote, but some societies may reject this ideal, perhaps because
they think it is a mistake to regard individual persons as having an equal basic right to
political participation.265 Even in these non-liberal, non-democratic cases, law-makers go
some distance toward reciprocity in justification simply by appealing to publicly
available ideas. In effect, officials say to citizens the following: “people relevantly
similar to you—some of your fellow citizens—actually do affirm these ideas, so it is
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reasonable to believe that these are ideas that you could affirm as well (even if you
don’t).”
Soper does not mean that officials must correctly judge their law to be just or
otherwise to promote the common good. He is trying to give an account of the law’s
normative force that connects it to significant shared commitments like justice and the
common good, but that also respects reasonable disagreements about what justice and the
common good require. In the case of particular laws that are obvious failures, of course,
officials would be hard pressed to offer sincere defenses of them. But with most laws it
is not so obvious. People reasonably disagree about the justice of many laws, and about
the impact many laws have on the common good. Nor does Soper think it necessary for
citizens to agree with officials about the justice of the law; it is sufficient that citizens can
see that officials sincerely believe that the law takes everybody’s interests into account in
a morally significant way (at least as morality is understood in the culture/society in
question).266
Hart would accept Soper’s claim that the law need not actually promote any
value, but he rejects the claim that official acceptance must be moral acceptance. Soper
rejects Hart’s account, because (Soper argues) Hart’s refusal to adopt moral acceptance
means that his account fails to distinguish law from the gunman. On Hart’s view,
officials may accept the rules without making the moral claim that the rules serve the
common good. For instance, official acceptance may be based wholly on prudential
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reasons, such as the desire for income, security, or prestige. In this situation, citizens are
likely to see official acceptance of the rules as indicating only that laws will be coercively
enforced with sanctions. From the perspective of citizens, the law collapses into
coercion, and the government becomes the gunman. When citizens have no reason to
think the law serves any genuine moral purpose, they have no reason to think law counts
in their own deliberations about how to act morally. When the law is not morally loaded,
its practical significance for citizens is merely self-interested and prudential.

Respect for Authority and Political Obligation.

Political obligation—a citizen’s prima facie duty to obey the law—has to do with
respect for authority. Soper finds the appropriate paradigm of respect for authority in his
analysis of filial duty. On his view, filial duty provides a good analog for political
obligation.267 In a family, a person is confronted by demands for conformity, even
though that person’s membership is not the result of choice, or any other form of
complicit behavior (e.g., willful negligence, unjust enrichment, estoppel). The idea that
political obligation is analogous to filial duty has been around for a long time, but
discussion of it has been flawed, because both defenders and critics center their
arguments on benefits supposedly conferred by family membership. The problem with
this approach is that it makes filial duty arguments similar to unjust enrichment (fair play)
267
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arguments,268 which are weak and cannot ground political obligation.269 And even if the
focus on benefits could ground political obligation, it would leave untouched the problem
of deriving the specific content of political obligation.
So if it is not the benefits, then what is it about the family that generates filial
duty? The mutual acknowledgement of the members that an enterprise like a family is
valuable, coupled with the fact that the person who happens to be in charge is trying in
good faith to act in the interests of all family members, by acting in the interests of the
family as a whole. Soper says this makes plausible the following reaction to demands for
compliance from an authority:

1. Here is a job—directing an enterprise—that I concede someone needs to do.
2. The person who happens to be in charge is trying to do that job in good faith,
taking my interests equally into account along with the interests of others who
also find themselves part of the same scheme.
3. That effort deserves my respect and provides me with a moral reason to go along,
though at some point this reason may be outweighed by the seriousness of error I
think is being made.270
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One virtue of this approach, says Soper, is that this attitude of respect for authority can be
connected to themes in moral philosophy stressing empathy (“how would I want others to
respond if I were in charge?”) and fallibility or the dangers of hubris (“I could be wrong
about what ought to be done”).
For Soper, this analysis of filial duty provides a paradigm example of respect for
authority. This is, he argues, the best way to understand political obligation. On his
view, two features are sufficient to establish political obligation.
Those features are (1) the fact that the enterprise of law in general—including the
particular system, defective though it may be, that confronts an individual—is
better than no law at all; and (2) a good faith effort by those in charge to govern in
the interests of the entire community, including the dissenting individual.271
These two features are sufficient to generate a prima facie duty to obey the law. They
provide a rational basis for moral respect for the law. This resolves, for instance, Wolff’s
worry that the state’s demand for compliance is not consistent with every person’s moral
duty to exercise autonomy.272 Soper’s view allows a person P to autonomously defer to
the authority of another, A, even when P judges that A’s view is incorrect.
Soper concedes that feature (1) of his account leaves a gap in his solution to the
problem of political obligation.273 The anarchist insists that (1) is false. The anarchist
holds, according to Soper, that people would be better off overall without any state
enforced legal system. Whatever person-to-person moral duties people have could be
handled privately (e.g., through voluntary associations). If the anarchist is correct, then
271
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there is no obligation to the law. That is, if the enterprise of law in general is not better
than no law at all, there can be no political obligation.
Soper does not think it is hard to show the anarchist is wrong, because the
standard claim that law promotes security and stability is almost universally accepted.
Further, this flaw in his own theory should be easier to accept than the conclusion that
political obligation does not exist. But the anarchist does present a difficult problem:
does an individual who honestly believes that all law is bad have a political obligation to
obey it?274
Soper admits the appeal of arguing that, even if the anarchist is correct, still he
has an obligation to obey.275 Is not the good faith effort of officials to govern in the
interests of the entire community sufficient to generate obligations even for the anarchist?
The answer is no. Respect for others obligates the anarchist to listen to others in good
faith. But if the anarchist is correct that we would be better off without law, he cannot be
obligated to comply with law without threatening his autonomy. Soper’s account of
political obligation depends on the falsity of anarchism.
Here Soper points to an asymmetry between (a) disagreements about what kind of
legal system is best and (b) disagreements about whether any legal system is defensible at
all.276 Disagreements of the former kind are matters of degree, while disagreements of
the latter are disagreements in kind. Between those who accept the value of law, there is
common ground—a community of value—that makes the possibility of persuasion real.
If you and I agree that law in general has value V, then it is possible that I can persuade
274
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you that my law L contributes more to V than your law M, and vice versa. This common
ground, coupled with good faith concern for the whole community, generates respect for
others. But with the anarchist there is no such community of value. How then can the
anarchist have an obligation to obey the law? Why should he respect it? Soper says that
if we are to hold that the anarchist has an obligation to the law, we must hold that he is
wrong about its value. The law is valuable, and deserves the anarchist’s respect, whether
he believes it or not.
Feature (2) of Soper’s account of political obligation holds that those in charge
must make a good faith effort to rule in the interests of all, including the interests of
dissenters. This is important because it emphasizes autonomy and mutual respect,
especially between citizens in general and officials in the legal system.277 First, it is
rational for citizens to acknowledge the value of a legal system when the system
promotes their self-interest. In this case, respect for authority is consistent with
autonomy. Second, the respect officials have for citizens’ autonomy requires them to
consider the interests of citizens when they use their authority. Finally, in the case of
citizens, respect is owed to officials because they do an important job and honestly think
that compliance with their directives is required, if the job is to get done. The content of
the respective obligations of citizens and officials varies and depends on the interests of
each, but in each case the resulting obligations are generated by respect for the interests
of the other.
On Soper’s view, respect for the law is, more precisely, a duty to obey those in
charge, who make law and desire that citizens obey it. “My respect for those in charge
277
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provides a reason for doing what these persons believe I should do: comply with the
law.”278 He does not focus on large-scale effects of disobedience (e.g., social
disintegration) or on specific benefits received as the source of obligation. These will not
work. He says that one could develop a utilitarian defense of his view. Such a defense
would focus on
the persons one confronts and their response to one’s disobedience rather than on
the effects of disobedience on the enterprise itself. Disobedience cannot easily be
linked to societal disintegration; but it can be linked in an ascending scale to
sadness, disappointment, concern, anxiety, and fear on the part of those who think
the laws are important and my obedience desirable.279
But Soper feels his theory fits more naturally into a non-utilitarian background, “with the
tradition that traces the source of all moral obligation to the respect that is due other
equally autonomous, rational beings, mutually concerned for each other.”280
Soper’s theory of political obligation should not be confused with those that
analyze it in terms of gratitude.281 On Soper’s view, my duty to obey the Bush
administration is not a duty of gratitude, but of respect. In fact, I am not grateful at all for
many of the things they are doing domestically and around the world. But Bush and I
share at least two beliefs: (1) we both value the enterprise we are in, i.e., we both value
our democratic society, and (2) we both believe anarchy is worse than government (even
Bush’s version). Bush and I agree that our democratic society is good and worth
preserving and improving. Is Bush really doing the kinds of things that will strengthen or
278
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preserve what is good about our society? Well, he is not doing what I would do. But
here I have to acknowledge Soper’s version of good faith disagreement. Insofar as Bush
sincerely believes that his policies are good for our democratic society, and his actions
are not clearly out of the moral ballpark, I have to admit that his view is one a moral
person could rationally affirm. I am not grateful for his actions, but must concede that
one might honestly see his efforts as good for something we both care about. I could be
mistaken about what is best for us, and he could be right. I doubt it, but I cannot rule it
out. Since Bush is making a sincere effort to do what is best for all, me included, and is
willing to defend his actions in terms of values publicly available in our society, I have
reason to respect his actions. Since he happens to be in power, my respect for him gives
me sound reason to defer to him, to acquiesce, when he demands that I act in certain
ways that he honestly believes contribute to the common good. He wants me to obey the
law, so, out of respect for his sincere commitment to the common good, and his sincere
commitment to my good as well, I ought to do what he says. There may come a time
when I think Bush’s moves are so bad, so wrong-headed, that we have left the area of
good faith disagreement over how to govern and preserve what is good about our
democracy. In that case, I may still have a prima facie obligation to obey the law, but I
have even greater non-political moral reason to resist it. The sincerity of his belief may
give the law normative force, but my strong moral objection to his positions may override
the political obligation his sincerity entails. But until that point is reached, our common
beliefs, coupled with reasonable disagreement, give me sound reason to obey. Gratitude
has nothing to do with it.
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One virtue of Soper’s approach to political obligation is that it helps us
understand and derive the weight of the prima facie obligation to obey.282 The weight of
any particular law, and the accompanying obligation, is determined by how seriously
those who demand compliance view the law in question.
If I do not believe that abortion is wrong, the intensity with which others hold the
opposite moral view makes the obligation to obey a law against abortion strong
…. 283
The intensity with which others hold a moral view can be estimated by considering how
serious are the sanctions attached for disobedience. If, on the other hand, no one cares
much about a law—running a stop sign at 2 A.M.—the obligation to obey can be
outweighed by less important moral considerations. The law that no one cares much
about has less prima facie moral weight than the law about which many people have very
strong convictions.
Soper recognizes that many will object to that his theory of political obligation is
too modest.284 Traditionally, political obligation has been understood to require more
than minimal moral respect for the law, more than a mere prima facie duty to obey. So
even if he were to account for minimal respect, he would not thereby account for political
obligation. Soper rejects this for two reasons. First, accounting for minimal respect is
more than either legal or political theory can do today. If he is successful, this will be
quite an accomplishment in itself. Second, once one admits that political obligation is not
absolute—that is, that political obligation can be overridden by other moral
282
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considerations—the problem becomes understanding just how much weight political
obligation carries. In other words, unless one wants to hold the untenable position that
political obligation is absolute, (wiping out, for instance, the moral value of civil
disobedience) one must talk about political obligation in terms of prima facie duties.

The Limits of Law.

Soper makes officials’ sincere belief in the justice of a legal system a necessary
condition of the existence of law’s normativity and political obligation. This sincerity
condition places limited constraints on the content of law.285 Official justifications for a
legal system must be (a) consistent with the minimal basis for recognizing the value of a
legal system, and (b) believable in fact. These conditions do not imply anything
substantial about the appropriate content of law, but they do imply certain “natural” rights
that all legal systems must respect. These include (i) a minimal right to security of life,
liberty, and property, (ii) a right to formal justice (formal equality), and (iii) a “right to
discourse.” These rights are largely formal, but they do place limits on law, mainly by
ruling out certain extremely harmful situations.
Soper’s sincerity condition places few substantive constraints on the forms
government can take or on the content genuine laws can have. Did the Nazis have a legal
system? Did South Africa have a legal system during apartheid? Answers to these and
similar questions turn on whether officials sincerely believe they are ruling justly, and not
on whether their beliefs are correct. A sincere or good faith belief is not necessarily an
285
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accurate one. History tells us that thoughtful and otherwise decent individuals can
sincerely believe that institutions like slavery are consistent with the common good.
“Officials who accept the beliefs that underlie such moral judgments are acting in the
interests of justice and fairness as they see it, and in that sense in the interest of all.”286
Thus a slave-holding society could have genuine laws and obligations. Fair does not
mean equally weighted. From the official standpoint, the advantaged and the
disadvantaged in a slave-holding society each fairly get what they deserve.
But the sincerity condition does put limited constraints on the law.287 Officials
who sincerely believe that a legal system promotes the common good must also sincerely
believe that having a legal system is better than not having one. That is, having a legal
system must be better than anarchy or the state of nature. This limits law, because any
particular law that clearly would leave subjects in a condition worse than anarchy cannot
generate obligations. For example, a policy of genocide could not generate obligations
for those affected by it, because no official could sincerely hold that laws designed to
exterminate a class of people are better for those people than no law at all.288 This is
implied by the sincere belief that law is better than anarchism. In fact, any policy that
undermines the minimum security of individuals runs counter to the sincerity condition.
Thus the sincerity condition entails a sincere commitment to minimal security rights (life,
liberty, property). The same is true of the right to formal justice. A legal system must
not be wholly capricious, but must in some minimal sense treat like cases alike. This is
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necessary if any official is to sincerely hold that having a legal system is better than not
having one. In fact, a legal system without formal justice is pretty much the same thing
as no law at all. Thus all genuine legal systems must secure rights to minimum security
and formal justice (formal equality) for subjects.
So the sincerity condition implies limited natural rights, and thus minimal
constraints on law. But sincerity is difficult to judge. How can we know when an
official sincerely believes a policy is just? We test sincerity with consistency.289 We
examine policies to try to determine whether or not they are consistent with the claim that
law is better for those affected by it than the state of nature. For instance, it is clear that a
policy of genocide is worse for those affected by it than the condition of no law at all. No
one could sincerely claim that a policy that clearly leaves citizens worse off than they
would be in the state of nature is consistent with the claim that having a legal system is
better than not having one for those citizens. However, most laws are not such obvious
failures as a policy of genocide. Suppose officials insist that a policy of slavery is
consistent with the common good. Could this meet the sincerity condition? It is not
obvious that slavery is inconsistent with the sincerity condition. That is, some forms of
slavery are not necessarily worse than anarchism, even for slaves. Certainly some forms
of slavery are worse, but not all. In the anarchist condition, many things worse than
slavery could happen to a person. Thus it seems that slavery is not inconsistent with the
sincere belief that having law is better than not having it.
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Judging sincerity of belief is very difficult, and the consistency test will often be
indeterminate, leaving us without any firm conclusion. This leads Soper to insist on a
third right, which he calls the “right to discourse.” The right to discourse is a limited
right of citizens to request evidence of sincere belief among officials, by engaging them
in dialogue and debate. Judging sincerity is difficult to do, but knowing when officials
are sincere is key for citizens who want to know if the law deserves moral respect and
thereby fits into their moral calculations. Thus citizens have a limited right to probe
official claims to sincerity in the public square. Soper offers several reasons for thinking
this right is a necessary component of all legal systems. First, the sincere exercise of
power in the name of justice implies a commitment to a theory of justice and not just a
thoughtless response to tradition or self-interest. A sincere official can reveal the process
of reflective judgment that supports his personal world view, and will respond to
dissidents with more than a simple “that’s just how it is.” Second, officials are charged
with making disinterested choices in situations that also impact their self-interest. If
citizens are to regard claims of justice in such situations as sincere and not merely selfinterested demands for compliance, officials will want to be able to demonstrate how they
arrived at their conclusions. One way to do this is by developing decision procedures that
are impartial, consistent, and objective, and maintaining a certain level of transparency.
When no such procedures are in place, officials have a duty to explain their decision
process. Third, it is not uncommon for people to confuse self-interest and public-interest,
and to willfully overlook important facts or implications relevant to their decision.
Sincerity requires a willingness to admit this possibility and to confront apparent
discrepancies between theory and action. Fourth, sincerity requires that officials treat
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citizens as fully competent. Citizens can understand the value of the legal system, and
can judge official sincerity by talking with officials about how proposed laws contribute
to that value. Citizens have reason to doubt the sincerity of officials who simply refuse to
engage in such discussion. In the broadest terms, discourse is necessary because it
counteracts self-deception and expresses mutual respect between officials and citizens.
The right to discourse is not a right to free speech. The discourse right ensures
that officials consider all relevant sides of political issues, which gives citizens some
reason to think officials are sincere. Discourse has more to do with “soothing wounded
autonomy,” and producing peace and mutual respect, than it does with the reasons
traditionally thought to support free speech. It is not required as a means of developing
individual capacities, or as a means of ensuring participation in government, or even as a
means of getting closer to truth, though this plays some role. Discourse is ultimately
about making it possible for citizens to sincerely believe they are not simply being taken
advantage of by government officials. It affords citizens a certain amount of self-respect,
by allowing them to conclude that their legal system really does (or could) promote the
common good.
Discourse thus differs from free speech in many ways. For example, sincere
officials can prevent debate of all substantive political issues, without violating the
discourse right, provided that they are willing to engage in honest discussion of the
justifications for such restrictions on discourse. The discourse right does not give every
citizen the right to make political statements, to confront public officials, or even to try to
persuade officials or other citizens. What is required is that the reasonable challenges
each person might mount against official claims of justice find some public expression.
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A state that offers a more-or-less thorough justification of its basic structure has already
engaged many potential challenges to its claim to justice. But since laws and cultures
evolve, and officials need continuously to impress upon citizens their sincerity, some
form of discourse must always be possible.

Potential Problems for Soper’s Theory.

Two potential problems for Soper are the Who? and What? problems. Who
exactly must make the moral claim? What exactly must they claim is moral? These
seemingly simple questions interact in complex ways to produce difficulties for Soper’s
theory. Another potential problem is the claimed link between respect for officials and
having reasons to comply with their commands. These are separable issues, and so the
link between them needs defense.

The Who? and What? Problems.

According to Soper, the law merits the moral respect of citizens only when
officials sincerely affirm that the law is just. But Who must make the justice claim? And
What must they claim is just?290 The Who? problem has two elements. The first has to
do with exactly which government officials must make the claim. The second has to do
with the number or percentage of government officials who must make the claim. The
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U.S. Government, for instance, is composed of the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. Must members of all three branches make the justice claim? Is it enough if
members of one (e.g., the legislature) make the claim? Also, how many members must
make the claim? All? A simple majority? At least one? The What? problem asks
whether officials must claim justice for (a) the legal system as a whole, or (b) particular
laws. The Who? and What? problems interconnect in complicated ways. I will start by
describing alternative interpretations of the What? problem. I will discuss the Who?
problem as it arises for each interpretation of the What? problem.

A. Government officials claim legal system LS1 as a whole is just.

This is one generic answer to the What? question. Below I discuss different
interpretations of A. None of them are free from difficulties.

A1. Some official(s) sincerely believes that every law Px in legal system LS1 is just.

On A1, the claim that the legal system LS1 is just means that every single law Px
that comprises it is just. This is not a plausible interpretation of the justice claim. It is
unlikely that any government official could sincerely claim that every law in a legal
system is just. Every citizen, officials included, who is aware of all the laws of a legal
system will certainly find at least one of them morally objectionable. As a standard of
legal and political obligation, A1 is simply too demanding. In this case, the Who
question is irrelevant. If we cannot expect even one official to sincerely make this justice
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claim, there is no point in asking whether we should require that some significant number
of them sincerely affirm it.

A2. For each law Px in LS1, at least one government official sincerely deems it just.

One might hold that the whole legal system can be deemed just when, for each
law, at least one government official affirms that it is just. On this reading, no single
official need hold that all of the laws are just. It is sufficient if official justice claims
overlap enough to encompass all of the laws. This is a possibility, though there is
certainly no guarantee that every law will be affirmed as just. A potential problem is the
possibility that some law may be deemed just by only one official, and rejected by one or
more other officials. This issue falls under the heading of the Who problem.
Exactly how many government officials must make the justice claim? And what
does it mean when government officials disagree over the justice of a particular law?
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is necessary for members of the legislative
branch to make the justice claim. (Leave aside for now the question of whether or not
this is sufficient.) Must every member of the legislature make the justice claim? Is a
simple majority sufficient? Is it enough if just one makes the claim?
On A2, the legal system as a whole is held “by officials” to be just, because at
least one official affirms the justice of each and every law. But this means that for some
laws, only one official may affirm it. This is a potential problem in conflict situations.
Suppose one official affirms that a law is just, but another official rejects it. Could we
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then hold that legal system LS1 as a whole is deemed just by government officials? This
seems odd. We might amend A2 as follows:

A2.1. For each law Px in LS1, at least one official sincerely deems it just, and in no case
do more officials reject any law than affirm it.

As a matter of social fact, A2.1 seems implausible. I think it likely that in every
legal system at least some laws are rejected by more officials than affirm it as just, and
this can change through time. If this is wrong, however, the modified A2 is a possible
reading of the justice claim for whole legal systems. But suppose then that only one
official does affirm the justice of a law, and the rest are not sure about it. Would this be
enough to support the claimed legal and political obligations? I do not find this
compelling. In a complex modern state, in which the government is comprised of many
different officials, it hardly seems plausible to hold that the sincere belief of one official
alone could generate the normative force necessary for legal and political obligation.

A3. An official sincerely believes that legal system LS1 is more just on balance than any
available alternative legal system LSx.

On A3, a whole legal system is considered just by an official when she regards it
as more just overall than any alternative legal system. That is, an official of LS1
considers it more just, on balance, than potential legal systems LS2, LS3, and so on, and
so considers LS1 as a whole to be just. No one need claim that all of the laws are deemed
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just. The claim is only that the legal system as a whole is regarded as more just than
other alternatives. This seems like the most plausible interpretation of the claim that
officials must affirm that the whole legal system is just. Nevertheless, it is not without
problems.
One problem with A3 is that it is not inconsistent with the sincere belief that some
particular law P1 of LS1 is not just. That is, an official can sincerely claim that a legal
system LS1 is more just than any alternative, but still sincerely hold that policy P1 of LS1
is not just. She might hold that the reasons for thinking that LS1 is just (e.g., maximizing
liberty) actually count against thinking that P1 is just (e.g., because it sacrifices certain
freedoms for the sake of other goods). As we saw above in the discussion of A1, it is
highly unlikely that any official will hold that every law in a legal system is just, even if
he sincerely considers the legal system just overall. When an official considers LS1 just
overall, but considers P1 unjust, does P1 have normative force? Since the official in
question considers P1 unjust, there is no reason to think that it merits the moral respect of
citizens.

B. Government officials claim particular laws Px of LS1 are just.

In contrast to A, which had officials claiming justice for the legal system as a
whole, B has officials claiming that particular laws are just.
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B1. Government officials claim this particular law P1 is just.

Who must make this claim? In a democracy like ours, for instance, must officials
from all three branches affirm the justice of P1? Is it sufficient if the members of only
one branch make the justice claim? If so, does it matter which branch?
How many must make this claim? Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
members of the legislature must make the justice claim. It is implausible to hold that all
of the members have to make the justice claim for P1. And as I suggested earlier, in
complex societies like our own, we probably need more than one official to make the
justice claim, if a particular law is to have the normative force necessary for legal and
political obligation. But if one is too few, and all is too many, what number seems right?
On the face of it, it seems like a simple majority might be sufficient. However,
this gets complicated in a two party system like our own. Imagine a situation in which
Republicans effectively control Congress. For the sake of simplicity, I will focus only on
the Senate, and posit that there are 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats. When the
Republicans decide on a policy, they have the political muscle to enact it. Should we
require that a simple majority of all Senators makes the justice claim (51), or is it enough
if a simple majority of the controlling party’s Senators make the claim (28)? Both
options have problems.
One option requires a simple majority of all Senators (51). I will describe a
scenario that is not uncommon but that reveals a potential problem with this simple
majority reading. Suppose there are 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats. On certain
important issues, e.g., gay marriage, different Republican and Democratic leaders will
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propose different policies. That is, different Republican Senators may offer different
proposals, PR1, PR2, and PR3, and different Democratic Senators may do the same, PD1,
PD2, and PD3. The Republican Senators may be divided over the justice or moral merits
of their three proposed laws: 20 favor PR1, 18 favor PR2, and 17 favor PR3. The
Democratic Senators may be divided too. In this case, the Republican Senators are likely
to settle on one of their own proposals, PR1, and put all of their support behind it, even if
most of them do not think it is the just proposal. Why? Because the greater proportion of
Republican Senators support it (20), and all of the Republican Senators are likely to feel
it is better than any of the Democratic proposals. In this example, the law enacted, PR1,
is not thought of as best for the community by most Senators, even Republicans. Does
this law merit the moral respect of citizens? Can we say that a majority of Senators have
affirmed it as just? I do not think so. Nevertheless, I do not think there is anything
particularly morally suspect about the situation I have described, so I think we need to
say laws produced this way are genuine laws with the normative force that entails. Thus,
if B1 is the best way to read Soper’s theory, there may be a problem.

These Who? and What? problems are complex and largely overlooked by Soper.
Neither interpretation A nor B are free from problems, and it is not obvious that any
interpretation is clearly superior to the others. Since Rawls draws on Soper, he faces
similar problems. I will discuss Rawls’s answers in the next chapter..
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From Respect to Obligation.

Soper argues that when officials sincerely claim that the law is just, citizens have
a moral reason to respect the officials. This respect for officials in turn gives citizens a
reason to do what officials want them to do, namely, obey the law. Some question this
link.291 Respect and obligation are clearly separable issues, so the move from one to the
other needs defense. Those who act on sincere moral convictions plausibly deserve
respect, but it is not obvious that this respect implies a duty to obey. In some cases, for
instance, respect for moral sincerity might require only a less harsh response to those
whose behavior we judge foolish or immoral, however sincere they may be. The mugger
who steals to feed his family deserves less scorn than the one who does it to feed himself,
but neither deserves to be obeyed. Lyons puts the challenge this way: “the kind of
respect (if any) that a sincere champion of chattel slavery is due seems to provide me
with no reason at all to respect (that is, to comply with) his slave laws.”292
Three points need to be made on Soper’s behalf. First, Soper’s notion of political
obligation amounts to a weak prima facie moral reason for citizens to obey the
government. It is not an absolute duty, or even a strong prima facie reason to act. Of
course, it is still possible to question the link between respect and this weak sense of duty.
They are separable issues. But Soper’s weak notion of duty lowers the burden of proof
for him. It is easier to draw a connection between respect and a weak duty than it is to
draw one between respect and a strong or absolute duty.
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Second, Soper does not assume that respect as such implies his weak duty to
obey. Rather, he argues that certain social contexts make the move from respect to duty
both natural and plausible. Soper is not talking about all relationships of respect and
obligation, but the political relationship between government officials and citizens. He
assumes as background context this conventional authority relationship, and wonders if
this conventional relationship can be morally justified. He posits (a) a state with
government officials who give orders backed by sanctions, and (b) citizens who think that
these commands are “laws” that give them sound reason to obey the government, and
asks when (if at all) this respectful attitude that citizens have toward law is morally
sound? His answer is that this respect is morally justified when citizens have reason to
think officials are honestly ruling in (what officials believe to be) the interests of all.
This might be the wrong way to approach the problem of political obligation, but it is not
the same as assuming that respect implies a duty to obey.
Third, Soper’s theory is context or culture sensitive. What can be sincerely
affirmed in any society depends on the belief system of the people in question. Chattel
slavery could not be sincerely held to be in the interest of slaves in any society, because it
represents a condition no better for citizens than the state of nature. But some forms of
slavery might be sincerely held to be just in some societies today. In a modern
democratic society like our own, chattel slavery could not be sincerely held to be just.
Our science clearly refutes crude determinist or racial arguments for natural superiority or
inferiority for classes of people that were sometimes offered in the past as justification for
slavery. And our deep moral commitments to the freedom and equality of persons also
count against slavery. Thus, in a modern democracy like our own, no one could sincerely
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hold that chattel slavery is just. But does this not contradict Soper’s contention that
sincere belief is not necessarily correct belief? No. It is true that sincerity does not
depend on correctness, but there is a complex relationship between them. The greater the
evidence against a position, the harder it becomes for anyone to maintain and
demonstrate sincere belief in it. For example, a government official could maintain,
against all evidence and reason, that a practice like chattel slavery is just, but this is less
an example of sincerity than it is an example of dogmatic insistence. These are not the
same thing. Sincerity requires a rational commitment to a position. What a person can
rationally commit to depends in part one her society’s belief system, on her society’s
views of the natural and moral world. This implies that where practices like slavery can
be sincerely held to be just, there will be traditions of natural and moral inquiry that
support the view. This does not mean they will not meet opposition, even in those
societies. It does mean that possibility that slavery might be sincerely held to be just does
not amount to an obvious reductio argument against his view.

Soper and Liberal Democracy.

There is one last issue I would like to take up. The question is whether or not
Soper’s view is adequate as a theory of political obligation for a liberal democratic
society like our own. This is not so much a criticism as it is a reflection on the larger
theme of the liberal hope of shared reason. Soper’s view is generic and intended to apply
to all societies with genuine legal systems. What does Soper’s view imply for a liberal
democratic society? To the best of my knowledge, Soper never explicitly addresses this
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question.293 But if we take what he says at face value, we can see how it might work.
The key is that public officials must base their political activity on some considered
conception of justice that is publicly available, that has some traction in their particular
liberal democratic society. So, for instance, in the U.S. today we can imagine different
officials acting on the basis of all sorts of different conceptions of justice, including
utilitarian, explicitly liberal, libertarian, Marxist, socialist, and communitarian
conceptions, and a variety of religious conceptions as well. There are resources in our
public discourse that make it possible for someone to sincerely affirm many views that
fall into any of these families of conceptions of justice. In fact, serious and thoughtful
persons do offer sincere defenses of versions of all of these conceptions in an attempt to
bring justice to our society. While it is clear that we can find defects in all of these views
too, this is not the issue. What matters is that all of these conceptions are publicly
available, and all of them give consideration to the interests of all citizens. Thus, a public
official in the U.S. could sincerely affirm any of the above views as correct for us.
There is reason to worry about this. Even though Soper’s view is a shared reason
view, it may be inadequate as an account of the law’s normative force in modern liberal
democracies like the U.S. Soper’s account of reciprocity and shared reason is very
relaxed and open. This relaxed standard raises two kinds of worries in the liberal
democratic context. First, Soper’s view encourages and legitimates types of political
behavior that some liberal theorists regard as forms of political domination. Second, it
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authorizes or allows for illiberal political activity, or activity rooted in illiberal political
views.
One worry is that Soper’s view legitimates political behavior that some liberal
theorists regard as forms of political domination. I have in mind the kind of complaints
that (e.g.) Rawls, Nicholas Audi, and Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson make
against political behavior that is ultimately rooted in controversial comprehensive
understandings of the human good, such as religious views.294 By permitting, e.g.,
religious government officials to ground political activity in controversial and
comprehensive views taken from just any publicly available discourse or tradition, Soper
leaves his view open to a number of criticisms, e.g., that it fails to respect the fact that
other citizens can reasonably reject religious and other comprehensive views; that it does
nothing to show citizens that official decisions are based on the merits of the various
political views in question and not on the sheer bargaining power of the different parties;
that it discourages truly public-spirited political activity; or that it does not promote
mutually respectful decision-making processes. In essence, the worry is that Soper’s
view is so relaxed about shared reason and reciprocity, that it fails to properly constrain
political behavior. This amounts to a kind of domination if (as Rawls, Audi, and
Guttmann and Thompson argue) there are less controversial, more fully shared (or at least
potentially shared) public reasons that officials can appeal to in politics. In Soper’s
defense, though, he does insist that political behavior must be rooted in some conception
of justice. So e.g. religious citizens could not simply enforce their religious views as
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such, but only conceptions of justice related to or based on those views. Further, on
Soper’s view religious citizens would not simply be exerting their will against others, but
would be acting within constraints imposed by a common commitment to justice, similar
to the way Hart’s legislators are constrained by secondary rules.295
A second potential difficulty is that Soper’s view allows for political action
ultimately rooted in non-liberal or even illiberal views. Soper’s view authorizes, e.g.,
official law-making aimed at realizing libertarian conceptions of justice. Rawls has
argued that libertarianism is at best an impoverished form of liberalism, since, inter alia,
it does not share liberalism’s desire to prevent social and economic inequalities from
becoming excessive.296 (Libertarianism does not meet Rawls’s more demanding
understanding of shared reason and reciprocity, which I discuss in the next section.)
Freeman has argued that libertarianism is illiberal because it sees political power as
ultimately rooted in private contracts, and “rejects the idea, essential to liberalism, that
political power is a public power, to be impartially exercised for the common good.”297
If Rawls and Freeman are correct, then we might regard Soper’s generic view as
inadequate to the needs of a liberal democracy, since it legitimates lawmaking aimed at
realizing non-liberal (e.g., libertarian, Marxist, Christian, and so on) conceptions of
justice.
If it turns out that Soper’s generic view cannot be rescued from these problems,
this does not necessarily mean that we ought to reject it, even as an account of the law’s
authority in a liberal democracy. It may simply turn out to be the best that we can hope
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for from any view that takes seriously both respect for individual judgment and
reasonable disagreement. But if Soper’s view represents the best that shared reason can
do in the face of such disagreements, the liberal political project as many understand it
may have reached its end. Shared reason may prove inadequate to securing and
promoting a liberal society.

Hart, Soper and Rawls.

Rawls was influenced by both Hart and Soper. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls
argues that certain non-democratic, non-liberal constitutional republics (“decent”
societies) deserve full and good standing in the international community.298 Decent
societies meet enough conditions of right and justice to merit the respect of liberal
democracies and the right to self-determination, to be free from the interference of other
societies. One condition of decency is that a society’s system of law imposes genuine
moral duties and obligations on citizens.299 An early version of this idea appears in
Political Liberalism.300 There Rawls says that in order to be viable, the legal system of a
decent society must be guided by something like Soper’s common good idea of justice,
coupled with either Hart’s minimum content of natural law or Soper’s natural rights to
security, formal justice, and discourse. Later, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls mentions
only Soper’s ideas. Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy can be understood as an
application of Soper’s generic account of legal and political obligation to the context of
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democratic political culture. A large part of Rawls’s liberal project is aimed at providing
the background context against which sincerity can be judged. Rawls’s liberal legitimacy
is the subject of the next chapter.
While Rawls clearly draws inspiration from Hart and Soper, he does not offer a
definition of law. He rejects Soper’s claim that the sincerity condition and its implied
natural rights define law proper, and says he does not want to argue that entities like the
antebellum South did not have legal systems. But Rawls does seem to regard Soper’s
theory as an adequate account of the class of laws that do give rise to obligations,
regardless of whether it adequately defines law as such. Rawls actually leaves open the
question of whether some command that does not give rise to obligations might properly
be called law. Soper makes the same move in a paper published soon after A Theory of
Law.301 He scales back his goal, from defining law as such, to accounting for the class of
obligation producing laws. It is not clear if either Rawls or Soper was aware of this
parallel move.
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CHAPTER 4
RAWLS

In the 1960’s, Rawls affirmed a fair play account of political obligation. By the
1970’s, he had rejected this view and replaced it with his natural duty of justice. By the
1990’s, when he published Political Liberalism (hereafter PL) his natural duty of justice
had given way to the liberal principle of legitimacy. This chapter develops and evaluates
an exegetically sound interpretation of this principle and its role in Rawls’s political
liberalism. Theories of legitimacy account for or justify a government’s claimed right to
coercively enforce laws against citizens, and any duties citizens may have to acquiesce or
defer to the government when it seeks to exercise this right. Rawls’s theory is aimed at
accounting for legitimacy in modern pluralist democracies like our own. It is not a theory
of legitimate state power as such, but of the legitimate power of this one kind of state.

Hart, Soper, and Rawls.

Rawls holds, like Hart and Soper, that political institutions and practices must be
governed by rules, if they are to be just or legitimate. Rules are a necessary restraint on
the arbitrary use of political power, and are an essential element of constitutional
government. A fundamental organizing idea in Rawls’s political liberalism is the idea
that society is a fair system of cooperation over time.302 For Rawls, this means more than
just that cooperation among citizens is effectively coordinated by some ruler. It means
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that cooperation among citizens is structured by rules that citizens publicly recognize as
mutually advantageous and as properly governing their coordinated behavior.
Rawls’s commitment to rules is evident in his appeals to a constitutional form of
government. The term “constitution” has two meanings.303 It may refer to a text, to
some written document that proclaims certain fundamental social rules. The U.S. has a
constitution in this sense, while England does not. And it has a prior, deeper meaning,
which Samuel Freeman calls its “institutional” sense.304 In this institutional sense, a
constitution is a set of fundamental, shared rules for making and applying laws. In this
respect, institutional constitutions are very much like Hart’s secondary practice rules. An
institutional constitution is a set of behavioral standards internalized by citizens, and used
by them as a guide in political interaction. These fundamental norms define the offices
and positions of political authority in a political system, their qualifications, rights,
powers, duties, and so on, and the procedures for making, applying and enforcing laws.
Constitutions may be written when no institutional constitution exists, but these often
have little purchase on those whose behavior they are meant to guide.305 The most
effective written constitutions proclaim important social norms shared by the writers and
those they represent. Both the U.S. and England have institutional constitutions.
Institutional constitutions do several things. Most importantly, they restrict the arbitrary
rule of leaders.
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But Rawls follows Soper in rejecting Hart’s purely procedural or pedigree
account of legal normativity. Instead, Rawls accepts the broad strokes of Soper’s generic
account of legal and political obligation, which holds that the law has genuine normative
force only if it is sincerely held to be just by government officials. In his political
liberalism, Rawls applies Soper’s generic account to the context of liberal democratic
political culture. In liberal democracies, citizens regard each other as the free and equal
co-authors of their law.306 The state’s power is public power, the power of free and equal
citizens as a collective body. For Rawls, then, the law has genuine normative force only
when it is consistent with an account of justice that all citizens could reasonably affirm.
But Rawls rejects Soper’s notion of political obligation. Rawls holds that
obligations can only be generated through voluntary acts, but since political society is
closed—we enter at birth and leave only when we die—citizens cannot have political
obligations.307 Critics like Simmons would complain that Rawls assumes too much
here.308 Simmons chastises theorists who assume that membership in political society is
a social or political fact about persons, because this is one of the more hotly contested
issues in traditional debates about political obligation.309 No answer should be assumed
without explanation or defense. But Rawls and Hume have got it right: the state’s
authority cannot be freely accepted, because “the bonds of society and culture, of history
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and social place of origin, begin so early to shape our life and are normally so strong.”310
Not even a right of emigration could change the fact that leaving one’s nation is a “grave
step” that involves
leaving the society and culture in which we have been raised, the society and
culture whose language we use in speech and thought to express and understand
ourselves, our aims, goals, and values; the society and culture whose history,
customs and conventions we depend on to find our place in our social world. In
large part we affirm this society and culture, having an intimate and inexpressible
knowledge of it, even though much of it we may question and even reject.311
Membership in political society is not a choice. For Rawls, this means there is no point
in talking about political obligation as such. Instead, he offers an account of legitimacy.
Whether or not citizens have an obligation to obey the law, it is still important to try to
understand the conditions under which it would be appropriate for the state to use its
power to coercively enforce laws against citizens.
The conditions outlined in Soper’s account of political obligation cannot generate
obligations, according to Rawls, because obligations require voluntary commitment. But
here we might borrow a page from Finnis and Soper. Finnis and Soper are not
comfortable rejecting the correlativity thesis, because any conditions that would account
for political obligation should also provide justification for the state’s use of force, and
vice versa. Finnis and Soper are wrong about the correlativity thesis, but there is
something to be said for their observation. The interesting insight is that an account of

310
311

Rawls, Justice as Fairness (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 94. Hereafter JF.
JF, p. 94.

225

political obligation might also work, and might even work better, as an account of
political legitimacy. And the proper correlate of legitimacy (as a justification right) is not
the duty to obey, but the duty to defer. So Rawls might think that, even though Soper’s
account cannot explain political obligations (because they don’t exist), it could still
account for the state’s legitimacy right, and the citizen’s correlative duty to defer to the
state.
Thus, I argue, one way of understanding much of Rawls’s post-1980 work on
political liberalism is to see it as an effort to explain what it means for democratic
citizens, in their common role as public officials who jointly co-author their law, to
evince a sincere commitment to the justice of their constitution. Rawls’s work describes
what might be thought of as Soperian “sincerity conditions” applicable to modern
pluralist democracies. But these conditions no longer explain a citizen’s duty to obey the
government; instead they account for the state’s right to use its power against citizens.
Both Soper and Rawls hold that the law has genuine normative force only when
those responsible for it sincerely hold that the law is just. Soper is careful to avoid saying
too much about justice. He makes no claim about what problems it might solve, or about
what its basic subject might be. One reason for this is that he wants his account of
obligation to be generic, to apply to all societies with genuine legal systems. He does not
want to bias his account toward any particular sort of society, so he remains largely
agnostic about the nature of justice. He also wants to respect what I call good faith
disagreements about it. Every society’s tradition of political thought contains a plurality
of views about justice and the common good, and in every society, people disagree in
good faith about which of the various publicly available accounts of justice is most
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appropriate for them. Thus, Soper intends his view to respect both inter- and intracultural disagreements about justice. This does not mean that Soper thinks that, say,
something like Apartheid would be just, according to our modern liberal democratic
political values. He simply does not want presume that only liberal democracies have
genuine legal orders. Soper offers just two minimal conditions of justice: no official can
sincerely hold that terms of political association are just for some citizen if those terms of
association ignore altogether or threaten (what the official sincerely believes to be) the
interests of that citizen; and no terms of association can be considered just if they cannot
reasonably be linked to some publicly available political discourse. The interests of all
citizens (as these are understood by officials) must be taken into account, at least in some
minimal way, if citizens generally are going to have political obligations. Further, they
must see that officials are not acting solely on the basis of self-interest, and are instead
acting on the basis of ideas about justice that have some weight in their culture.
Rawls applies Soper’s generic account to a specific cultural and political context:
modern liberal democracies. He has a well-developed and fairly specific understanding
of the nature of justice in this context, which forms the heart of his political liberalism.

From TJ to PL: Rawls’s Turn to Legitimacy.

Rawls holds that liberal democracies are constituted by citizens who share a
commitment to democracy, but who cannot resolve their political differences, or even
find mutual understanding, in terms of their irreconcilable religious, moral and
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philosophical understandings of the good for human beings.312 This situation—the
condition of reasonable pluralism—raises three fundamental political problems: how can
citizens so divided constitute themselves as a democratic body politic that is (a) just, (b)
legitimate, and (c) stable? Over the course of his career, Rawls proposed solutions to all
of these problems. In A Theory of Justice (hereafter TJ), his first sustained effort to
answer them, he develops and defends an answer to (a) that he calls “justice as
fairness.”313 Not long after he finished TJ, he realized that the work contained a serious
flaw. Roughly put, in answering (b) and (c) in TJ, Rawls assumed that citizens raised in a
society organized by justice as fairness would eventually converge on a Kantian moral
outlook, and that everyone would eventually come to see internalizing and acting from
justice as fairness as a component of his or her own good, as a bit of self-realization as an
autonomous being.314
In TJ, after Rawls generated the two principles of justice as fairness, he wanted to
show that a society guided by them would become stable for the right reasons, that is, that
they could effectively regulate society if publicly affirmed by most reasonable citizens.
So he tried to show that citizens have a duty to obey the laws of their just regime, and can
reasonably be expected to have motivation to live up to their duties. He offered his
“principles of natural duty” and “fair play” arguments to solve the first part of the
problem.315 He offered the so-called “congruence argument” in Part III of TJ to solve the
second part. In this congruence argument Rawls assumed citizens raised under just
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institutions would converge on a Kantian comprehensive doctrine and come to see doing
justice as part of their own good. Thus, he claimed, citizens can be expected to
voluntarily comply with the law. But by 1980, Rawls realized the congruence argument
was flawed and rejected it. There is no reason to expect citizens raised under liberal
institutions shaped by even justice as fairness to converge on any single comprehensive
doctrine, let alone Rawls’s favored Kantian moral outlook. Once Rawls recognized the
true problem presented by reasonable disagreement, he faced a much more serious
problem than the one he dealt with in TJ.
Reasonable disagreement allows citizens to affirm comprehensive doctrines that
do not make Rawlsian (or any other notion of) self-realization as an autonomous being a
part of the human good. Thus, for some reasonable citizens the human good is
completely distinct from self-realization or even the realization of justice in society.
Further, while Rawls recognized in TJ that citizens could reasonably disagree over
whether or not justice as fairness was the most appropriate understanding of justice for a
liberal democracy, he did not seem to think that (many) citizens would disagree,
especially once they had converged on his favored Kantian moral outlook.316 But once
he gives up the convergence argument, reasonable disagreement about justice as fairness
becomes much more likely. At this point Rawls had to find new answers to (b) and (c).
Under what conditions would it be legitimate to enforce something like justice as
fairness, given that citizens may reasonably reject it as an account of justice? And, given
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the likelihood of such reasonable dissent, would a society organized around justice as
fairness prove stable through time? These issues are at the heart of PL.
But very few seem to understand Rawls’s post-1980 work. Rawls certainly shares
some of the blame for this. PL is a difficult book to read, largely because Rawls is not
very clear in the body of this work about his aims. This is partly due to the fact that the
book was composed of lectures and papers written separately and at different times in
Rawls’s career. Nevertheless, one of his principle aims is showing what legitimacy
requires, and demonstrating that justice as fairness meets these requirements.317

His

theory of legitimacy has been the subject of a great deal of confusion. In fact, a common
but incorrect reading of Rawlsian legitimacy has taken on a life of its own. I will explain
and reject this reading later in the chapter. Much of this confusion can be traced to the
fact that the theory of legitimacy is presented in the broad strokes in PL, but it is not fully
worked out there. Rawls continues to develop it through time, and though he never
radically revises it, it finds its most complete expression only in his later works.
Two often overlooked keys to understanding the project of PL are the
“Introduction to the Paperback Edition” and the “Reply to Habermas.”318 Burton Dreben
claims these additions are so important to understanding Rawls’s project in PL, that we
are warranted in thinking of the paperback edition, published in 1996, as a second edition
of the hardback edition, published in 1993.319 These additions provide a context for the
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body of PL that, on Dreben’s view, modifies the basic thrust or emphasis of the main
arguments in it. Whether these additions are meant to alter the meaning of the text, or
simply to provide proper context for its main parts, it is clear that PL cannot be
understood without them. The hardback edition of PL is, in this sense at least,
incomplete. In any case, PL is decidedly not a second or revised edition of TJ; the goals
and methods of these works are simply very different. A third oft-overlooked but
essential key to understanding Rawls’s post-1980 work is “The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited” (hereafter IPRR).320 It is here that Rawls gives his most complete account of
his theory of political legitimacy.321
But I am getting ahead of myself again. In the next section I want to describe the
basic problem that Rawls intends his political liberalism to solve. This will clarify
Rawls’s understanding of the problem of legitimacy.

Political Liberalism and Reasonable Pluralism.

Rawls’s political liberalism is not an effort to justify constitutional democracy as
such.322 In neither TJ nor PL does he make any effort to defend democracy against those
critics who reject it. His work is more practical than this. It is aimed at solving a
particular set of political problems that arises within the liberal democratic state for
citizens whose particular and diverse understandings of the good are not in conflict with
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the essentials of democratic government.323 To use Rawls’s language, political liberalism
addresses only “reasonable” citizens. Reasonable citizens are divided by their particular
moral, philosophical, and religious commitments, but they are united insofar as their
different conceptions of the good are not in conflict with the essentials of constitutional
democracy. Rawls’s overarching goal in PL is to show this diverse group of citizens how
they might constitute themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable body politic, despite the
irreconcilable disagreements about the good that divide them.
A reasonable citizen affirms what Rawls calls a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine (RCD).324 RCD’s have four main traits:
(a) “Theoretical reason.” A person’s RCD expresses a more or less consistent and
coherent account of value for human beings, covering the important religious,
philosophical, and moral aspects of human life.325
(b) “Practical reason.” A person’s RCD, in singling out human values and ordering
them when they conflict, provides practical guidance through life.326
(c) Tradition. Most RCD’s belong to and draw on some major religious, moral, or
philosophical tradition. They are not fixed, but tend to evolve slowly.327
(d) Democratic. RCD’s are consistent with the essentials of constitutional democracy
and the idea of legitimate law.328 Comprehensive doctrines not consistent with
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these essentials are not reasonable. This does not mean that comprehensive
doctrines need to be democratic (in fact, most won’t be); they simply must not be
in conflict with democracy.
To summarize, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is a broad conception of the good
for human beings that is consistent with the idea of legitimate democratic government.
There has been some confusion in the literature over the nature of Rawls’s
RCD’s, for which Rawls shares some of the blame. Rawls describes the first three traits
(a-c) in the body of PL. But the fourth trait (d) does not appear in the body with (a-c).
Trait (d) appears in the “Introduction” to the first edition of PL, and in various places in
IPRR (Rawls’s revised account of public reason). This has hindered discussion of PL.
For example, in a well-regarded and much-read paper, Leif Wenar rejects Rawls’s
characterization of reasonable comprehensive doctrines as “unsuccessful” because it fails
to rule out comprehensive doctrines that Rawls clearly regards as unreasonable, such as
Muslim fundamentalism, white supremacy, and rational egoism.329 The problem with
Wenar’s objection is that he thinks RCD’s are fully characterized by traits (a-c) alone.
This is not correct as an interpretation of Rawls. Thus Wenar’s criticism fails because it
is based on an incomplete account of Rawls’s idea.
Traits (a-c) are distinct in ways from trait (d). Traits (a-c) appeal to one sense of
reasonable, and focus primarily on the life of an individual person. RCD’s are efforts at
theoretical and practical reason, drawn from some tradition of moral, religious, or
philosophical thought. They represent our efforts to make rational sense of our individual
329
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lives.330 In this way, at least, Muslim fundamentalism, rational egoism, and even white
supremacy (reprehensible though it is) can be regarded as reasonable. Characteristic (d)
invokes something different. Here “reasonable” has less to do with thinking as such, or
with practical guidance for some individual, and more to do with political cooperation or
fairness in a society of individuals. Further, it suggests that there is a tradition we might
draw on for some understanding of how we ought to cooperate in this society that is
distinct from the traditions drawn on by traits (a-c).
In a way, Wenar’s complaint shows that he does not recognize the limited and
practical nature of Rawls’s political liberalism. The problem that Rawls is trying to solve
in PL is this: how is it possible for persons who might affirm democracy, but who are
deeply divided by their different comprehensive doctrines, to constitute themselves as a
just, legitimate, and stable democratic society? Traits (a-c) can be seen as fully
characterizing reasonable comprehensive doctrines, only when they are seen in the
context of this practical problem that Rawls tries to solve in PL. Trait (d) puts traits (a-c)
in the proper context. For Rawls, the possibility that a person might commit to
constitutional democracy is part of the very idea of a reasonable person in democratic
societies like our own.
The distinction between traits (a-c) and trait (d) mirrors Rawls’s belief that each
democratic citizen is partly the product of some particular moral, philosophical, or
religious tradition, but also partly the product of a democratic political culture. Our
particular moral, philosophical, and religious views divide us, while our shared
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democratic political culture unites us. The reasonable citizen is, of course, an ideal, but it
is an ideal that Rawls thinks that “you and I, here and now”—real democratic citizens in
real democratic societies—hope to realize. The way we realize such an ideal is to figure
out just what it commits us to, and then to start living up to those commitments.
Rawls recognizes, of course, that every society contains people who hold
unreasonable, irrational, or even mad comprehensive doctrines, but these people present a
different kind of problem for reasonable persons: the issue is not how we might see
unreasonable persons as cooperative members of democratic society, but rather how “to
contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of a society.”331 A
democratic society is constituted as a body politic, as a set of social and political
institutions, by citizens who share fundamental political values. This is the root or
institutional meaning of constitutionalism. As reasonable citizens work to constitute
themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable democratic body politic, they need not consult
those who reject their democratic values. Such communication would serve no real
purpose.332
In the same way that Rawls distinguishes comprehensive doctrines with traits (ac) alone from those with traits (a-d), he also distinguishes pluralism as such from
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reasonable pluralism.333 In a free society, we expect a variety of comprehensive
doctrines to develop. What impresses Rawls is that “… among the views that develop are
a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (my emphasis). That is, in a free
society, many views develop, some of which are reasonable. “These [reasonable ones]
are the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that political liberalism must
address.” So “pluralism as such” refers to the totality of comprehensive doctrines that
develop in a free society. (This might be what I call good faith pluralism in the Preface.)
“Reasonable pluralism” refers to a subset of that totality, which Rawls defines as those
doctrines that are not inconsistent with democracy (at least, this makes his use of
“reasonable” here consistent with his use of it when identifying certain normatively
significant comprehensive doctrines).
Political liberalism (the book and the theory) is about how reasonable citizens,
those holding reasonable comprehensive doctrines—i.e., those persons who hold
comprehensive doctrines not inconsistent with the essentials of constitutional
democracy—can constitute themselves as a stable, (nearly) just, and legitimate
democratic society, despite the fact that they don’t share a comprehensive view. Political
liberalism is about politically managing reasonable pluralism, not pluralism as such. PL
has little or nothing to say about unreasonable people, except that they must be
“contained” to protect “the unity and justice of society.”334
I think there is a kind of “Lockean” moment here for Rawls. Locke develops a
two-stage account of the formation of civil society in the Second Treatise. For Locke, a

333
334

E.g., PL, p. 36.
PL, p. xix.

236

“community” is formed when persons, wishing to leave the state of nature, agree to
transfer some of their individual rights to the collective comprised by those entering the
compact. In essence, each person voluntarily gives up individual control of certain
natural powers for an equal share in the joint of control of the community’s pooled
power. The formation of this community requires unanimous consent. It is comprised
only of people who choose to be part of it. (Locke’s appeal to tacit consent in this
context does present certain problems for this account.) But this community is not yet a
state. In the second stage, the members of the community must develop a constitutional
form of government that can remedy the problems associated with the state of nature. (If
joining a political community were not preferable in some way to living in the state of
nature, no one would join.) Those who have agreed to form a political community will
disagree over what form their government should take, so, after discussion, they will vote
and the majority decision will settle the issue. On Locke’s view, those who agreed to the
initial compact have implicitly agreed to be bound by the majority decision on what form
of government to have.
Rawls does something similar. Each person must reflect on his or her
comprehensive doctrine, and decide whether they can accept democracy or not. Some
will find their doctrines incompatible with democracy. Rawls calls them unreasonable.
When these individuals judge their comprehensive doctrines to be inconsistent with
democracy, they basically remove themselves from the democratic community. Rawls
does not think those committed to democracy need to consult those who reject it, when
they are trying to settle the question of what democratic institutions ought to govern their
democratic political relations. Other people will find their doctrines compatible with
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democracy. Rawls calls these people reasonable. Here, I think, is the formation of
something analogous to the Lockean pre-state “community.” That is, in our society,
some people agree that democracy is consistent with their comprehensive doctrines.
These reasonable people come together to constitute themselves as a democratic society.
Rawls must believe most members of actual democratic societies will (or could) find
their comprehensive views compatible with democracy, or else there would be little point
to his political liberalism, even as ideal theory. It is not a philosophy of the minority, but
an effort to come to grips with the political problems faced by the bulk of the members of
any actual democratic political community. The trick is showing this society of
reasonable citizens how they might have a just, legitimate, and stable government, when
they do not share a comprehensive view. Here Rawls must develop something like
Locke’s second stage. And while unreasonable persons almost always live in the same
territory with reasonable persons, the unreasonable are not part of the democratic
community, in the sense that they are not part of a community of value (though of course
the unreasonable have the full slate of rights and so on).
According to Dreben, Rawls has no interest in arguing against those who reject
democracy, nor any interest in consulting them or considering their views when
discussing what democracy entails or requires.335 Rawls takes democracy as a given, and
tries to see if it can work, given the fact that the people committed to it do not share a
comprehensive view. Dreben notes Rawls’s emphasis on our “working out” or “working
through” notions implicit in the tradition of democratic thought that is publicly available
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to citizens, and which most of them have some familiarity with.336 Rawls does not argue
for this democratic tradition, but instead intends to see what it leads to. He is not trying
to justify liberal democracy, but is instead trying to see how it might work, and what it
demands of us.
My reading of Rawls’s aims may leave some readers cold. If reasonable
pluralism is defined as consistent with democracy, how is it a problem? To some, the
project will now seem less ambitious, and less interesting, than it is generally understood
to be. Nevertheless, I believe that Rawls has the aims that I have described. As I have
indicated above, political communities are quite literally constituted through the shared
commitments of individuals. Rawls restricts political liberalism to his understanding of
the community of the “reasonable.” I think there are reasons to question his
understanding of this community. In my view, Rawls may have restricted the community
too much. I will explain this later. In any case, even if Rawls’s project is limited in the
way I’ve suggested, many serious problems still remain. First, he has to explain to
citizens when it is and is not appropriate to appeal to RCD’s in political debate. Our
RCD’s describe some of our deepest value commitments, so it will be natural for citizens
to want to appeal to them when disagreements arise over what justice requires, especially
when it is not clear what our democratic political values are, or how they apply to some
question. Rawls has to explain why citizens ought to resist the natural urge to fall back
on RCD’s, and why citizens must forge ahead with political values, as difficult as this
may be. Second, he has to say something about how citizens can appeal to their political
culture. It is one thing to claim that we share some democratic political culture, and an
336
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altogether different thing to explain what exactly this amounts to. At first glance, the
political culture of any liberal democracy seems to be an incoherent mix of competing
ideas. Rawls admits as much, but holds that if we look deeper, we can see that certain
shared political commitments are implied in these public political debates, e.g., freedom,
equality, the common good, and so on. What we need, according to Rawls, is an
(“Dworkinian”) interpretation of our political practice that shows it in its best light, that
shows how it is organized around important shared political norms, and, perhaps most
importantly, that shows how this interpretation of our political practice fits into a
compelling account of our moral self-understanding. This is no easy task, and it is made
more difficult by a third problem, “liberal” pluralism.337
So far I have just talked about reasonable pluralism, but another problem is raised
by “liberal” pluralism. The burdens of judgment (described in the Preface) apply
paradigmatically to disagreements over comprehensive doctrines, but they also apply to
disagreements over political matters. Even if, as Rawls insists, we share a democratic
political culture, we should not expect that citizens will converge on a single
understanding of that culture. Rawls thinks that the best interpretation of our political
practice is captured by what he refers to as a family of liberal views. These views share
certain important features, but it is impossible to publicly justify one as uniquely correct.
There will always be reasonable disagreements about political matters, even between the
members of this liberal family. Explaining how we might manage liberal pluralism is
another difficult task that Rawls faces.
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So even my stripped down version of Rawls’s political liberalism leaves Rawls,
and democratic citizens, with several serious problems. When and why is it appropriate
to restrict appeals to RCD’s in political debate? What are the values implicit in
democratic political culture? How can we determine what the values are? How should
we put these ideas together to solve our political problems? How do we manage liberal
pluralism? What are we to make of these reasonable disagreements about political
matters? How could any particular constitutional order be considered just, legitimate, or
stable under these conditions?

Reasonable Citizens, RCD’s, and Shared Democratic Values.

The fundamental political problems that reasonable citizens face are how to
constitute themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable democratic body politic. According
to Rawls, they must find basic terms of political association that all could accept as
appropriately explicating the various rights, liberties, and opportunities of liberal
democratic citizens. Reasonable pluralism prevents citizens from basing such terms of
association solely on one RCD. Reasonable citizens understand the burdens of judgment
(described in the Preface) and accept their consequences for the legitimate use of public
power.338 One consequence of the burdens is simply the fact of reasonable pluralism
itself. The free exercise of human reason, even under a just and democratic regime, does
not lead to convergence on one RCD, but instead leads inevitably to a plurality of often
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irreconcilable RCD’s.339 This is not an accident of history, but a permanent fact about
societies with free and open social institutions. It is not an “unfortunate condition,” but is
simply the result of the free exercise of human reason. A second consequence of the
burdens is what Rawls calls the fact of oppression. The only way we could get all
citizens to affirm one RCD is through the oppressive use of state power. If political
society requires that all citizens share one RCD, then political society requires oppressive
state power. The only way to have a political community that rests on one doctrine—
even liberal Kantian or Millian doctrines—would be to impose that doctrine on all with
the state’s might. Unless the free exercise of human reason is suppressed, divergent
views will develop.
Reasonable citizens do not agree on the truth of any particular religious, moral, or
philosophical doctrine. They do not agree, for instance, that just terms of association can
be found in the Christian Bible, or that we have access to an independent moral order that
we can use to produce such terms. As a result, reasonable citizens will not insist that
their own favored RCD should structure their political society. To insist on this is to be
unreasonable. Acceptance of the burdens lead to a kind of toleration.340 Reasonable
citizens recognize the fact of reasonable pluralism. They do not view this with suspicion,
but see it a natural result of the difficulties involved in human judgments regarding
especially questions that involve judgments about complex empirical matters and abstract
values. Reasonable citizens recognize that the burdens affect everyone equally. All are
subject to these problems. Reasonable citizens believe that their RCD’s are probably
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true, but they recognize that everyone else feels the same way. Almost all reasonable
citizens think their RCD’s are true. But since there are no generally agreed upon
standards for determining the truth or falsity of comprehensive doctrines, it is clear that
no comprehensive doctrine has any particular claim on people generally. No shared
dictates of reason require citizens to believe any specific comprehensive doctrine. Given
this, reasonable citizens regard people who insist that fundamental political issues be
resolved in terms of the own favored comprehensive doctrine as unreasonable, not
because they believe that their view is true—most of us do—but because these people fail
to appreciate the burdens and the limits this places on what can be justified to others
generally. Reasonable citizens thus understand that their RCD’s cannot serve as the
basis for public justification of political decisions on fundamental issues.341
There seems to be an important difference here between Rawls’s and Soper’s
shared reason views. Soper’s understanding of “publicly available” reasons is much
broader than Rawls’s. For Soper, an RCD itself may be publicly available, if it can be
demonstrably and not unreasonably linked to some current tradition or discourse. If the
RCD contains (resources for) a conception of justice, Soper holds that it could generate
genuine legal and political obligations. For example, on Soper’s view a Christian
conception of justice could be sincerely held to be just by a liberal democratic public
official, since there is a viable and current tradition of Christian political thought, as long
as the Christian political view in question respects the interests of all in some way. If
these conditions are met, our Christian politician could base his political activity solely
on what Rawls regards as a comprehensive view, without this interfering with the law’s
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normativity. For Soper, reciprocity in justification requires only that public officials can
say to citizens, “people relevantly similar to you—some of your fellow citizens—actually
do affirm this view, so it is possible that you could too (even if, in fact, you don’t).”
Soper sees just about everything in a culture as publicly available, as long as it is part of a
discourse or tradition of thought that remains current, that still carries some weight. He
does not require what we might think of as active or engaged sharing of ideas. You just
need to be part of the culture. Rawls, on the other hand, has a much more stringent
understanding of what is publicly available. It is not enough that other citizens do affirm
a view, so you might too. This is too weak a sense of what “could” be affirmed for
Rawls. For him, ideas are publicly available only if they are part of some more actively
shared tradition or discourse. Rawls thinks liberal democratic political culture provides
just such an actively shared discourse. Thus, it represents a public pool of ideas from
which democratic citizens may appropriately draw reasons that others “could” affirm.
So Rawls argues that the shared public democratic political culture could serve as
the basis for public justification of political activity in a democratic society. Democratic
citizens share a political culture that provides certain fixed and general points that could
serve as starting points that everyone could at least reasonably accept. Democratic
political culture contains a wealth of political ideas about democratic values, that most
citizens are familiar with, e.g., a more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, and the
values they imply or assume, such as equal basic rights, liberties, and opportunities.342
According to Rawls, reasonable citizens see their task as working these democratic ideas
into some understanding of the basic terms of political association for their society. An
342

IPRR, p. 144.

244

idea of political justice worked out from such recognizably democratic political values
can be seen to stand free from any particular RCD. As such, it is the kind of view that
any citizen could affirm, as a democratic citizen.
At the heart of Rawls’s public/non-public split there is a distinction between
persons as individuals and persons as citizens. The idea of a person does not necessarily
require the idea of political community. That is, we can think of persons as individuals in
a “pre-political” sense. Individuals’ RCD’s often require community for their realization,
but they need not require specifically political community. Many RCD’s might be
realized in the state of nature. However, there are no citizens in the state of nature.
Persons are not citizens until they enter a political community. The term “citizen”
describes an office in a political society. It is through the constitution of that political
society that the office of citizen comes to be, with all of its attached rights and duties.
The proper understanding of democratic citizen, Rawls holds, comes not from our
understanding of ourselves as individuals pursuing particular RCD’s, but from our
understanding of ourselves as a democratic society committed to the sort of freedom and
equality that makes it possible for individuals to pursue their RCD’s. This does not mean
that RCD’s can make no reference to citizenship. There is nothing that prevents any
RCD from making this sort of political participation an element of the human good. The
point is that RCD’s need not require this political participation. But citizenship is a
fundamental element of democratic political culture. In democracies, final political
power rests in the hands of individuals as free and equal citizens. This is simply part of
what we mean when we talk about democracy. This is not to imply that there are no
disagreements about what rights and duties of citizens have, nor disagreements about just
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how they wield final political authority. What it means is that it wouldn’t make sense to
talk about a democracy that is completely devoid of any notion of citizen.
So reasonable citizens must find political terms of association that can be justified
in terms of shared democratic values. But what are these democratic political values?
And how are they to be worked into basic political terms of association? On Rawls’s
view, these terms are produced through “political constructivism.”343

Constructing Justice.

Rawls explicitly distinguishes political constructivism from ethical
constructivism. Ethical constructivism is generally considered an anti-realist approach to
ethics.344 Ethical constructivists claim that moral facts are not real or true, but
constructed in some way from our beliefs or attitudes about human beings and what is
ultimately good for us. Rawls’s Kantian constructivism is one version of ethical
constructivism.345 Rawls’s political constructivism is not anti-realist. It is intended to be
neutral between all controversial comprehensive commitments. It does not assert the
truth of anti-realism or deny the truth of realism. It remains agnostic on such issues.
This neutral stance is important to political constructivism, because one of its main
purposes is to construct principles of justice that citizens could affirm at the same time as
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they affirm their particular RCD’s. There must be no conflict between them. This is
necessary if they are to serve as publicly affirmed political principles for people who
share a commitment to democracy but are also committed to a plurality of incompatible
RCD’s. In other words, the process of construction, and the principles of justice
constructed, must not conflict with the essentials of RCD’s, or they will not be publicly
affirmed by all reasonable citizens. Political constructivism would conflict with some
RCD’s, if it took a stance on the realism/anti-realism issue. If the process of construction
itself cannot gain such an overlapping commitment, no principles constructed through it
have any chance of success. Thus the process of construction must be such as to gain the
support of an “overlapping consensus” of comprehensive doctrines. So Rawls is careful
to make political constructivism consistent with, for example, Kantian constructivism.
For instance, those committed to Kantian constructivism as a moral doctrine must be able
to affirm that it does not reject Rawls’s political constructivism. A reasonable person
committed to Kantian constructivism must acknowledge the facts of reasonable
disagreement and oppression. The aim of political constructivism is to provide a method
for resolving the political problems posed by reasonable disagreement that is consistent
the essentials of comprehensive doctrines. Thus, a reasonable citizen committed to
Kantian constructivism as a moral doctrine should also be committed to political
constructivism as a method of resolving political differences.
It is certainly possible, though, that different citizens will feel different levels of
commitment to political constructivism. Citizens’ RCD’s will vary in terms of the
relationship they draw, if any, between the human good and a just political society. The
weakest forms of commitment will be felt by citizens whose RCD’s make political justice
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irrelevant to the human good. These citizens might affirm democratic society, just
because it produces a more or less stable political setting, which makes possible the
pursuit of their own RCD’s. Otherwise, though, these citizens may have little interest in
political justice, and so little commitment to political constructivism. They will be
satisfied with any political society that is stable enough to allow them to live out their
RCD’s. Other citizens might may be more strongly committed to political
constructivism, because their RCD’s tie the realization of the human good in some
important way to the realization of political justice in their society. Rawls’s Kantian
constructivism, for instance, makes pursuit of political justice an important part of the
human good of self-realization as an autonomous being. Kantian constructivists, then,
may have a particularly strong affinity for political constructivism.
Principles of justice are constructed through the development of “political
conceptions of justice.” There are many possible political conceptions of justice
(hereafter political conceptions) in any society. All political conceptions have three main
features.346 First, a political conception is a moral conception of the basic terms of
political association for a society.347 Its subject is what Rawls calls the basic structure of
society.348 The basic structure is the set of basic social, political, and economic
institutions in a society, the way the fit together as a whole, and the basic rights and
duties they assign to various political offices, including the office of citizen. All of this is
structured by, or is ultimately consistent with, principles of justice that form the core or
“content” (to use Rawls’s term) of the political conception. The content of Rawls’s
346
347
348

PL, pp. 11-15; JF, pp. 26-27; IPRR, p. 143.
See, e.g., PL, pp. 11-2.
See Lecture VII of PL, pp. 257-288.

248

political conception justice as fairness are his “two principles.”349 Other political
conceptions may specify different content. This content is what gets “constructed.”
Rawls argues that the basic structure is the first subject of justice for two main
reasons.350 First, we need a way to maintain what Rawls calls the background conditions
of justice. If we were to prescribe an initial just distribution of goods, and social
conditions under which fair agreements might be reached, still it would be possible for
inequalities in wealth and property to become large enough to threaten important political
values, such as equality of opportunity, the fair value of political liberties, and so on.
This is a serious threat to political justice. The basic social structure, when properly
organized, can regulate these inequalities, and thereby maintain the background
conditions necessary for justice. Second, the basic structure has a “profound and
pervasive influence on the person who live under its institutions.”351 Even in a just
society, many contingencies affect a person’s prospects in life. These include the social
class a person is born into, their native endowments and their opportunities to develop
them, and good or bad fortune over the course of a life. The basic structure does not seek
to eliminate these differences, or otherwise to remedy them. It does, however, have a
role to play in ensuring that these contingencies do not render a citizen simply incapable
of making effective use of her liberties, opportunities, and so on. For these two reasons,
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the basic structure is the first subject of justice, and so a necessary component of all
political conceptions.
Second, a political conception does not depend on any particular comprehensive
doctrine, but is presented as free-standing.352 The goal of a political conception is to gain
the acceptance of reasonable citizens holding a plurality of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, to become the subject of an “overlapping consensus” of them, so it cannot
depend on any one of them. A political conception needs this kind of support if it is to
play its “public role” in society, and thereby “well order” it.353 A well-ordered society is
one effectively regulated by publicly recognized principles of justice. In a well-ordered
society, everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the same principles of
justice, and they have good reason to believe that the basic structure of their society
satisfies these principles. Further, citizens have a normally developed sense of justice, so
most see the basic structure as just and comply with its rules. Rawls admits that this is
highly idealized, but any political conception that cannot well order a democratic society
is inadequate as a democratic conception. A sound and enduring democratic regime must
be stable “in the right way,” that is, it must be affirmed and supported by the majority of
politically active citizens. A political conception that does not gain such support is one
that is not stable, that can only be maintained through manipulation, deceit, or force. Of
course, unpopular political conceptions are forced on people all the time, but none of
them counts as a democratic regime.
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Third, a political conception is worked out of ideas implicitly or explicitly
expressed in the public political culture of a democratic society, and does not depend on
ideas explicitly drawn from any RCD. A political conception must be explainable in
terms of shared democratic values, without any reference to comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral commitments such as Christian salvation or Utility. Proper
political ideas include some that are explicit in democratic political culture, such as the
idea that citizens as free and equal, politically speaking, and political values such as those
expressed in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States: a more perfect union,
domestic tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, and so on.354 Other
proper political ideas are implicit in democratic political culture. One of the more
important ones for Rawls is the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation.
The idea that society is a fair system of cooperation means three things. First, a
democratic political order is more than mere coordinated effort among citizens. It is not
enough for a ruler to effectively coordinate the behavior of citizens, even if this leads to
more-or-less effective government (i.e., basic human rights are secured and people are
materially and spiritually satisfied). Fair cooperation is social cooperation between
citizens that is structured by rules those citizens publicly affirm as appropriately
governing their cooperative activity. It is a specific kind of rule-governed social activity.
Second, the rules that structure the political order must specify “fair terms” of
cooperation. This is Rawls’s idea of reciprocity. It has two aspects.355 One aspect is the
idea that each citizen can reasonably accept the rules, provided that others accept them
354
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too. It is a kind of reciprocity in judgment or justification. Another aspect is the idea that
“all who are engaged in cooperation and do their part as the rules and procedures require,
are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of
comparison.”356 This we can call reciprocity of advantage. According to Rawls, this idea
of reciprocity lies between “impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general
good), and the idea of mutual advantage.” Reasonable citizens try to create a democratic
political order that allows them to advance their own lives, in terms of the values
expressed in their particular RCD’s, but that also allows others to do the same. This idea
is implicit in democratic political culture, and does not depend on any particular RCD.
As such, it is properly seen as part of the shared democratic culture
Principles of justice—“substantive principles specifying the content of political
right and justice”—are constructed through the development of a political conception.357
The starting points for the process of construction are basic conceptions of society and
the person, the principles of practical reason, and the public role a political conception
must play. I will illustrate this by briefly discussing Rawls’s notion of “justice as
fairness,” which is one example of a political conception. According to Rawls, the
fundamental idea implicit in democratic political culture is that society is (or should be) a
fair system of social cooperation. Other fundamental ideas include the idea of democratic
citizens as free and equal and the idea of a well-ordered society. These ideas can be
described in many different ways. A conception is a more-or-less well-developed
description of an idea. Thus, there are many possible conceptions of the ideas at the heart
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of democratic political culture. Different conceptions, while possible, are not necessarily
equally compelling. Citizens in every particular democracy must make a judgment about
which interpretation of their democratic political practice shows it in its best moral light,
which interpretation makes it most morally appealing, and that also makes it fit best with
their own past political practice and moral self-understanding. Which interpretation the
citizens of any particular democracy will judge best is, in a way, an empirical and
contingent matter, partly shaped by vagaries of history and culture. In defending justice
as fairness, Rawls fleshes out the bones of these key ideas by developing conceptions of
them that he believes most accurately represent the shared ideals of our society. These
conceptions are intended to clarify or make explicit our own implicit self-understanding.
After describing these conceptions in detail, Rawls draws on them to lay out a procedure
for determining which principles of justice best fit that self-understanding. According to
Rawls’s favored political conception, “justice as fairness,” the “original position” is the
procedure for finding principles of justice that is most consistent with our selfunderstanding.
The original position models what Rawls sees as our conceptions of our
fundamental ideas of citizenship and society as these are expressed in our public political
culture. The original position has agents, who represent citizens, choose principles of
justice for those citizens from behind a veil of ignorance. The agents model the
“rational,” the capacity for a conception of the good for human beings. They also model
the idea of a well-ordered society. Thus, they are guided in their choice by two main
considerations. First, they seek principles of justice that maximize the rational selfinterest of those they represent. Second, they know that the principles they choose will
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be publicly recognized, so they must keep in mind the consequences of the mutual
recognition of whatever principles they choose, for instance, the way common acceptance
of any chosen principles would affect the self-understanding of those raised according to
them. The veil of ignorance prevents the agents from knowing exactly who they
represent, and exactly what interests they have. The agents know they represent rational
and reasonable democratic citizens, and that these citizens have and are trying to realize
the ideals of their comprehensive doctrines, i.e., their conceptions of the good, but they
do not know what comprehensive doctrine is affirmed by the person they represent. Here
the veil of ignorance models the capacity for a sense of justice, by hiding from the agents
information that we (you and I, here and now) think of as improperly influencing fair
decision-making. Once the agents and the veil of ignorance are fully laid out, the agents
are presented with a list of principles of justice. If we have done a good job of
developing our conceptions of the fundamentals of democratic political culture (society
as a fair system of cooperation, free and equal citizens, and so on) and of representing
these commitments in our decision procedure (e.g., the original position) then the
principles of justice indicated by the procedure are reasonable for us—you and me, here
and now. In this way we can construct principles of justice implied by and consistent
with our own self-understanding, with our own ideals as they are expressed in our public
political culture.
There are two ways that disagreement can arise here. First, citizens might
disagree with Rawls about conceptions of the different ideas of citizenship and society
expressed in public political culture. Different citizens might offer different conceptions
of, e.g., society as a fair system of cooperation. Second, citizens might accept Rawls’s
254

conceptions of these ideas, but think that the agents in the original position would pick
different principles of justice.
The original position does not represent a hypothetical agreement, nor is it
intended as a method for discovering the objective truth about justice. It is a way of
constructing a solution to a practical problem faced by us as reasonable democratic
citizens. The original position is a “thought-experiment for the purpose of public- and
self-clarification.”358 On Rawls’s view, we—“you and I, here and now”—face a practical
political problem: we are reasonable citizens, divided by reasonable pluralism, who must
develop just terms of association for our society. How are we to do this? The original
position helps us to see what our considered political convictions commit us to. It models
our ideas of citizens as free and equal, reasonable and rational, and our ideas of fairness,
and so on, and thereby helps us to see what principles of justice “we regard—here and
now—as fair and supported by the best reasons.”
While political constructivism does not attempt to discover the objective truth
about justice, taken in realist terms, when performed properly it does produce results that
are inter-subjectively objective. Inter-subjective objectivity requires a public framework
of thought that: (a) is sufficient to support an idea of judgment, where conclusions can
generated from reasons and evidence after due deliberation; (b) specifies an idea of
correct or reasonable judgment; (c) specifies an order to reasons to be weighed; (d)
distinguishes an “objective” point of view from that of any particular agent or group; and
(e) accounts for agreement in judgment among agents.359 Political constructivism meets
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these requirements. For example, justice as fairness provides a public framework that
meets conditions a-e.
While justice as fairness is Rawls’s favored political conception, there are many
possible political conceptions.360 Rawls does not deny this. The ideas from which
political conceptions are formulated, ideas like free and equal citizens, are open to a
variety of interpretations. These ideas are subject to the burdens of judgment. As there
are many possible ways to interpret these ideas, there are many ways to develop political
conceptions of justice. Rawls identifies Habermas’s discourse conception of legitimacy
and Catholic views of the common good as potential rival conceptions. He requires only
that these views be expressed in terms of political conceptions, that is, that they be
developed as free standing prescriptive models of the basic structure from ideas implicit
or explicit in public political culture. Since principles of justice are constructed from
political conceptions, there are also many possible principles of justice.
Political conceptions can be divided in two groups, liberal and illiberal. Liberal
political conceptions share three features.361 First, they contain a list of basic rights,
liberties and opportunities, such as those commonly found in democratic societies.
Second, they give priority to these rights, liberties and opportunities over, for example,
the common good or perfectionist values. Third, they secure basic social security, by
ensuring that all citizens have all-purpose means sufficient to make use of their freedoms.
Since all of these ideas can be specified in a variety of ways, there are many possible
liberal political conceptions. They may differ in how they specify and order the various
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rights and liberties, or in what form social security is provided, and so on. Political
liberalism does not specify any one liberal political conception as correct.362 Rawls
thinks his favored conception, justice as fairness, has a “special place” in the family of
liberal political conceptions, but there are always several possible political conceptions.
If a few conceptions come to dominate, or if one eventually takes a central role in a
society, still it is always permissible and appropriate to propose new conceptions, to
supplant old conceptions with new ones, and for old conceptions to fade from the public
consciousness.
This is where the liberal principle of legitimacy comes into play.

The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy.

Legitimacy is one of the fundamental political problems faced by democratic
citizens under conditions of reasonable pluralism. Democratic citizens are the free and
equal coauthors of their political order. In this way the coercive power of the state is
always theirs as a collective body. They determine, through their constitutional order,
how and when political power may appropriately be used. A constitutional order is part
of or expressed by a political conception. Reasonable citizens face two related legitimacy
problems. First, many different political conceptions (constitutional orders) are possible
in any given society. Since citizens can reasonably affirm different political conceptions,
under what conditions can the terms of one political conception be legitimately enforced
against all citizens? For instance, we need an account of why the state might enforce
362
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something like justice as fairness, even though it is open to reasonable dissent. Second,
even when citizens affirm the same political conception (constitutional order), they may
disagree about how its content, the basic principles of justice it specifies, are to be
worked out in practice in their actual society. For instance, citizens may agree that each
should have claim to “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties,” but disagree over
whether or not this includes a right to abortion. Thus, the second problem is this: since
citizens may and will reasonably interpret the content of a political conception in more
than one way, under what conditions is it legitimate to enforce one interpretation against
all citizens? Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy is meant to solve both problems.363
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy belongs to his ideal of public reason.364 Public
reason does not apply to all political discussion, but mainly guides public officials—
legislators and executives, candidates for political office, and judges—engaged in
deliberations over constitutional rights and liberties and other matters of basic justice.365
Rawls claims that citizens rarely have the opportunity to vote on fundamental political
issues, so public reason guides citizens mainly in voting for representatives.366 The
theory of legitimacy explains how public reason can generate enforceable laws.
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The liberal principle of legitimacy receives its most complete treatment in IPRR.
The liberal principle of legitimacy holds that
Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the
reasons we would offer for our political actions—were we to state them as
government officials—are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other
citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.367
To these two conditions Rawls adds a majoritarian democratic principle: “on a
constitutional essential or matter of basic justice … the legal enactment expressing the
opinion of the majority is legitimate law.”368 In summary, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy
has three parts: (a) the Reasonableness Condition, (b) the Sufficiency Condition, and (c)
the Majority Principle. My discussions of the Sufficiency Condition and the Majority
Principle are brief, so I will present them first. My discussion of the Reasonableness
Condition takes up most of the remainder of the chapter.

The Sufficiency Condition.

The Sufficiency Condition is in one respect straightforward—we must sincerely
believe that we have adequate justification for the political positions we offer to fellow
citizens in the public square. This is a somewhat open-ended condition, as there is no
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shared public standard for determining what counts as sufficient justification. In many
cases, people may disagree over whether or not sufficient justification actually exists for
various positions. This is not a problem. Such agreement is not necessary for legitimacy.
What is necessary is that the person offering the position to fellow citizens sincerely
believes (and reasonably believes, as the Reasonableness Condition holds) that she has
sufficient justification for doing so. How we might know when someone is sincere is not
obvious, for, as we saw in the discussion of Soper, testing sincerity is not an easy thing to
do. Nevertheless, this is part of the Sufficiency Condition.
The Sufficiency Condition also requires that political conceptions be
“complete.”369 A complete political conception describes principles, standards, and
ideals, and guidelines of inquiry, that are sufficient to generate and unify a determinate
order of values that gives reasonable answers to most questions involving constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice. Justice as fairness is well-worked out and might
be regarded as more or less complete. Completeness is significant for two reasons. First,
when some citizen’s political values are seen as unified by a political conception, and not
viewed separately, it is evident to other citizens that the political values are not being
distorted by any comprehensive doctrine. Any order of political values so distorted is
clearly unreasonable. This is one of the consequences of the burdens of judgment. An
order of political values may mirror the order generated by any comprehensive doctrine,
without losing its claim to reasonableness, as long as the order in question is also
demonstrably supported by a political conception. Second, an incomplete political
conception does not provide a sufficient framework for public discussion of fundamental
369
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political issues. A political conception is supposed to make it possible for reasonable
citizens to resolve such issues without appeal to comprehensive doctrines. A complete
political conception provides all of the basic values necessary for such political
resolutions.
It does not seem plausible, though, to think that most citizens have or ever will
have a complete political conception. One might defend Rawls by pointing out that he
holds that the liberal principle of legitimacy does not apply to all political discourse, but
is meant mainly as a constraint on discussion and action regarding constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice that occurs in what Rawls calls the public political
forum.370 This forum consists of the discourse and action of judges (especially supreme
courts justices), of government officials (especially legislators and the executive), and of
candidates for public office (in particular when they make public political statements).
Constitutional essentials have to do with e.g. what political rights and liberties could
reasonably be included in a written constitution, and matters of basic justice have to do
with questions of basic economic and social justice not covered in the constitution.371
The principle applies only indirectly to citizens, mainly in their selection of public
officials.372 Thus, it might be sufficient if public officials have complete political
conceptions, even if citizens do not.
But this issue is not clear. Citizens do have an important role to play, even if they
do not get to vote on the most fundamental political issues. Citizens realize the ideal of
370
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public reason by holding government officials to it.373 Ideally, citizens should think of
themselves as if they were public officials: they should “ask themselves what statutes,
supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most
reasonable to enact.” When citizens generally start to see themselves as ideal legislators,
they will reject public officials who ignore public reason. If citizens do not do this, their
democracy will lose its strength and vitality. Does this role require citizens to have
complete political conceptions? It is hard to see how they could ask themselves what
statutes are best supported by what reasons without one. This seems to require that
citizens have some more or less well-worked out political conception.

The Majority Principle.

Rawls’s theory of legitimacy holds that when we are resolving a dispute over a
constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, “the legal enactment expressing the
opinion of the majority is legitimate law” (provided that citizens and the relevant public
officials have followed public reason).374 This is clear enough, but one might well ask
how Rawls can justify this appeal to majoritarian democracy. There is a regress problem
here. Democratic institutional design is an issue subject to the burdens of judgment.
Thus, there are several decision procedures that might reasonably claim to be
“democratic.” We have to decide which of these possible democratic decision
procedures can legitimately be used to resolve disagreements. But how can we make this
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decision? Our decision on this issue will not be legitimate, unless it results from a
decision procedure that is itself legitimate. But this just pushes the problem back a step.
So it is not clear why Rawls thinks we can regard any particular democratic decision
procedure as a legitimate means of resolving disagreements. It is certainly not obvious
why he thinks it is safe to assume majoritarian democracy.

A Common Misreading of The Reasonableness Condition: The Consensus Reading.

The Reasonableness Condition requires that citizens, when attempting to resolve
disagreements over constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice, appeal only to
reasons that “may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those
actions.”375 This is one aspect of Rawls’s familiar commitment to reciprocity.376 By
honoring this requirement, citizens show the proper kind of respect for one another. This
solves part of the problem of legitimacy by requiring that the constitution of political
authority be acceptable to all members of the body politic, from an appropriate and
shared moral point of view. Distinct political actions should be acceptable to all as at
least consistent with that authority, even if some see the action as unwise, unjust, etc., and
express this view by voting against certain measures or candidates.
Before discussing the Reasonableness Condition in more detail, it will be helpful
to describe and dismiss one common misreading of Rawls’s principle of legitimacy.
Rawls is often read as insisting that legitimacy requires constitutional essentials no
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reasonable person could reasonably reject. I will refer to this misreading as the
Consensus Reading in what follows. Commentators who hold this view think that
Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy requires that we find a liberal political conception
that all reasonable citizens would converge on and affirm without reservation, i.e., one
that is somehow immune to the burdens of judgment and thus free from what I earlier
referred to as liberal pluralism. This would be a very demanding theory of legitimacy,
one that is similar in ways to Scanlon’s moral philosophy.377 On the Consensus Reading,
the liberal principle of legitimacy requires citizens, when voting or acting as public
officials, to act from principles they could justify in terms others could not reasonably
reject. It requires us to find reasons somehow immune to the burdens, that are somehow
free from reasonable disagreement. It should be clear from what I have already said that
this is not actually Rawls’s view of legitimacy. But this Consensus Reading is attributed
to Rawls by many prominent political theorists, including Jeffrey Stout, Joseph Raz, Kent
Greenawalt, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.378 Since this misreading has taken on a life of its
own, I want to spend a little time showing that it is not actually Rawls’s view. I will
describe two exegetical problems with the Consensus Reading, and reject two potential
sources of support. After that, I will offer a better reading of the Reasonableness
Condition.
First, Rawls does not say that legitimacy requires constitutional essentials no
reasonable person could reasonably reject. His statements are ambiguous.379 For
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instance, in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” he says that legitimacy requires that
“we sincerely believe the reasons we would offer for our political actions … are
sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might reasonably accept those
reasons” (my emphasis).380 This can be read several ways. The Consensus Reading
describes one way. But Rawls could be asking for something less: reasons any (and thus
every) person could reasonably affirm, that is, that it would not be unreasonable to
affirm. This reading describes a less demanding theory. I believe this is his view, but for
now I just want to establish that he does not use the language of the Consensus Reading.
Second, the Consensus Reading contradicts Rawls’s claims about reasonable
disagreement and the burdens of judgment.381 These ideas are central to his work, so this
is exegetically troubling. This problem can be demonstrated in many ways. I will give
one example, which has to do with the implementation of democratic decision
procedures.382
In democratic societies, Rawls says, legitimacy requires a liberal constitution.383
Minimally, liberal constitutions assign basic and familiar rights and opportunities to
individuals, give them priority over the common good and perfectionist values, and
secure their effectiveness with adequate social security. But citizens who share these
commitments will still disagree over many issues, e.g., how to specify and order the
380
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rights and opportunities.384 Rawls says such disagreements should be resolved
democratically, because this is most faithful to the ideal of citizens sharing ultimate
political authority.385 But even if we agree, we face more questions. For instance, which
procedures best satisfy this condition? Does shared authority require winner-take-all
democracy or proportional representation? Some argue that the latter is most consistent
with shared authority, others that the former is, and still others that the former could be,
in the context of certain prohibitions on gerrymandering. In any case, every reasoned
answer depends on abstract value judgments, e.g., how to describe and order freedom and
equality, and solutions to complex empirical issues, e.g., how the drawing of districts
affects the representation of minority groups in elections. Here the Consensus Reading
founders.
Democratic decision procedures are constitutional essentials, so, on the
Consensus Reading, legitimacy requires procedures no reasonable person could
reasonably reject. Otherwise citizens could claim the outcomes were illegitimate. But
Rawls’s view is that questions like this, which involve judgments about abstract values
and complex empirical situations, are subject to the burdens of judgment.386 The burdens
explain how thoughtful and sincere individuals can arrive at different answers to such
questions, and why these differences always exist in free societies. They apply
paradigmatically to disagreements over comprehensive doctrines, but also to questions of

384

IPRR, p. 141.
Rawls also thinks democratic decision procedures are necessary because they most reliably produce
nearly just outcomes.
386
PL, pp. 54-58; JF, pp. 35-37.
385

266

constitutional design.387 When the burdens of judgment apply to a question, every
answer could be reasonably rejected (even if they could also be unreasonably rejected).
This is just what Rawls means by the burdens of judgment and reasonable
disagreement.388 This illustrates a family of problems for the Consensus Reading,
because the issue of democratic design involves many questions over which citizens will
reasonably disagree.389 In fact, the explication and implementation of all constitutional
essentials will involve such reasonable disputes. The Consensus Reading has Rawls
insisting on consensus in situations he identifies as those where consensus will never
appear.
Still, some things Rawls says appear to support the Consensus Reading. First, he
seems to use its strong language in TJ. Second, he cites approvingly T. M. Scanlon’s
work, and Scanlon clearly uses language like that of the Consensus Reading.390 In fact,
neither case actually supports it.
Rawls’s search for unanimous agreement in TJ appears to support the Consensus
Reading. His goal is to find principles of justice appropriate for democratic societies. An
appropriate principle is one that would be accepted by parties suitably situated behind his
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veil of ignorance.391 This is his “original position.” The agents behind the veil are
moved by rational self-interest and seek principles all could agree to.392 They express our
sense of the rational.393 The veil models our sense of the reasonable, our willingness to
advance fair principles of justice, by removing from consideration factors that might
improperly influence us.394 In TJ, Rawls develops one version of the original position
argument that he believes all citizens could reasonably affirm. In fact, he thinks it is the
most reasonable conception of justice for a liberal democracy. He develops a conception
of citizens from ideas found in the public political culture of a democracy. These form
the basis of his construction of the agents and the veil. From this perspective, he feels,
his two principles would meet unanimous consent. But if we find his substantive
principles too at odds with our moral convictions, we should not reject his approach.
Instead, we should adjust the original position argument, by reconstructing the veil, the
agents, or both, until we find an arrangement of them, and principles they support, that
fits our convictions. He seems to think that, in the end, some version of the original
position argument will produce principles of justice that (nearly) all citizens would (in
fact) affirm, even if they could (in principle) be reasonably rejected.395 Rawls says we
just need the right construction of the argument.
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Then why think the Consensus Reading mistaken? In TJ, Rawls’s concern is
justice; in most of his post-1980 work, it is legitimacy.396 These are different virtues
states might possess, and are subject to different evaluative standards.397 Rawls holds
that justice as fairness best answers the question of what justice requires, but he admits it
is just one possible answer.398 What if people disagree? We must make some laws. Can
we do this legitimately? Much of his post-1980 work deals with these problems.
Rawls’s claims in TJ do not support the Consensus Reading.
Rawls’s appeal to Scanlon’s work seems to provide a second reason for affirming
the Consensus Reading, since Scanlon uses the “could not reasonably reject” language.399
But this support is only apparent. Rawls appeals to Scanlon when discussing what Rawls
calls the “reasonable,” our willingness and desire to find fair terms of cooperation and to
offer justifications for action others might accept.400 What Rawls does here is explain
one of our two moral powers, not offer a principle of legitimacy. In fact, it is reasonable
to think many of our desires will never be wholly satisfied. We may desire to find
justifications for political action that no reasonable person could reasonably reject, but be
forced by the burdens of judgment to settle for justifications reasonable persons could
reasonably affirm. This seems most consistent with Rawls’s view that it is unreasonable
to deny the burdens of judgment and the reasonable pluralism that results.401
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A Shared Reason Reading of the Reasonableness Condition.

Rawls’s view is a shared reason account of legitimate state power. Following
Kant and Soper, Rawls does not insist that citizens converge on some particular liberal
conception of justice, or that they find one that no reasonable person could reasonably
reject. Such a requirement is simply unrealistic. What Rawls does with his liberal
principle of legitimacy is to apply Soper’s generic understanding of the law’s normative
force to the liberal democratic political context. It is enough if public officials treat all
citizens with a certain kind of respect, a respect that is captured by reciprocity in
advantage and reciprocity in justification. Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is thus less
demanding, and more plausible, than many suppose. This relaxed version of reciprocity
is the heart of Rawls’s account of shared reason, and the core of his Reasonable
Condition. Roughly put, public officials in a democracy show respect for democratic
citizens when they base their political activity (regarding, in particular, constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice) on the liberal political conception they judge best,
because doing so responds to the requirements of reciprocity in advantage and reciprocity
in justification.
When public officials in a democracy base their political activity on the liberal
political conception each judges most appropriate, public officials show respect for
citizens by fulfilling the requirements of reciprocity in advantage and reciprocity in
justification. For example, Rawls insists that the basic structure is the first subject of
justice, because this network of institutions deeply affects people’s characters, plans and
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aspirations, and prospects, and because it can protect the background conditions of
justice, by keeping inequalities in wealth and property from getting large enough to
threaten poor citizens’ political liberties. This is a kind of reciprocity in advantage—
citizens would have little reason to affirm the law if it ignored their interests altogether,
or was obviously insufficient as a means of protecting those interests. And he insists that
only liberal political conceptions are reasonable. For instance, he holds that it is not
reasonable to believe that liberal democratic citizens could accept a political conception
that put some citizens’ perfectionist values ahead of the individual liberties of all citizens.
And it is not reasonable to believe that such citizens could accept a political conception
that did not guarantee the effectiveness of their rights and opportunities with some form
of social security. This again is reciprocity in advantage. But he also insists on
reciprocity in justification. For instance, he insists that the ideas used to develop political
conceptions be drawn from the public political culture of a liberal democracy, because
(he holds) these are ideas shared by citizens committed to liberal democracy (i.e., by
those individuals whose common commitments quite literally constitute their liberal
democratic body politic). It is wrong for a person to include in her political conception
her controversial comprehensive commitments, because it is unreasonable for her to
believe that every reasonable person would accept such a conception, given the obvious
fact that many citizens reasonably reject her comprehensive doctrine. This is reciprocity
in justification. But while appeal to public reasons is necessary, it is not sufficient to
demonstrate sincerity. This requires that public reasons be drawn together into a moreor-less coherent whole (i.e., a conception of the whole basic structure).402 If an official in
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were to appeal to public reasons willy-nilly, citizens might regard her behavior as simply
opportunistic. Here we find another idea that Rawls takes from Soper. Soper argues that
officials sincerely committed to the justice of their law can do more than simply give
public reasons in defense of it—they can also explain why they offer the particular public
reasons they do, by explaining how these reasons fit into some larger understanding of
the common good. For Rawls, officials do this by being prepared to show that the public
reasons they invoke are firmly rooted in their own favored political conceptions of
justice. This is necessary for reciprocity in justification.
Thus, when officials in a liberal democracy base their political activity on a liberal
political conception, citizens have good reason to think their officials are sincerely
committed to justice and the common good. Of course, some citizens will always see
their constitution and laws as suboptimal in ways—as not the most just, or not the most
reasonable—but their normative authority does not depend on such agreement. The
constitution, and laws enacted pursuant to it, deserve moral respect when they are
reasonably seen as rooted in shared democratic ideals, that is, when they are linked to
some liberal conception of democratic justice. When laws are generated in this way, the
process respects all citizens as citizens, through reciprocity in justification and reciprocity
in advantage. Further, it results in laws that at least approximate liberal justice. This is
the most that we can expect of shared reason under the conditions of reasonable
disagreement and dissent that we face in modern liberal democracies.
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A Challenge to Rawls’s Reasonableness Condition: Only Liberal Political Conceptions
are Reasonable?

Rawls holds that only liberal political conceptions meet the demands of his liberal
principle of legitimacy. This means that only liberal political conceptions of justice may
reasonably be offered by citizens to others understood as free and equal. Only liberal
conceptions can be offered by citizens in the right spirit, that is, as reasonable terms that
respect citizens in the right ways (reciprocity in justification and advantage). Rawls’s
view is not troubling insofar as it rules out extremely illiberal conceptions of justice, for
instance, a new Nazi regime or a slave society, which reject the very idea of citizens as
free and equal and deserving of respect. But Rawls also seeks to rule out as unreasonable
less extreme views, like Libertarianism, Marxism, and Communitarianism. He rejects
Libertarianism as unreasonable, because it does not take seriously the idea that the basic
structure is the first subject of justice. He rejects Marxism and Communitarianism as
unreasonable, because these views give priority to the good over the right. What is not
clear is just what sort of mistake Rawls thinks that each makes. Why are these issues
over which reasonable citizens cannot reasonably disagree?403
Rawls rejects libertarianism as unreasonable because libertarians do not take
seriously the idea that the basic social structure is the first subject of justice. But exactly
why this makes libertarianism unreasonable is not clear. Rawls could be claiming that
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libertarianism is unreasonable because it is based on a simple error.404 Libertarian
principles of justice govern the acquisition and transfer of holdings. People are entitled
to hold whatever they obtain without violating these principles. If we start from a state of
nature where the existing distribution is just, then all future distributions are just as long
as everyone follows the rules. Rawls’s problem with this could be the libertarian reliance
on the initial state of nature. Why think that initial distribution was just or unjust? Here
the libertarian seems to need an account of the basic social structure. When the
libertarian rejects this, he makes a simple mistake. The problem with this, as Reidy
points out, is that its hard to see what the mistake is here. If we need a basic social
structure, then it is a mistake to reject it. But libertarians like Hayek and Nozick seem to
reject the idea that we need a basic social structure in the first place, or even that there is
any sense to talking about distributive justice as a virtue of social systems taken
holistically in the first place. What is the simple error here? Given the burdens of
judgment, there is no reason to think the libertarian makes such an error. Why then it
libertarianism unreasonable?
There is another way of reading the problem. We can see Rawls’s dispute with
the libertarian as what I call a good faith disagreement, a disagreement rooted in the
burdens of judgment. However, it may not be what Rawls calls a reasonable
disagreement. That is, it is not one that occurs between citizens who share a commitment
to democracy. The libertarian view is not founded on a simple mistake, but it is
nevertheless unreasonable. That is, Rawls might see generic liberalism (the family of
liberal political conceptions) as the dividing line between democratic and other forms of
404
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government. I think this is how Freeman reads Rawls’s rejection of libertarianism.405
What is not clear is how Rawls might justify this dividing line.
It is not obvious that libertarianism is inconsistent with democracy. Nozick does
reject democracy in the “Demoktesis” in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.406 And Nozick’s
libertarian project seems inconsistent with Rawls’s liberal one. Libertarianism is rooted
in an ideal of persons as free individuals who own themselves and their assets and
cooperate only on the basis of private contracts. Rawls rejects voluntaristic accounts of
political society. His liberalism is based on an ideal of persons as free and equal citizens
permanently engaged in a cooperative activity that is structured by reciprocity. Political
society is not something we can join or opt-out of. So if the only reasonable conception
of democracy is Rawls’s, then libertarianism is unreasonable. But there is no reason to
think that Rawls’s conception of democracy is the only reasonable one. To make good
on the claim that libertarianism is inconsistent with democracy, we would have to show
that libertarianism is inconsistent with democracy simpliciter. But I do not believe that
this is the case. That is, if a libertarian argued that libertarianism is consistent with some
form of democracy, it is not obvious to me that he would be wrong. I cannot see any
reason to say, before looking at the argument, that he must be mistaken.
Rawls could be arguing that libertarianism is not consistent with liberal
democracy (even if it could be consistent with some understandings of democracy). This
strategy is suggested by some of what Rawls says about inequalities and the possibility of
democracy. Vast inequalities in wealth undermine fair equality of opportunity, the fair
405
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value of political liberties, and so on.407 If we ignore vast inequalities, and the way these
affect people’s prospects in life, we do not take seriously the idea of society as a fair
system of cooperation.408 A person’s self-understanding is deeply influenced by the
public’s understanding of the social institutions of the society in which he is born. In
societies where huge inequalities are allowed, it is difficult for people to come to see
themselves as free and equal citizens, and those low on the social ladder have little reason
to be hopeful or optimistic about their own life prospects.409 This is not to say that
libertarianism does not treat people as free and equal, but that it does not do so in a way
that is consistent with the democratic values implicitly expressed in our public political
culture.
According to this argument, libertarians can, in good faith, reject democracy for
philosophical or moral reasons, but they cannot do so reasonably, because the reasonable
implies a commitment to liberal democracy. Unfortunately, if this is Rawls’s strategy, it
is not a good one. It amounts to nothing more than the claim that libertarians reject
liberalism. But we already know this.
So it is not clear that Rawls has good reason to reject libertarianism as
unreasonable. The different arguments that he might make for this claim seem vulnerable
to reasonable disagreement or otherwise very weak. This problem and others like it
suggest that Rawls’s view does not adequately deal with the scope of the burdens of
judgment. His view seems too demanding.
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Similar problems arise for Rawls’s rejection of Marxist and communitarian views.
He rejects these views as unreasonable because they give priority to the right over the
good, but it is not clear why he thinks this makes them unreasonable. Rawls could hold
that it is a simple mistake to give priority to the good over the right. But, once again, it is
not clear just what the simple mistake is. Disagreements over whether the good or the
right has priority are better understood as rooted in the burdens of judgment, and not as
based on simple factual or logical errors. Alternatively, he could hold that views that
give priority to the good are not consistent with democracy simpliciter. But, again, this
hardly seems plausible. The only strategy left seems to be arguing that Marxist and
communitarian views are unreasonable because they are not liberal. Of course, this is not
satisfying either.
In the end, it is not clear why the problems Rawls has with libertarianism,
Marxism, and communitarianism, should be taken as evidence that these views are
unreasonable. It seems like the disagreement between liberals and libertarians over the
basic structure, and the disagreement between liberals and Marxists and communitarians
over the priority of the good and the right, are best understood as disagreements rooted in
the burdens of judgment. On my view, this makes them good faith disagreements. I
think Rawls sees these disagreements as rooted in the burdens of judgment too, but that
he does not see them as reasonable disagreements. What I do not see is how Rawls can
justify this.
There is one more possibility that we can consider. Rawls holds that every body
politic is literally constituted by those individuals who share certain fundamental values
and norms, which define the offices and positions of political authority in a political
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system, their attached right and duties, and so on. This is the root or institutional
meaning of constitutionalism. Rawls also draws on Hart’s understanding of rules. Rulegoverned behavior is more than regular, patterned of behavior; it is better understood as
an internal attitude toward patterns of behavior. Rawls could be rejecting libertarian,
Marxist, and communitarian views because the people who hold these views simply do
not share the fundamental norms and values that are held by people who affirm liberal
democracy. That is, Rawls may think that liberals and libertarians share some values,
e.g., a commitment to citizens as free and equal, but that they do not ultimately share the
kinds of values that would allow them to constitute themselves as a body politic that is
just, legitimate, and stable. Libertarians are, in this sense, “foreign” to liberals. And
Rawls may think that liberals do share some values with Marxists and communitarians,
but that these groups do not ultimately share the kinds of values that would allow them to
constitute themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable body politic. Marxists and
communitarians are also foreign to liberals. Rawls may think that libertarians, Marxists,
and communitarians simply live outside of the liberal community of value. From this
perspective, it could be the case that his problem with libertarianism, Marxism, and
communitarianism is that they are not liberal.
If this explanation is correct, we should read the arguments that Rawls offers in
defense of his political liberalism as aimed specifically at his reasonable (i.e., liberal
democratic) citizens, and not at citizens as such (i.e., all those people who happen to have
political membership in a liberal democracy). From the perspective of those committed
to liberal democracy, libertarians, communitarians and Marxists are unreasonable. They
insist on values not shared by individuals committed to liberal democracy. These
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unreasonable views are not based on simple errors, but those who affirm them remove
themselves from the liberal democratic community. This is significant, because citizens
as such cannot constitute a liberal democracy. A liberal democracy can only be
constituted by citizens who share liberal democratic values. It is not clear if citizens as
such can constitute a body politic at all, insofar as they do not share the values that might
make this possible. Rawls might think it is simply not possible for them to do so.
Does this reading imply that Rawls is simply assuming the legitimacy of liberal
constitutional democracy? In a way, yes. In IPRR he holds that “a reasonable doctrine
accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.”410
What he is trying to understand is how citizens committed to liberal democracy can see
their law as legitimate in the face of both reasonable pluralism and liberal pluralism. But
the reading I am suggesting now does not require Rawls to assume that liberal democratic
values are immune to the burdens of judgment, that is, that there are not good faith
disagreements about whether the basic structure really is the first subject of justice, or
whether the right really does have priority over the good. What he seems to be assuming
is that citizens committed to liberal democracy form a community that is in important
ways distinct from the communities of libertarians and the communities of Marxists and
communitarians. This again is not the same as assuming that liberal democracy is
legitimate. It is, rather, to assume that liberals form a community apart from these others.
In a way, this is similar to Rawls’s approach to the problem of international
relations in The Law of Peoples. There Rawls develops “laws” meant to regulate
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relationships between different societies in the global community. But when he develops
these laws, he does not ask what terms of association all societies would adopt. Rather,
he begins by asking what terms of association all liberal democratic societies would
adopt as properly regulating international relations between societies. He then wonders if
other types of societies might not also adopt these terms of association. Perhaps Rawls’s
arguments in political liberalism are aimed simply at his reasonable (i.e., liberal
democratic) citizens.
In the end, I am not sure if this is Rawls’s view. I think it is one way to
understand his rejection of libertarianism, Marxism, and communitarianism. If this view
is correct, Rawls does not hold that his generic liberalism is immune to the burdens of
judgment, but he nevertheless does hold that reasonable citizens do not reject it.

A Plurality of Legitimacy Theories?

One problem Rawls’s theory of legitimacy faces is the possibility of an
incompatible plurality of theories of legitimacy. His theory is based on his conceptions
of shared ideas implicit in our public political culture (e.g., free and equal citizens,
reciprocity), roughly those that support his favored political conception, justice as
fairness. But Rawls insists that there are many reasonable ways to describe these shared
ideas. They are subject to the burdens of judgment. This suggests that it is possible to
have good faith disagreements over theories of legitimacy. Apparently, one can reject
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy in good faith, and prefer a different one, so long as it is
suitably grounded in some conception of shared democratic ideas. This seems like the
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only approach that respects the burdens of judgment. Rawls insists that reasonable
persons acknowledge the burdens of judgment and accept their consequences for public
justification of solutions to political problems. Thus, reasonable persons must be willing
to accept the fact that different theories of legitimacy will develop in any society, and that
it is not reasonable to expect all citizens to converge on a theory of legitimacy. This
seems to be implied by Rawls’s understanding of reasonable persons, unless some
conceptions of our shared commitments are simply immune to reasonable disagreement.
But this seems unlikely. So Rawls’s view implies a plurality of reasonable and possibly
incompatible theories of legitimacy.
For example, Rawls holds that legitimacy is rooted in reciprocity. On his view,
reciprocity has two aspects, reciprocity in justification, and reciprocity in advantage.
Reciprocity in justification has to do with each person offering reasons others could
reasonably affirm. Reciprocity in advantage has to do with each person benefiting in an
appropriate way from political arrangements. But it is not obvious that this is the only
way to develop a conception of the idea of reciprocity implicit in our political culture.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have developed an idea of reciprocity that is
different from Rawls’s version.411 Rawls ultimately rejects their view, for his purposes at
least, because it is grounded (he claims) in a comprehensive doctrine and is not properly
political, i.e., neutral between competing conceptions of the good.
Reidy has developed an account of legitimacy that draws on Rawls’s theory and
that is, in Rawls’s terms, appropriately political. Reidy narrows Rawls’s idea of
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reciprocity to reciprocity in advantage. Reidy calls his approach Democratic Legitimacy,
to distinguish it from Rawls’s Liberal Legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy is Rawlsian in
spirit, but avoids certain problems by dropping Rawls’s commitment to reciprocity in
justification. It is enough, Reidy says, if we can develop an account of reciprocity in
advantage that does justice to our understanding of democratic citizens as free and equal
and committed to particular comprehensive doctrines.
The point is not that Reidy’s Democratic Legitimacy solves all of our problems,
but that it is a plausible account of legitimacy, in that it is developed from properly
political ideas. It does not depend on any comprehensive commitments, but seems
instead to have the kind of political neutrality that Rawls seeks. What this shows is that it
is possible to develop many “free standing” accounts of legitimacy. The problem is that
it is not obvious how we might decide between them. None of them are free from the
burdens of judgment. Nor are there any publicly recognized methods or standards for
determining if any are true, or which might be regarded as most reasonable. Thus,
Rawlsian political liberalism seems to leave us with an irresolvable legitimacy problem.
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CONCLUSION

“What we affirm, when we align ourselves with democracy, is hesitant, confused
and often in bad faith…. Above all what we deny is that any set of human beings,
because of who or what they simply are, deserve and can be trusted with political
authority. We reject, in the great Leveller formula, redolent of England’s
seventeenth-century Civil War, the claim (or judgement) that any human being
comes into the world with a saddle on their back, or any other booted and spurred
to ride them.”
John Dunn 412

“The utility of moral and political philosophy is to be estimated, not so much by
the commodities we have by knowing these sciences, as by the calamities we
receive by not knowing them.”
Thomas Hobbes 413

A Reasonable Hope for the Future of Liberal Democratic Society?

In this dissertation I have sought to develop and defend an account of the
conditions under which a modern democratic government could rightfully enforce the
law against its citizens, and the nature of any duties that citizens might have to obey or
412
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acquiesce. My account draws on a line of thought that develops through the works of
Hart and Soper and reaches its culmination in Rawls’s political liberalism. Soper’s
generic account of political obligation is a helpful way of thinking about the normativity
of political relations. There is reason to think, though, that this generic account is
inadequate as it stands for a modern liberal democratic context. Rawls’s account of
legitimacy is an advance on Soper’s, insofar as it represents one way to apply Soper’s
generic account to this democratic context. Thus, although I am not sure that Rawls’s
account ultimately succeeds, I think that Rawls is on the right track. I find the
Soper/Rawls line of thought particularly attractive for several reasons. First, it takes
seriously the depth and breadth of good faith disagreement. Second, it respects the
judgment of individuals in a particularly strong way. Third, it is particularly faithful to
the liberal ideal of shared reason. Finally, it offers what Rawls’s might call a reasonable
hope for the future of democratic society.
Good faith disagreements are a fact of social life. The common resources of
human reason are simply inadequate to the task of publicly justifying answers to many of
the most important questions we ask about our individual good and the good of our
society. The burdens of judgment get in the way. Political theory must recognize this
fact. The line of thought I have developed in this dissertation does just that, by putting
good faith disagreements front and center in our thinking. The Soper/Rawls line makes
the law’s normativity a function of a sincere commitment to justice, but it does not
depend on any implausibly strong consensus regarding what justice requires. It requires
only the much weaker notions of reciprocity in justification and reciprocity in advantage.
While Soper never talks explicitly about the liberal democratic context, I have suggested
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one fairly straightforward way of constructing such a Soperian view. On this direct
Soperian reading, we end up with a very generous and open understanding of what public
officials are allowed to affirm in the name of justice. But as we saw, this view may be
too open, as it may allow too much. Rawls has a more narrow understanding of liberal
democratic justice. It is rooted in an ideal of free and equal citizens who, as co-authors of
their law, offer terms of political association to one another that they think those others
might reasonably accept, from their shared moral point of view as citizens. While
Rawls’s view avoids the problems that the Soperian view faces, by developing a robust
understanding of justice appropriate for liberal democracies, it has problems of its own.
In particular, while Rawls’s view of liberal democratic justice makes some room for good
faith disagreement, it is not clear that the room it makes is sufficient to encompass all of
the views of justice that might be held in good faith in any modern liberal democracy,
even if we require that conceptions of justice be couched in political terms. So although
Rawls’s view does not depend on the implausibly strong notion of consensus, which is
correctly rejected by the power friendly theorists, it may still depend on a sort of
consensus that is implausible nonetheless. Nevertheless, I think the Soper/Rawls line
represents a more promising way of handling the issue of good faith disagreement than
does the family of respect for judgment views.
One worry I have about respect for interest views, such as Shapiro’s competitive
democracy, is that they do not make sufficient room, or the right kind of room, for good
faith disagreement. The family of respect for interest views that includes Shapiro’s view
makes the law’s normativity (or the government’s right, or the citizen’s duty) a function
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of some significant shared interest of citizens.414 Shapiro argues that democracy
“deserves our allegiance” because it represents our best chance of minimizing domination
in society. Individual persons face the possibility of domination any time someone else
can threaten their basic interests, which Shapiro defines in terms of the essentials any
person needs to become and survive as an independent agent in the world. Democracy,
in particular Schumpeter’s competitive democracy, reduces the threat of domination by
making politically powerful agents compete for the allegiance of politically weak
individual citizens. Competitive elections give citizens the means to remove from office
elected officials who do not take seriously their basic interests. This gives politicians
incentive to protect these basic interests. While I think there is much that can be said in
favor of Shapiro’s competitive democracy, the reason that I cannot whole-heartedly
affirm it is that there are good faith disagreements over just what our basic interests are,
and, maybe more importantly, over what sorts of democratic decision procedures best
protect and promote those interests. One might think that we can easily resolve such
disagreements over the nature of our basic interests through democratic political
processes themselves, but before we can see the results of any such decision procedure as
authoritative, we would need to overcome the problem of good faith disagreement over
what sorts of democratic decision procedures any society ought to have, even given the
stated goal of protecting basic interests. But it is not obvious how we might do this.
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Respect for interest views all suffer from versions of this problem. And here we
bump up against a worry expressed by Waldron.415 Respect for interest views tend to
reject some people’s considered judgments about their basic interests, or about what form
of democracy best protects those interests, in the name of (as Waldron puts it) some
fancied consensus regarding how to answer these questions. But there is no such
consensus, and we should not pretend that such a consensus is even an achievable goal.
Of course, one might simply reject the idea that consensus plays any important role in the
identification of the relevant normatively significant basic interest, but this puts us in the
position of asserting that some people do not really understand what their basic interests
are, or of admitting that they do understand their basic interests, but that this is irrelevant
to a discussion of the nature of their relationship to the state. Both of these options are
unattractive, in particular because they seem to fail to give sufficient weight to the idea
that people are capable of understanding and determining for themselves how they ought
to live, or to the basic normative ideal that people ought to be free to exercise this
capacity in their actual political lives (i.e., political autonomy is threatened or ignored).
While I reject Simmons’s consent account of political obligation, I think there is
something right in his insistence that political authority (broadly construed) ought to have
some close relationship to the way citizens freely choose to live.
This is one reason that I find the Soper/Rawls line particularly attractive. It
respects the judgments of individuals in a particularly strong way. Not only does it make
room for good faith disagreements over comprehensive doctrines, it also makes room for
good faith disagreements about justice and democracy and other political matters. It does
415

Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Chapter 1.
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not presuppose or assume some consensus about what justice or democracy require, but
instead makes room for each person to express his or her good faith views about these
issues. The views that people actually hold take on a fundamental significance. The free
choices that citizens actually make determine what justice requires, what our basic
interests are, and so on. There are limits to this, of course, and one of the problems with
Rawls’s view in particular is where and how he sets the limits. Nevertheless, individual
judgment is given more room, and a more appropriate place, in respect for judgment
views like Shapiro’s and Rawls’s, than it is in respect for interest views like Shapiro’s or
Buchanan’s.
Another reason that I find the Soper/Rawls line particularly attractive is the way
these views come together to further the liberal ideal of shared reason. Neither Soper nor
Rawls ignores the fact that good faith disagreements deserve a central place in political
theory, but this does not lead either to give up on the idea that terms of political
association might still be shared in some normatively significant sense. They offer
instead a relaxed account of shared reason, that is rooted in reciprocity of justification
and reciprocity in advantage. Rawls sees in the relaxed account of shared reason an
opportunity to make good on the liberal claim that democratic state power is the power of
free and equal citizens as a collective body, in a way that responds as well to freedom of
conscience or political autonomy. This resolves the worry, expressed forcefully by
Wolff, that state power is always immoral because it is simply incompatible with
individual moral autonomy. The relaxed account of shared reason reconciles individual
autonomy with the fact that democratic power must often be exercised under conditions
of good faith disagreement.
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Finally, any theory of justice, political legitimacy, or political obligation must be
concerned (at least instrumentally) with civic virtue.416 Liberalism recognizes that people
have differing views of the value of political participation, and that many citizens are
generally uninterested in political issues. Nevertheless, it is important to maintain what
Rawls calls republicanism.417 The idea here is roughly that certain political virtues need
to be instilled in some minimum number of citizens in order to keep a liberal democratic
society from degenerating into some form of tyranny or fanaticism (e.g., religious or
nationalist). Citizens should recognize a minimal duty to foster and uphold just social
and political institutions. In addition, citizens should develop what Kymlicka calls the
virtue of “civility” or “decency.”418 Minimally this requires that citizens generally do not
break the law, or harm others, and so on. It also requires that we treat other citizens as
free and equal citizens.
Much more could be said about civic virtue, but I do not intend to develop and
defend any robust account of it here. My point in raising this issue is to indicate one way
that I think the Soper/Rawls line is superior to Shapiro’s view. Republicanism and
civility are instrumentally necessary for the maintenance of any decent democratic
political order. But we have reason to worry about whether or not citizens would
willingly affirm and support democracy under the conditions described by Shapiro. He
hardly presents an attractive vision of democracy. This is not a problem for all respect
416

For an introduction to the issue of civic virtue, see, e.g., Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Theory, pp.
299-312.
417
This is not a form of perfectionism. Perfectionist theories argue that civic virtue is necessary because
this sort of political activity is essential for the realization of some significant component of the human
good. I do not find perfectionism compelling. My interest in civic virtue is instrumental. I am mainly
concerned with the minimal conditions necessary for the promulgation of a decent liberal democratic
society.
418
Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Theory, p. 300.
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for interest views. It is a problem for Shapiro because he presents a fairly grim account
of what it is reasonable for us to hope for from a democratic society. Justice has little to
no role to play in his proposed democratic society, even as a regulative ideal. The best
that the majority of us can reasonably hope for is that we will not be dominated by those
who wield political power. This is better than nothing, I suppose, but it is hardly
inspiring. We do not need to be inspired, of course, to develop civic virtues, but
Shapiro’s dim assessment makes me doubt that his democratic society would find much
support at all among citizens. He may be correct when he says that many people around
the world aspire to have democracy largely because it represents their best chance at
avoiding domination. However, it does not seem unreasonable to think that people in
other democratic societies, where the worst sorts of domination have been relegated to
the past, might hope for more than this from their democratic society. We might prize
democracy initially because it protects us, but once we have achieved that aim, is it
wrong to hope that democracy might also bring something more?
The Soper/Rawls line presents a more hopeful vision of the future of democracy
than does Shapiro’s view. Even the straightforward Soperian understanding of
democratic political authority does better than Shapiro’s view on this measure. For in
Soper’s proposed society, officials are at least guided by their own understanding of the
common good. This is what gives their political activity its distinctively moral character,
and what gives citizens reason to respect it, at least a little bit. In Shapiro’s democracy,
the law can be made to serve any private interests whatsoever, just as long as citizens
maintain the means to “throw the bums out” when they deem it necessary. In the
Soper/Rawls version of democracy, the law is made to serve justice and the common
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good. This gives citizens a reason to affirm the Soperian/Rawlsian society that is simply
missing from Shapiro’s democracy.
In the end, I agree with Dunn when he says that our commitment to democracy is
often hesitant and confused, because it is fairly clear that We, the People, do not hope for
the same things from our democratic society. We agree, of course, that people are free
and equal, but this agreement does not get us very far. We disagree at the deepest levels
over what these ideals commit us to, and over how a democratic society committed to
these ideals ought to be organized. But I believe that if we all seek justice in our
democratic political order, even though we know that there is no real hope that we will
reach a consensus on what justice requires, what we will achieve instead is a political
order society that is legitimate, that is comprised of genuinely authoritative relations of
authority between citizens and their democratic state. In this way we can avoid the
calamities that so worried Hobbes, the chief of which, in his estimation, was a society
divided against itself, a society in a state of civil war.419

Moving Forward.

I want to end this dissertation by briefly describing two directions for further
research that develop out of this project. First, despite my worries about Soper’s and
Rawls’s views, I think this line of thought is a helpful way of thinking about political
authority in modern liberal democracies. I am not convinced that the generic Soperian
account of political obligation works for a liberal democracy, nor am I convinced that
419

Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, p. 10.
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Rawls’s effort to apply Soper’s generic view to the context of liberal democratic political
culture is entirely successful. However, I do think that Soper and Rawls are on the right
track, so one of my projects for the future will be to develop an account of liberal
democratic political authority in the Soper/Rawls line. One way to do this might be
simply to find a better way to apply Soper’s generic account to the liberal democratic
context.
Second, I ended Chapter 4 with the suggestion that, because of the burdens of
judgment, we might be faced with an irresolvable plurality of legitimacy theories. This
gives us reason to worry about the possibility of there being a legitimate democratic state.
Nevertheless, the prospect of such an irreconcilable plurality need not be the end of the
road for the Soper/Rawls line. Most theorists recognize a distinction between legitimacy
and justice.420 These are different virtues that a state or the law might possess. Justice
refers, in the broadest sense, to some appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens
(however defined) among the morally significant entities (e.g., individuals, associations,
peoples) in a society (domestic or global). Political legitimacy refers to a state’s right to
use coercive force against its citizens to compel obedience to its laws. Most believe
justice and legitimacy vary somewhat independently of each other. The upshot is that it
may be legitimate to enforce appropriately enacted but unjust laws, and illegitimate to
enforce just laws that are not enacted properly. For instance, one might argue that current
laws against same-sex marriage are legitimate, insofar as they have been properly
enacted, but unjust, as they fail to treat people equally, or to properly respect liberty
rights. Or one might argue that justice requires a more equitable distribution of wealth in
420
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(for instance) the U.S., but that it would be illegitimate to do this by executive order
without legislative input, or by overthrowing the current government and placing society
under the care of some bureau of benevolent guardians.
With this in mind, perhaps Soper and Rawls make a mistake when they insist that
a sincere commitment to the justice of the law is sufficient to generate the law’s
normative force. It might more appropriate, all-things-considered, to see the justice claim
as one, but not the only, necessary condition. The other condition might be the sincere
conviction that the just law is also legitimate. Since we recognize a distinction between
justice and legitimacy, and we have resources available to support claims to each, we
might want to insist that public officials show a sincere commitment to both. Thus, a
citizen may have good moral reason to respect the law only when government officials
sincerely hold that the law is both just and legitimate, even if the citizen disagrees with
the normative evaluations of the officials in question. What I am suggesting is that a
sincere claim that the law is legitimate might deserve respect in the same way that the
sincere claim that the law is just merits respect.
How does this help us? It offers a more complete account of respect for the law,
and it makes room for good faith disagreements over what legitimacy requires. We
recognize that it is sometimes illegitimate to coercively enforce just laws. What, then,
determines when citizens ought to respect the law? We could require government
officials to make both the justice and legitimacy claims. This is important for two
reasons. First, since legitimacy and justice vary somewhat independently, citizens cannot
tell from either the justice or the legitimacy claim alone if the law merits respect.
Citizens can only know that the law merits respect when officials sincerely make both the
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justice claim and the legitimacy claim. Here something like Soper’s sincerity condition
comes into play, but we must now judge sincerity according to two normatively
significant measures, justice and legitimacy. Second, the exercise of government power
in the name of justice, when it is not exercised legitimately, amounts to an abuse of
government power. The sincere commitment of government officials to both justice and
legitimacy might resolve this problem, and so it seems that both a commitment to justice
and to legitimacy are needed as constraints on the appropriate use of state power.
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